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THE HINDU VIEW OF WORLD HISTORY ACCORDING TO THE PURĀṆAS

By Henry R. Zimmer
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Viṣṇu, the god-maintainer of the universe in Hindu mythology and also its creator, through being the primary substantial source wherefrom the universe and its creatures ultimately proceed, bears, among other names, the epithet *Murāri* (the enemy, conqueror, or killer of Mura). This epithet is one of the most common among the many names of Viṣṇu, yet the event to which it refers, the story of how he slew Mura and wherefore the latter met his doom, is almost covered with oblivion. The killing of Mura does not figure among the many tales constituting the classic sequence of Viṣṇu's cosmic exploits and heroic deeds on which the Hindu Sacred Traditions of Old (*purāṇa*) invariably dwell in relating the mythical history of the universe. This history, interwoven with the manifestations (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu, is a chain of ever renewed strife between the gods (*sura, deva*) and the antigods (demons or titans: *asura, daitya, dānava*) which results in periodical crises and downfalls of the rule of the gods, and its restoration through the miraculous interference of the Supreme Being in the form of Viṣṇu or Śiva.[1]

Yet the story of Mura can be traced, and is worth being rescued from oblivion.[2] It contains, condensed in a nutshell, one of the prin-

1. I know of no dictionary or handbook giving substantial information on Mura and his encounter with Viṣṇu. E. W. Hopkins, *Epic Mythology*, lists the names Mura and Muru four times without recording any details. V. S. Apte's *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, which, in the absence of a dictionary covering the mythology of the *Purāṇas*, supplies much basic data on figures and episodes of later Hindu mythology, reveals but the general lack of knowledge of details of the Mura myth through its reticent and partly incorrect statements, "Mura: a demon slain by Kṛṣṇa," and "Murāri: an epithet of Kṛṣṇa." The deed of slaying Mura, however, does not fall to the share of Kṛṣṇa, the tenth avatar of Viṣṇu, born as a human savior of the Yadu clan in the feudal age of India; it belongs to an early period of the mythical era of the universe. It figures nowhere in the popular and well-known Kṛṣṇa legend. Apparently, through remaining isolated it was somehow lost from sight, not being linked up with one of Viṣṇu's avatars or a major cycle of the god's deeds.

2. E.g., in *Vāmana-purāṇa* (Veṅkaṭeśvara Press, Bombay) ch. 60, "The Life and Deeds of the Demon Mura (*Muradānavacarita*), ch. 61, "The Slaughter of the Demon Mura" (*Muradānavavadha*). Here Mura's story is told to explain Viṣṇu's epithet *Murāri*. The divine saint Pulastya, one of the mind-born sons of Brahmā, enacting the role of the spiritual teacher by imparting the contents of Vāmana-

cipal motifs with which Hindu mythology of the Purāṇas is concerned throughout, and which commands a lasting interest. The story of Mura leads straight back into the beginnings of time, Mura being styled the "own son" (*aurasa putra*) of Kaśyapa, the ancient "Tortoise Man," who through his various wives, gave birth to the gods and demons as well as to various other kinds of beings.[3] It implies the remarkable fact that, at this early period of the universe, neither the gods nor their rivals for supremacy, the demons, had yet achieved immortality. For, thus the tale starts, when, in the struggle between the two rival groups of superhuman beings aiming at world domination, Mura saw the demons shattered, he was seized with fear of death (*maraṇād bhīta*). He flew away to a solitary place in the wilderness, where he devoted all his energies to severe asceticism. By prolonged and fierce austerities he accumulated fiery strength and, through this usual method of self-inflicted penances for gaining an overwhelming status of power, he reached the goal of pleasing Brahmā. He forced the all-pervading guardian of the universe to manifest before him, and extracted from him the offer of a boon. And this was his demand: "Whomsoever I may touch with the palm of my hand in battle, by the mere touch of my hand he shall die even though he be immortal."

Brahmā cannot but grant the demon's wish. Here, as elsewhere in innumerable parallel situations of Hindu mythology, Brahmā, though, in his heart of hearts, constantly siding with the gods and assisting them with his advice, remains strictly impartial. Representing the supreme consciousness of the world-organism, he cannot but be aware

purāṇa to the divine saint Nārada, by using this epithet arouses the curiosity of the latter, who apparently knows as little of Mura as is generally known of this remarkable adversary of the Supreme Being. Nārada interrupts Pulastya in one of his tales of how the gods, led by Brahmā and Indra, once resorted to the "abode of Murāri," in search of advice and help in one of their ever recurring mythical difficulties, by asking, "Who is this Murāri?" Having been told it is Viṣṇu, he questions, "Who is this Mura? whose son? and why was he killed by Viṣṇu?" So, Pulastya embarks on the story of the demon Mura.

3. The extensive role of this ancient god-creator bringing forth all kinds of beings remained considerable, though with the growth of the classic Hindu myth he had to yield precedence to Brahmā and Viṣṇu as cosmogonic divinities. It is summed up by V. S. Apte, *loc. cit.*, as follows: "He bears a very important share in the work of creation. According to Mahābhārata and other accounts, he married Aditi and twelve other daughters of Dakṣa and begot on Aditi the twelve Ādityas. By his other twelve wives he had a numerous and very diversified progeny: serpents, reptiles, birds, demons, nymphs of the lunar constellations. He was thus the father of gods, demons, men, beasts, birds and reptiles—in fact of all living beings. He is therefore often called Prajāpati."

of the actual balance of energies in its divine and demonic spheres and, by his wish-granting gesture he has as if to endorse the actual status of overwhelming strength which the demon has gained by storing boundless energy in fierce austerities. The exceptional condition which Brahmā is bound to grant him bestows, as it were, only a definite and actual form upon the incredible potential force which the demon has already acquired by his own efforts.

Now, fortified by the deadly magic power in his unarmed palm, Mura fearlessly set forth alone to conquer all the world. He had but to lift up his bare palm against whatever beings he encountered and ask for battle in order to force them into flight or submission. Thus he ascended the central mountain of the universe, the seat of godly powers, peopled by various hosts of divine beings along the grades of its slopes, and crowned with the City of the Immortals (*Amarāvatī*) on its summit. In turn he challenged whomsoever he met to fight him, but all the inmates of the divine spheres, gods, goblins (*yakṣa*) and other celestial beings (*kinnara*, of half-man-half-animal appearance) at his deadly approach ran away. Nobody dared encounter him. Blazing with wrath, Mura reached the City of the Immortals, the mansions of the gods centered around Indra's palace. He provoked Indra to battle, but the King of Gods "could not resolve upon fighting him." Then uplifting his hand before him, the demon entered the City of the Immortals and nobody dared to ward him off. Entering Indra's mansion, Mura thus addressed him, "Do battle with me or else forsake the heavenly realm (*svarga*)!" Indra, however, preferred to abandon his kingly power over the universe; he fled from on high and became a fugitive on earth. He left behind him the symbols of his celestial kingship, the thunderbolt, and his mount, the divine king of elephants, and hid with his wife and son and the other gods somewhere on the bank of the Yamunā river.

The demon, meanwhile, vested himself in godly splendor and, wielding the kingly power over the universe, enjoyed with his fellow-demons the heavenly pleasures which by right are the privilege of the virtuous in heaven. Once Mura descended to earth on an inspection tour, astride the divine elephant. On his solitary walk on the bank of the river Sarayū, he encountered an odd sight. There he came across a kingly hero, Raghu by name, a scion of the solar dynasty, and realized that this pious prince apparently wholly ignored the remarkable change

which had taken place in the world-order. For Raghu still seemed devoted to the disestablished gods of old. He had consecrated himself for the performance of a sacrifice and was about to begin the holy rite in honor of the gods. Incensed, the demon challenged the king to fight him or else to abandon the rite, shouting "Thou shalt not worship the gods!" Raghu, however, was assisted by the holy seer, Vasiṣṭha, who acted as his priest. This saint interposed by shrewdly diverting the world-tyrant's wrath from his pupil by saying, "What avails it thee to conquer mortal men? Chastise thou the unconquered ones! If thou wishest to strike, curb Death himself! This mighty one does not yet obey thy orders. When thou hast overcome him, thou hast overcome the whole earth."

Forthwith the demon set forth to conquer the King of Justice who wields the rod of punishment in the netherworld. Yama, "knowing the demon to be invulnerable," on hearing of his coming, hurriedly bestrode his bull and sought advice from his lord, Viṣṇu, the Supreme Being, who was recumbent on the Milky Ocean, his eternal abode beyond the sphere of universal strife. Yama told Viṣṇu about Mura's doings, and the Highest Being dismissed him comforted by the brief remark, "Go and send the mighty demon hither!"

Meanwhile Mura had reached the realm of King Death, and Yama, returning, obsequiously asked him for his orders. Mura enjoined him to stop his business of curbing living beings, else he would smite off his head, but Yama excused himself for obeying the command of a higher one whom Mura should conquer first. In case Mura returned victor, Yama promised to obey *his* orders henceforth.

Immediately Mura set forth to encounter Viṣṇu, and found him in the Milky Ocean. As he approached with his outstretched death-portending palm, the God, reclining on the coils of the giant snake, Śeṣa, unflinchingly asked him: "Whyfore hast thou come, mighty demon?" and Mura answered, "to fight with thee." "When thou has come to fight with me," the killer of the hosts of demons replied, "why then does thy heart quiver again and again as if thou wast seized by the fever of fear? I will not fight with a coward." At these words of Viṣṇu the demon placed his own hand on his heart, inquiring, "What's that? Whose heart is quivering? Where?" and in speaking he fell to the ground, bereft of consciousness. Then Viṣṇu, with a gentle, easy gesture, threw his disk against him and split asunder the

heart of the demon. The gods, however, relieved from their agony, sung praises to the god with the lotus-navel.

The ominous figure of the demon, advancing threateningly with his uplifted palm portending death to all who oppose him on his reckless march to world-domination, is the particular and striking feature of this old tale, and an unforgettable one. The climax of the story, however, is among the typical motifs of Puranic myths. It is the sublime irony of the demon's meeting his doom through the very magic which rendered him unassailable, thanks to the superior cunning of the God, who nullified the particular condition which guaranteed safety, by turning it against him who robbed the world of safety. This irony forms the culminating point of a common pattern, and so are the other main motifs of this tale typical elements in an ever recurrent structure of mythical events.

Elsewhere, with other demons conquered by Viṣṇu and Śiva, these motifs are unfolded with more detail and greater clarity as to their meaning. The unquenchable thirst for power constituting the driving passion of the demons, invariably forms the beginning. It inspires one among them to practice fierce austerities for gaining the boon of invulnerability. This security leads to his triumph in driving the gods from their seats and establishing a demonic world-tyranny, a kind of chaotic "new order" which destroys the godly order of religious life and moral duties based upon sacred revealed tradition. The life-process of the world-organism, in which all spheres and creatures are attuned to a harmonious intercourse and co-operation beneficent to all, in piously abiding by their respective duties, is upset through the boundless ambition of a demonic individual claiming paramount power and unlimited duration. Finally the interference of the Highest Being, in the garb of Viṣṇu or Śiva, destroys the monstrous tyrant through a playful trick which blends superior wisdom with divine strength and restores the divine order of the universe. This chain of motifs forms the pattern common of countless Hindu myths.

There is a place in Maisur, called *Hari-Hara*, after a temple dedicated to the joint divinity of Viṣṇu (*Hari*) and Śiva (*Hara*).[4] The

4. The joint manifestation of Viṣṇu and Śiva under the combined aspect of Hari and Hara is built on the same pattern as the appearance of Śiva in union with the Goddess in the figure of Ardha-nārī, i.e., "Half man half woman." This hermaphroditic symbol of Ardhanārī, again, shows Śiva, the manly ascetic constituting the right half of a single body, while its left half is formed by the Goddess, his

combined appearance of both gods in one single male figure, Viṣṇu forming the left half, Śiva the right, gave rise to a myth, attached to this locality, which was meant to account for this striking union of two antagonistic divinities. Later Puranic tradition, despite its sectarian character and its tendency to enhance the glory of one or the other, insists on the fundamental truth that both, Viṣṇu and Śiva, intrinsically are one and the same being. They form two conflicting aspects of the highest universal essence, just as the three persons of the highest triad, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, are fundamentally but three different attitudes or masks of the one and only God. Yet this mystic union of Viṣṇu, the benign maintainer of the universe, and Śiva, its destroyer, in the esoteric appearance of Hari-Hara, was liable to cause confusion among the many devotees who, on the lines of sectarian initiations, were exclusively addicted to the worship of either of them. The enigmatic figure of Hari-Hara, intended to reveal the mystic unity of opposite principles, demanded a popular explanation in the form of a story which unfolded the paradoxical truth by recounting how actually the union became manifest.

This story tells of a demon *Guha* (the hiding, concealing one), who once lived at this place. Craving for universal power, he practised

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spouse, shining forth in youthful charm and bedecked with womanly attire. Both figures, Hari-Hara and Ardhanārī as well, are symbols reconciling opposite principles; with Ardhanārī, the ascetic and the sensual, the spiritual and the vegetative, the destructive and the procreative, represented by Śiva and the Goddess respectively, figure as the co-operative halves of one sole organism. The perfect balance and harmony of this union, moreover, point to the secret oneness of the transcendental quiescent divine principle with its dynamic display as the cosmic force (*śakti*) evolving the Māyā of the phenomenal world-process, i.e., the basic identity of saṁsāra and nirvāṇa, as voiced by Tantric wisdom and Mahāyāna philosophy. Fundamentally the Hari-Hara symbol is meant to convey the same meaning and, in a cryptic way, also bears a hermaphroditic character. Viṣṇu not only figures under various feminine disguises, e.g., as a charming damsel, forming a couple with the youthful naked Śiva shocking the hermits in Devadāruvaṇa, and as the dazzling Mohinī bewitching even Śiva himself, or as the divine dancer and singer who snatches away the elixir of life from the demons. Besides, he displays a definite maternal character by carrying the universe in his womb between its periodic dissolutions and evolutions. He brings forth the body of the universe through the lotus calix growing from his navel. Viṣṇu, through being Narāyaṇa, i.e., the source and impersonation of the primeval cosmic waters (*nara*) which also have a female character, in early Hindu mythology has assumed the function of the old pre-Aryan neolithic Mother of the Universe. Under the urge of Vedic-Brahmin tradition, which strictly denies female divinities major roles, Viṣṇu, on the line of the Parajāpati, the procreative Lord of Creatures in Vedic prose, had to fulfil the maternal role of the Ancient Mother, until, in later Hinduism, she regains her supreme place among gods under the guise of Śiva's spouse and manifesting energy (*Śakti*).

PLATE I

(Courtesy of the India Museum, London)

VIṢṆU NARASIṂHA
(North India)

PLATE II

(*Courtesy of Musée Guimet, Paris*)

THE CHURNING OF THE MILKY OCEAN
(Cambodia)

fierce austerities and forced Brahmā to grant him a boon. According to the typical course of these tales, the demon asked a fabulous safeguard for his ambitious ego, the charm of invulnerability. He fancied to become immortal by stipulating that he could not be killed by either Viṣṇu or Śiva. Of the other gods and beings he feared none, but he was eager to make himself safe against these two highest beings, who again and again come to the rescue of the divine order in the universe. Then, fearlessly, he displayed his boundless ambition and strength and established a godless order of his own by driving the gods from their seats, wiping out religious practice; and disturbing the holy pursuits of saints and ascetics enlightening mankind.

The highest divine forces, Viṣṇu and Śiva, whom Guha fancied as held at bay through Brahmā's boon, were aware of a weak spot in the demon's magic armor which seemingly made him invulnerable. They spied the loophole left in the safety stipulated by Guha, that *neither* of them could overcome him in single combat. And so both resigned their separate characters and abandoning their antagonistic attitudes, combined their individual essences into one being, hitherto unimagined. They merged the conflicting forces of "Hari," the "Verdant," promoting growth, and of "Hara," who "takes away" with the grip of death, into the startling new manifestation of "Hari-Hara." Thus they outwitted the demon's foresight and, through this monstrous paradoxical appearance covering totality, life and death, reconciling growth and decay, they rid the universe of the monster who insisted on the unlimited duration of his powerful ego beyond the cycle of growth and decay.

The combined figure of Hari-Hara presents an inscrutable mask, flashing forth a wholly ambivalent meaning through the inner tension of antagonistic forces combined to form one organism and to act in unison for the fulfillment of the high task of restoring balance and rhythm to the life of the world organism. What is able to face the baffling sight of this illogical union of opposites, which is not to be anticipated by imagination nor to be accepted by reason? Certainly not the demon who ignores half of the essence of Hari-Hara and the secret harmony between his antagonistic halves, by stubbornly insisting on personal power and individual growth without end. Certainly not he to whom the maintenance of his own particle of life means everything, who cherishes his ego at the expense of all others, and

enjoys power at the cost of the sufferings he inflicts on his fellow-creatures in the reckless pursuit of his selfish aims. Certainly not he who jealously excludes himself from the relentlessly cycling course of life's continuous changes.

This story of the origin of the figure of Hari-Hara is meant to impart the readiness humbly to accept both aspects of life, expanding and shrinking, growth and destruction, delight and suffering, as equally true manifestations of the divine essence which brings forth, maintains, and dissolves the universe and its creatures. The supra-logical identity of the opposites whose constant interaction produces the life-process, is represented through the figure which reconciles both conflicting tendencies as the two halves of one body. This paradoxical identity of the highest divine forces is among the ultimate truths on which the popular philosophy of the Purāṇas insists. In Puranic myths, even the highest gods themselves again and again are depicted as experiencing difficulty in being aware of this hidden truth. Śiva, for instance, when marrying his eternal spouse, the Great Goddess, in the garb of Satī, in a fit of jealousy almost kills Brahmā on seeing the latter enamored of Satī's dazzling charm; and Viṣṇu has to interpose to rescue the god-creator from the wrath of the god-destroyer by reminding Śiva of the basic truth that fundamentally all three of them are but one and the same being, which manifests under three personal aspects.[5] These phenomenal personalities of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva are all too liable to be caught by the illusion of being self-contained, independent and antagonistic individualities, that is, even *they* are not utterly free from the common spell enthralling all creatures which cling to their phenomenal individuality as an ultimate reality.

The popular myth of the origin of the lingam symbol from the depth of the cosmic waters tells how, at the dawn of creation, Brahmā and Viṣṇu, floating on the primeval ocean, fancied themselves each to be the sole creator and material source of the universe. They quarreled as to which of them ranked first, until Śiva suddenly revealed himself out of a giant lingam bursting forth from the depths of the ocean, and put to shame their attempts to measure its infinite growth. Thus he finally made them aware of the truth that they were both but attitudes, or modes, of the all-comprising essence which manifests in the lingam symbol.

5. *Kālikā-purāṇa* (Veṅkateśvara Press), ch. 11.

This union of co-operating opposites, through which life's web is woven by means of constant change, is not to be challenged by the self-will of a demonic individual craving unlimited power and duration; nor can it be eluded indefinitely by means of any stipulated safeguard; this is the meaning conveyed again and again by the popular Puranic myths. A demon may ask for anything to make himself secure, but the very safeguard he has stipulated will, in ironic mockery, contain that which eventually will work his doom. In these tales, Brahmā is forced to grant everything short of immortality to the aspiring demons who, one after another in the epochs of world history, arise and upset the divine order, but some slight chance left in the stipulation, some utter impossibility, as it would seem, miraculously grows into overwhelming reality and crushes the one who fancies himself secure.

Thus, the demon Golden Garment (*Hiraṇyakaśipu*), by the practice of austerities, attained a most elaborate guarantee—that he could not be slain by any living being he could name, nor by any weapon he could imagine, neither by day nor by night, neither indoors nor out.[6] And this taxed the inventiveness of the god-savior into producing the fabulous appearance of the fourth avatar of Viṣṇu, *Narasiṁha*, a monster, half-man, half-lion. Bursting out of a pillar in the demon's palace, he dragged his victim to the threshold, and there, neither indoors nor out, at the moment of dusk between day and night, he tore the demon's heart from his breast.[7] Thus the demon, obsessed by his security-complex, by excluding all possible means of destruction which he could imagine, simply provokes the incredible, the apparition of an unimaginable monster. And the divine power maintaining the cycling course of the universe out-monsters the monster who had disturbed the creative balance of cosmic energies, by assuming an enigmatic garb to circumvent the demon's foresight.

The demon Tāraka, when obtaining a similar boon from Brahmā, was told by the god, "There are no living beings without death, therefore thou choose death by someone whom thou dost not fear."[8] There-

6. *Matsya-purāṇa*, ch. 161. Cf. translation in *The Sacred Books of the Hindus*, XVII (Allahabad, 1917).

7. This motive of an elaborate safeguard circumvented by the superior cunning of the god-savior, goes back to Vedic mythology. The Vedic demon, Namuci, protected by the stipulation that he cannot be killed either by day or by night, nor by any weapon, solid or liquid, is killed by Indra at dawn by throwing foam at him (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 1, 7, 1, 6, and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 12, 7, 1, 3.

8. *Matsya-purāṇa*, ch. 148.

upon, the giant demon mockingly made the stipulation that only a seven-days babe might slay him, for, thus, he thought, where in all the world could a babe be born that could be his better at seven days? The gods, bereft of their powers, betook themselves to Brahmā and Viṣṇu to ask their advice. They were told that only a babe conceived from the ascetic strength of Śiva, the destroyer, in the womb of the Great Goddess, the all-nourishing mother of the universe, would be capable at seven days of slaying the demon. Thus the gods must try to bring about a marriage of these mighty twain. But difficulties without end arise before this aim is achieved, and the antagonistic principles of male ascetic spirituality and the female procreative force of the universe are ready to be united. And then arises a new series of obstacles from the peculiarly passionate character of the two divinities, and other incidents which delay the conception, but eventually he is brought forth—Skanda, the boy-like god of war, who, on his seventh day, at the head of the army of the gods, by his miraculous valor, rids the world of the hateful tyrant.

Another of these demon protagonists, the bull-shaped Mahiṣa, defied the universal law of death by choosing to be slain only by a woman, for he could think of no woman who could withstand his furious assault. But when the dispossessed gods, led by Brahmā and Indra, complained to Viṣṇu and Śiva, flames of wrath blazed forth from the faces of the highest trinity, and at this portent all the other gods breathed forth their fiery energies, exhaling, as it were, the particular forces of their respective natures.[9] These glowing energies combined into a flaming cloud which grew in splendor and condensed, eventually taking shape and assuming the appearance of the Goddess, provided with many arms. The light of the fire-god formed her eyes, dawn and dusk her eyebrows; Śiva's glow became her face, and the moon's splendor her breasts. Thus all the gods, by pouring forth their individual essences, built up the appearance of the universal mother. Then, to complete her manifestation, they bestowed their weapons and emblems upon her, arming her many hands, and decking her limbs with ornaments. By this voluntary act of self-abnegation, they merged their individual powers into the all-comprehending nature of the divine woman, who, in this supreme array, represented the integration

9. Cf. *Devī-māhātmya*, in the *Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa* (translated by F. E. Pargiter, *Bibliotheca Indica*, 1888-1905).

of all the cosmic powers differentiated in the various gods. And by means of the totality of the divine forces combined in her womanly manifestation, the demon met his doom.

Here again, it is the irony of the incredible coming to pass which brings about the climax, and the miracle is accomplished, as in the figure of Hari-Hara, through the self-abdication of the separate personalities of the gods. In pouring forth their essence and laying down their instruments of power, they prove themselves capable of sacrificing their cherished personalities. This readiness for self-surrender saves the gods and the universe from the self-centered demon. It is the very attitude of which he is utterly incapable and which finally works his doom.

The same meaning is conveyed by a local myth which figures in the description of a model pilgrimage to various holy places, in *Vāmana-purāṇa*.[10] Here the pious Prahlāda, the exceptional perfect devotee of Viṣṇu among the demons, is described as touring all over India visiting many shrines. At the river Madhunandinī, he beholds the images of Viṣṇu (Govinda) and Śiva (Hara) with their symbols exchanged—Viṣṇu bearing Śiva's weapon, the trident (*triśūla*), and Śiva bearing Viṣṇu's missile, the discus (*cakra*). This odd sight is explained to him by an "old tale" of a great demon, Jalodbhava, who met his doom in this place. By austerities he had won the boon not to be killed by any of the gods with their own weapons.[11] To end his despotic rule, which destroyed religious practice, and tormented the guardians of the divine order, gods, saints, and kings, eventually Viṣṇu and Śiva descended into the world. They roamed along without weapons, lest the demon grow suspicious. Jalodbhava, however, realized that they had come to slay him and, being afraid, hid in a river.[12] But the two gods found out his hiding-place and, invisible, took their stand on the bank of the river. With a fearful eye the demon scrutinized the sky

10. Ch. 81, "The Slaying of Jalodbhava" in "Prahlāda's Pilgrimage to Holy Places," (*Jalodbhavavadhaḥ Prahlāda-tīrthayātrāyām*).

11. Devāsurānām ajayo mahāhave nijaiś caśastrair amarair avadhyaḥ.

12. The waters are Jalodbhava's home; *Jalodbhava* is "he whose origin is the water," or "he who is the origin of the water." From the details of his death it becomes evident that he is a demon in control of the cosmic waters and, like Vṛtra in the Vedic mythology, jealously keeps them secluded in his belly, thus blocking the beneficent circuit of their divine enlivening essence through the world-organism. In slaying Jalodbhava, Viṣṇu and Śiva accomplish a deed parallel of Indra's killing of Vṛtra.

and, of a sudden, from the depth soared up to the snowclad summit of the Himalayas. At this moment the gods, beholding his flight, became manifest, each armed with the other's weapon, and with them cut the demon to pieces. His dismembered body fell to the ground and released the water.

The well-entrenched demon is only to be conquered through the co-operation of the supreme conflicting powers acting in unison and, what is more, exchanging their intrinsic attitudes as represented by their favorite instruments of heroic triumph. The idea of accepting the opposite, in the symbolism of this myth, is carried yet a step further than with the Hari-Hara figure, in which each half retains its character, as is shown by the weapons and ornaments pertaining respectively to Hari and Hara. The joint figures of Viṣṇu and Śiva at the shrine of Madhunandinī, standing side by side with emblems exchanged, exhibit an extreme artfulness and self-abnegation: the opposite powers, forming an alliance to rescue the world, exchange their very natures or modes of action, as represented by the symbolic weapons which they accept from each other. Thus Viṣṇu and Śiva conquer the demon who clings to his own individuality by their sovereign aloofness from their own sublime personalities; they divest themselves of the phenomenal glory of their familiar antagonistic masks, which for the sectarian devotee mean ultimate truth. Their joint figures, with symbols exchanged, are meant to strike the pilgrim confronted with them with an enlightening flash, initiating him into the hidden reality of the divine essence in and by itself, as it abides beyond its conflicting manifestations in life and death, and enacts the cycle of life's changes through these selfsame manifestations.

It is this enlightening wisdom, this readiness to accept the phenomenal character of their own individualities which, apart from their major cosmic functions, in later Puranic lore bestows the superior rank on the highest Hindu triad of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, above the gods and hosts of other beings. Though they may be temporarily tempted to succumb to the spell of their own mighty personalities, as if caught in the roles which they are acting, they rise again and again, when the world's emergency asks for an extreme effort, above the natural enjoyment of their masks. They are fundamentally beyond the universal spell of Māyā, through which the phenomenal display of the world and its figures is endowed with the semblance of reality.

All the other beings, demons and gods, as well as the innumerable hosts of creatures whose teeming crowds constitute the living body of the universe, are under this universal spell of Māyā; they remain enthralled by their own phenomenal individualities; they take the masks of their personalities, the roles they are enacting, the play of world history and its setting, and the universe, for fundamentally real. The creatures, including gods and demons, in clinging to their transitory individual masks become the constant victims of the power of Māyā which constantly evolves the mirage of the world, while the highest triad wields this power as its instrument of creation, maintenance, and dissolution. Gods and demons both eventually attain immortality, as it is told in the famous myth of the Churning of the Milky Ocean, thanks to the help of Viṣṇu and Śiva, yet the attainment of this highest boon is wrapped up in the mocking irony which invariably accompanies similar boons by which the aspiring demons become inflated.

The necessity of churning the Milky Ocean to extract from its substance the essence of the elixir of immortality (*amṛta*) arises from an odd incident. After endless battles and severe setbacks the demons had gained an unexpected advantage over their rivals. The brahmin who acted as their priest and spiritual adviser, through excessive austerities, prevailed on Śiva himself to grant him a magic charm by which he could restore life to the dead (*mṛta—sañjīvanī-mantra*).[13] The supreme divine controller of the forces of destruction possessed this secret of how to overcome death and was willing to reveal it to his fervent devotee. Now the balance between the rival groups fighting for supremacy became utterly upset. Fortified by this gift, the demons took advantage of the gods and, fearlessly attacking, routed them. While the ranks of the gods thinned with many lying slain, the demons suffered no losses. In despair, the gods sought refuge with Brahmā, and took his advice to make a truce with their foes and beg their help in the giant task of churning the Milky Ocean. The demons, pleased with the submission of their rivals, were willing to help them to the elixir of immortality, yet the achievement of the giant task mainly went to the credit of Viṣṇu, who consented to be roused from his cosmic slumber to direct the laborious process.

In various simultaneous manifestations, the maintainer of the uni-

13. *Matsya-purāṇa*, ch. 249.

verse assisted the gods to acquire that which should restore the balance of energies in the world. In the shape of the giant tortoise which carries earth, space, and firmament on its back, he rose from the depths to support the central world-mountain which the gods whirled around as a churning stick. In another animal garb, as the cosmic serpent Śeṣa,[14] he acted as the churning-rope which the gods and demons threw around the mountain and pulled alternately from both ends in the process of churning. He also manifested in the divine garb of man and held the mountain to steady it and direct its motions. Moreover, he appeared floating in mid-air to comfort and encourage the gods and demons, exhausted by their tiresome labor. At last, when the butter was churned out of the milky substance, and the elixir of immortality emerged in a white bowl carried by the god-physician Dhanvantari, arising out of the ocean, it was Viṣṇu again who secured the priceless essence exclusively for the gods. Assuming the form of a bewitching damsel, he fascinated the demons by his singing and dancing and, with a playful gesture, snatched the elixir away from the demons and gave it to the gods, who eagerly partook of the divine drink. Then, in the form of two ancient heroic manifestations of his, Nara and Narāyaṇa, he led the gods in the battle which brought them complete victory and the permanent possession of the elixir of immortality.

Yet, in spite of these manifold activities of Viṣṇu, the gods would never have secured this treasure without the intervention of Śiva in a supreme emergency which suddenly arose while they were belabor-

14. Or *Ananta*, i.e., "Endless." *Śeṣa* literally means "remainder, rest"; the serpent Śeṣa represents the "residue" of the primeval cosmic waters at the bottom of the universe, that which is left over, when, out of this divine universal life-substance, with the process of creation, earth and the other spheres of the world proceed and take shape for the spell of their duration (*sthiti*) and into which they again dissolve at the end of a world period. As the water of rivers, ponds, seas, etc. is symbolized by common serpent-genii (nāga), likewise the primeval abiding mass of water in the abyss, supporting the realms of earth, space, and the celestial spheres above, is viewed as the giant serpent Śeṣa, carrying the universe on its uplifted hoods. Śeṣa is identified with Viṣṇu, both representing the divine life-matter of the universe. Common images of Viṣṇu, with his human shape recumbent on the coils of the giant serpent floating on the water, express his character as the creative substance of the universe through three parallel symbols superimposed upon each other: the substance of the ocean, representing cosmic life-matter in its elementary form; the body of the serpent, being the animal symbol of the self-same waters; and the human figure of the god, growing creation in the form of a lotus calix from his navel, in fact from the primeval waters which support the human and the animal appearance of the Supreme Being in this vision of "Viṣṇu Anantaśāyin" (Viṣṇu recumbent on the serpent Endless).

ing the life-substance of the universe. For, in the midst of the churning process, while they were eagerly awaiting the elixir, there arose from the depth of the ocean a poisonous smoke which, singeing and burning their bodies, threatened to render them unconscious and kill them. Then the giant figure of a terrible being became visible, shooting out flames and roaring like thunder, death incarnate as it were. When addressed by Viṣṇu, he spoke thus: "I am Kālakūṭa (that is, the "peak" or "heaped mass of black death"). I am born from the cosmic ocean. When gods and demons in fierce wrath churned the deep sea, they were wishing for each other's destruction; that is how I came into existence to kill them all, gods and demons alike. In a moment I shall destroy whatsoever exists. Swallow me, all of you, if you dare, or else seek refuge with Śiva!" This the desperate gods and demons did and, led by Brahmā and Viṣṇu, implored the supreme lord of the destructive forces to save them by swallowing the cosmic poison. With perfect equanimity, the great ascetic consented, "I shall swallow Kālakūṭa, and if there is any other difficult task to be accomplished by you, I shall fulfil it also." So he went with them to the shore of the ocean and quaffed the deadly poison and again withdrew to his supramundane solitude.

The original meaning of the Churning of the Milky Ocean, in Puranic mythology, is to some extent obscured by the fact that, in Purāṇa cosmography, the Milky Ocean no longer stands as a symbol for the matter of the universe itself, viewed as a giant vessel containing the divine life-substance which is churned with the central mountain forming its axis and churning-stick, entwined by the cosmic serpent, its rope. In Puranic cosmography, the Milky Ocean figures but as a kind of fabulous sea, one among others filled with liquor, molasses, melted butter, saltwater, or other fluids.

The term "milk," however, is most appropriate for denoting the life-substance of the world-organism, which, by its constant circulation, nourishes and maintains all creatures and spheres of the macrocosmic body. It pours down from heaven as the enlivening water of rain, on which the vegetable and animal kingdoms depend. On earth it turns into the sap of plants, feeding the cows whose milk is among the main means of sustenance in the Hindu household. In the cows the vegetable sap turns into life-blood and, through it, assumes the form of milk. Thus water, sap, blood, and milk, fundamentally, are equiva-

lents, they are transformations or aspects of the same universal life-giving substance. The organism of the universe is served, in the life-process of all beings and spheres which constitute its body, by this unceasing circulation of life-essence, flowing on through its realms and building up all kinds of living shapes, from the transitory bodies of the clouds to the more solid bodies of the vegetable and animal kingdom. This all-nourishing essence might be called the milk of the universe, and so it is in a Vedic hymn which views the universe as the manifestation of the cosmic substance of "food" (*anna*), evolving its features through a constant metabolism.[15] This food substance provides for growth, maintenance, and procreation, but it does not safeguard against old age and destruction; its very cycle of transformations implies decay and death.

If, however, one could extract its essence in a condensed form, as the creamy substance of milk is extracted by churning butter, one might gain an elixir which contains life-essence to such an extent as to bestow immortal life. This the gods and demons do, in churning the ocean, but in doing so, all of a sudden, they are confronted with the concentrated power of poisonous death. The idea is that whosoever extracts increased life-force, the elixir of life, from the all-containing substance of life, by conjuring its most auspicious aspect, should be ready also to face its antagonistic aspect, the outburst of increased forces of destruction.

But who is able to face these forces? The gods and demons, evidently, are not, though Kālakūṭa mockingly challenges them to do so.

15. Cf. *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* II, 8, 8. Food, the divine substance of the universe, reveals its cosmogonic and world-maintaining function by saying: "I am the first-born of the cosmic order (*ṛta*), I was before the gods sprang into existence, I am the navel (that is the center and source) of immortality; whosoever bestows me on others, he thereby keeps me to himself. I am food; I feed on food and on its feeder. . . . This food is stored in the highest of the upper worlds; all the gods and the deceased ancestors (in heaven) are the guardians of this food. Whatever is eaten or spilt or strewn as an offering, is altogether but a hundredth part of my whole body." This "food" is called the milk of the cosmic spotted cow: "The two great vessels, heaven and earth, both are filled by the spotted cow with the milk of but one milking; pious people, in drinking of it, cannot make it less; it neither grows more nor less. Food is the exhaling and the inhaling breath of life; food they call death, the same food they call life; food the brahmins call growing old, food they call the begetting of offspring. . . . I (the cosmic food-substance) am the cloud, thundering and raining. They (that is: all beings) feed on me; I feed on everybody. I am the real essence of the universe, immortal. By my force all the suns in heaven are glowing."

They themselves are but manifestations of this life-substance, aspects of its cycling energy; they are full of its antagonistic tension; on the one hand, they are intent on unlimited power and endless duration; on the other, they are secretly longing to exterminate each other. Their will to humiliate and annihilate their rivals has but reached a temporary truce while they combine their energies to churn the ocean. Actually this mutual hatred and will for destruction is at the bottom of their longing for security and power. That is why the ambivalent matter of the ocean of life reveals itself to them in the very attitude they bear against each other, not as the auspicious creamy substance they are longing for, but as deadly poison. They have to face this sinister aspect, and they cannot withstand it. For they are, all of them, embodiments of the will to life and power in the constant conflict for supremacy. The perpetual strife of individuals and nations, classes and parties, for power and possessions is reflected in this unending strife among gods and titans for the supreme power in the world.

There is but one among the divine beings, and high above them, who is capable of swallowing the poison—Śiva, the model ascetic, the hermit and yogin among the immortals. Aloof from their strife, steeped in constant abstraction, he meditates on his crystal-pure Self, and abides in its sheer voidness of being, which forms the innermost essence of reality, the transcendent fountainhead from which becoming flows, and the figures and features of transient life well up. He is a match for death-power incarnate.[16]

Śiva's role in the churning of the ocean is most impressive, though he intervenes but sparingly, and gives no explanations for what he is doing. At the very beginning he bestows the secret of the life-restoring magic wisdom on the demons and thus upsets the balance between the rival groups. It is not he who advises the gods how to gain the same strength of immortality; he leaves this task to Brahmā's enlightened wisdom, and the heroic deed of churning the ocean he leaves to the god-maintainer who spreads out and supports the Māyā

16. While the cosmic poison is called "pitch (kūṭa) of death (kāla)," Śiva bears the surnames *Mahākāla* and *Yamāntaka*. "*Kāla*" means "the black one," "death," and "time,"—time as the all-devouring principle covering everything with oblivion. Śiva is viewed as Mahā-kāla, "Great Time," that is, Eternity, devouring time in its turn. He conquers the all-destructive principle, time, being timelessness. Hence he is called Yamāntaka, "he who puts an end" (*antaka*) to Yama, King Death, who "curbs" (*yam*) all beings.

of the universe. But, behind and above Viṣṇu's manifold activities in the limelight of the cosmic stage towers the silent figure of Śiva, who alone is able to rescue gods and titans from the destructive forces which they have stirred up as the embodiment of their own frantic lust for life, without knowing that its deadly blast is the breath of intoxicating desire for the fulness of life which swells their breasts.

Silently, as if not caring for thanks or consequences, the solitary god emerges from his aloofness, removes the obstacle which prevents the gods from attaining the perfect balance of strength with their rivals who have outgrown them by his own boon, and vanishes again into the background.

When the struggle for the elixir of immortality draws to its happy end, the gods victoriously ascending to heavenly splendor, possessed of the priceless drink, while the discomfited demons withdraw to the netherworld for a spell, the rejoicing of the immortals with the songs and dancing of heavenly damsels scarcely conceals the curious and mocking result of all the labor. After exertions and anxieties beyond measure, after predicaments, battles and triumphs, fundamentally not very much has been accomplished. The struggle between gods and demons will go on indefinitely now, both groups being immortal. In fact, only now, after both rivals have acquired unending life, their strife can go on more fiercely than ever, beyond any chance of ever coming to an end. Now, at last, the stage is perfectly set for the perpetual conflict between the demons of chaotic ambition and lust for power, on the one hand, and the wise, benign figures who preside over the moral and cosmic order. There is no fear any more that either of the antagonistic powers enacting the world's drama will receive a deadly blow. Out of his supreme aloofness from their strife, Śiva has guessed, as it were, the weak spot in the world's machinery, and has made it permanent. He, the ascetic beyond the temptations of life, charm and power, and beyond the fear of death, being the lord of destructive forces, has the vision to impart immortality to the struggle for life and power, because he is not concerned with either of them.

Neither the titans nor the gods have gained the heavenly boon of immortality through a spiritual transformation, or a purification of their natures, or in conquering by a transcending act of self-renunciation their self-centered will for duration and fulness of life. Hence, in the end, the effect of their exertions is nil. That is the supreme irony

of the fact that, in striving for a lasting superiority and indefinite security, neither of the rivals has gained anything of the kind. Evidently none of them are entitled to this highest boon of eternal peace which, being a supreme state of soul, belongs to a purely spiritual order, involved as they are in the strife for splendor and power, and clinging to their mighty personalities. Here again, as in the other myths dealing with the quest for invulnerability, the superhuman beings are granted what they long for, but, fundamentally, it avails them nothing. The security they acquire involves the doom of having to go on indefinitely in much the same situation from which they had tried to escape. They remain bound up in it, because they have remained what they were, instead of reaching the self-detached enlightenment which might disentangle them from the meshes of Māyā, that is, from the illusion of their phenomenal individuality and the craving for personal duration and power without end.

Yet the lesson imparted to the Hindu by these myths is one of equanimity, and not of resignation or despair. It is even optimistic, inasmuch as again and again the controllers of divine order and harmony are restored to their heavenly seats, though the disruptive powers of demonic evil appear to be invincible. The dispossessed gods have to humiliate themselves before the highest divine powers by imploring their miraculous assistance; difficulties are to be surmounted and obstacles removed, before the nearly incredible will take the shape of overwhelming reality; and, in the meantime, the sufferings inflicted on the world and its creatures fallen prey to reckless tyranny, will take their crushing toll. It needs all the combined wisdom and cunning of antagonists pooling their strength in co-operation, and even the final victors have to bide their time and be on the outlook for the propitious moment for the spectacular, unforeseen stratagem. Moreover, the ever recurring assaults, upsetting the divine order, form an equally constant feature of the world's history; it actually moves from crisis to crisis, it lapses from spells of rest and harmony into ever renewed turmoil and temporary enslavement. The cosmic opera of the Hindu myths teaches the equanimity with which this cycle of events and epochs, sparing none, should be faced, full of faith, not in the ultimate triumph of the righteous cause, but in the ever renewed conquest of the forces of evil.

The basic idea of this philosophic outlook on world's history and

affairs is that the scales of order and tyranny, harmony and chaos, are constantly going up and down; that is how the life-process of the world is viewed from above. This viewpoint from on high is not to be shared by the chorus of actors, by the gods and demons, engrossed by their roles, but is achieved through the supreme aloofness of the ascetic renunciation of Śiva, and through his attitude of spiritual indifference. To reach this perfection of his, is, among men, a privilege reserved for single, outstanding individuals, saints, ascetics, and yogin, who transcend the Māyā of phenomenal existence by their own efforts; but the world-process as a whole is not meant for a gradual progress toward perfection. It is the peculiar glory of Western idealism, with Christianity broadening into progressive humanitarianism, to have conceived such a goal, and to foster an ardent faith which embarks again and again, after each set-back, on its quest for collective perfection.

Perhaps it is to the tragic pattern of India's history that we must look for an explanation of this fundamentally skeptical attitude toward social progress—a cycle of catastrophic disasters alternating with periods of glory. The mythical series of demonic tyrants causing havoc with their chaotic "new order" is, of course, full of political significance. Their cosmic setting mainly means that they belong to all periods of history. (One cannot fail to be struck today by the strangely sinister figure of the demon Mura, with that familiar gesture of the uplifted palm!) It was the actual human tyrants who supplied the background out of which this criticism and interpretation of world affairs emerged into the pictorial script of mythology. For, side by side with the mythical history of the universe, the classic Purāṇas contain chronicles of historic dynasties from the early period down to the fourth century A.D.—a long record of invading hordes, from the Aryan invaders of the second and first millennium B.C., through the Greco-Bactrians, the Śaka and the Kuṣāna, down to the devastating flood of White Huns in the fifth century A.D. Moreover, it is also a record of ever recurring home-bred despots, enlarging their kingdoms by ruthless conquest at the price of universal suffering. For instance, the Maurya emperor, Aśoka, recording his campaign for the annexation of Kalinga, numbers his victims among the conquered population at a hundred thousand slain, and a hundred and fifty thousand led away into slavery.

To conclude, there is a later myth in which the mythical setting and the record of historic facts coincide—the story of Viṣṇu's two-fold avatar as Kṛṣṇa and his half-brother, Bala-rāma (Rāma-with-the-plow). Here the sufferings of the Indian masses which formed the sad reverse of the shining medal of the Aryan feudal age in Northern India, as it reaches its climax in the titanic conflict of the *Mahābhārata*, find expression in mythical language. For the rule of overbearing feudal chiefs, and the incessant strife between the warrior clans, has become so intolerable a burden that Mother Earth herself ascends to the high abode of Brahmā and Viṣṇu to make complaint. She begs to be freed from the host of demons, previously slain by Viṣṇu in cosmic battles, but now reborn on earth in the families of kings. She can sustain their load no longer; her sinews, the hills, are crushed; and she is sinking to the bottom of the universe, overcome by weakness.[17]

It is Viṣṇu, of course, who again descends to earth in human form "to relieve the earth from her burden by conquering the mighty demons," a task which he fulfils punctiliously. First, he frees the Yadu clan, into which he is born, from the tyranny of its blood-thirsty chief (the incarnate demon, Kālanemi), and from the agressions of their enemies. Next, acting as charioteer for Arjuna, the chief hero of the *Mahābhārata*, he leads the Pāṇdava hosts to a disastrous victory, in which the entire feudal chivalry of India is practically exterminated. Finally, he completes his task by destroying his own clan, which had achieved a crushing ascendancy, by provoking a fractricidal feud, and, at the last, withdraws once more to his supramundane abode. In this most popular of Hindu myths, the earthly tyrants are recognized to be incarnate demons, and their overthrow consequently too great a task for earthly heroes to perform. At such times in human history, it is necessary to seek redress from the highest divinity, consoled and reassured by these ancient tales of divine intervention, which teach the soul how to endure the vicissitudes of history, secure in the faith that Kṛṣṇa's promise shall never fail: "Whenever there is a withering of the Law, O son of Bharata, and an uprising of lawlessness on all sides, then I manifest Myself. For the salvation of the righteous, and the destruction of such as do evil; for the establishing of the Law I come to birth in age after age."

17. Cf. the opening chapters of the Kṛṣṇa legend in *Brahma-purāṇa*.

THE RELIGION OF PLUTARCH

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No better guide to the religious beliefs and practices of the Greco-Roman world can be found than the amiable and charming sage of Chaeronea.[1] By Trajan's day antiquity had attained its fullest development, physically and spiritually, and, though dissolution was already incipient, contemporaries were not aware of it. Plutarch was no master spirit whose attainments or inclination put him in opposition to the world about him or outside it; he participated fully in the intellectual and active life of his environment, and he summarizes his world in a more copious body of writings than has been left us by any other ancient author. Homer and Plato and Menander were as "classic" for him as they are for us, with the difference that for him they were part of a continuous and living tradition. He had read all the literature and had enormous quantities of it by heart. He had studied, with greater or less sympathy, all the current philosophies and theologies, native and exotic; he had seen and appreciated all the masterpieces of plastic art, and he was a connoisseur of music and mathematics. He knew Athens and Rome very well, and probably Alexandria also. He had been entrusted with diplomatic missions and was on terms of intimacy with the important men of his time. He might undoubtedly have remained at Rome in a position of honor, but he preferred to return to his Boeotian birthplace, there to become a petty local magistrate and a priest of Delphi.[2]

To a reader who comes to Plutarch from the more brilliant but harder productions of classical Greece, the first impression is apt to be one of a softness descending at times to sentimentality. He is always interested in women's character and influence and speaks of

1. Besides general works on ancient philosophy and religion, the following deal specifically with the subject in hand: R. Volkman, *Leben, Schriften, und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeronea* (Berlin, 1869); O. Gréard, *De la Morale de Plutarque*[2] (Paris, 1874): J. Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch* (London, 1902); B. Latzarus, *Les Idées religieuses de Plutarque* (Paris, 1920): P. Geigenmüller, "Plutarchs Stellung zur Religion und Philosophie seiner Zeit," *Neue Jahrb. f. klass. Altertum.* XLVII (1921), 251-70.

2. For a complete account of Plutarch's life, with full bibliography, see Christ-Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* II, 1[6] (Munich, 1920), 485 ff.

them in a tone of reverence quite new to Greek literature;[3] his affection and respect for animals[4] recalls St. Francis. The institution of slavery he accepted, for he was an ecclesiastic, not a social reformer; but in Plutarch (as contrasted, say, with his contemporary, Tacitus) slaves are people. There is a whole new vocabulary of gentleness in Plutarch; words like *humane, mild, gentle, soft* are striking by their frequency. He is a humanist in all the sense the word can carry. If religion is his paramount interest, it is still human goodness and happiness he is interested in; theology is there, of course, but only to satisfy the demands of the intellect and to serve as a scaffolding for practical religion. A sympathetic modern student of Plutarch can go so far as to make a criterion for the genuineness of doubtful pieces the answer to the question, "Would an amiable and sincere Protestant pastor in a provincial Dutch town have written such a piece?"[5]

Religion is the one common element which all civilized men share; cities may be found without walls, letters, kings, houses, wealth, coinage, theatres, gymnasia, but none without sanctuaries, gods, prayers, oaths, oracles, and sacrifices (1125E). Religion is defined as the science of the worship of the gods (*Aemilius Paulus* 3); to know what the gods require is a source of happiness (527F), and those who possess correct opinions regarding the gods have as legitimate cause of pride as those who rule wide dominions (545A). But how attain correct opinions? Three sources are provided: poets, legislators, and philosophers (763A); but of these three only authorized current practice ("legislators") is paramount, for the others are made ancillary to it. Poets tell lies, usually through ignorance, sometimes to give pleasure (16Af.), and only occasionally transmit correct traditions (358F). Homer is an exception, but even in Homer primitive concepts must be explained away. So the Homeric Zeus is distinguished from the real Zeus, and incidentally from the thin Aristotelian god (426D):

> The Zeus of Homer turned his gaze not so very far from the land of Troy towards the Thracian regions and the wandering tribes about the

3. See R. Hirzel, *Plutarch* (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 79 ff.

4. See especially *Cato Major* 5, and the treatises dealing with animals, 955D-999B. References to Plutarch's writings will be made by chapter for the *Lives*, and by Xylander's folios for the *Moralia*; for economy the titles of the treatises will be omitted.

5. J. J. Hartman, *De Plutarcho Scriptore et Philosopho* (Leyden, 1916), pp. 660 ff.

Danube; but the real Zeus has a fair and fitting variety of spectacles in numerous worlds, not viewing the infinite void outside nor concentrating his mind upon himself and nothing else, as some have imagined.

Aeschylus even is dangerous to take literally (417E); Euripides slips often (68E, 548D), and even Sophocles occasionally (21A, E; 417F).

Nor can philosophy be more than the mystagogue of religion (378AB); the crown of philosophy is theology (410B). Plato, whom Plutarch never opposes though he may make peculiar combinations and emphases of Platonic doctrine,[6] had established three canons for mythmakers (*Republic* 377f.): the gods must not be represented as the cause of evil, as altering their shape, as deceiving men (referred to in Plutarch 427B, 461E, 738B, 759C, 828A). But Plato merely recognizes the necessity of a national religion, he shows no interest or belief in it. Plutarch, on the other hand, was not only convinced of the necessity of the national religion, he had a personal devotion to it. He was priest of Delphi, and his best dialogues are laid there, on subjects suggested by the shrine. He accepted the traditional theology and interpreted it in the sense of Plato, but what he was trying to save was the theology, not Plato. If you accept the stories about the gods from those who interpret them reverently and philosophically, and if you always perform and observe the established rites of worship, and believe that no sacrifice that you can offer, no deed that you may do will be more likely to find favor with the gods than your belief in their true nature, you may avoid superstition which is no less an evil than atheism (355C). The greatest gift we can ask of the gods is knowledge of themselves (351CD). But speculation dare not run unbridled (549F); Herodotus' pious reticence is admirable (417C, 607C). Our fathers' ancient faith suffices us, and no argument must disturb it; if one point is shaken the whole structure may totter (756A). We must seek for explanations of such matters as stand in the way, and not relinquish the ancestral faith (402E). Logic, quotations, sheer earnestness are applied to the defense of the national religion, but Plutarch himself is his most persuasive argument; there can be no difficulties if so cultured and intelligent and charming a person finds none. Sojourns at shrines, observance of festival days, participation in religious exercises, dances, sacrifices, and mysteries

6. This is convincingly demonstrated in Roger M. Jones's excellent University of Chicago dissertation, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (Menasha, 1916).

bring jollity and happiness and freedom from fear and anxiety (1101E); these are the pleasantest things that men can enjoy (169D). The *practical* advantages of punctilious observance are illustrated, significantly, from Roman history. Fabius Maximus (4) showed the Romans that their recent disaster came upon them because their general had neglected the proper religious rites. The Romans were punctilious even in trifling matters of religion, but they did not fall into superstition, because they never deviated from their ancient rites. But those who live in the love of god experience a joy and hope which counterweighs ten thousand fold the fear which is the attitude of the superstitious; atheists deny themselves this joy and hope (1101D, 1102C). They are blinded to the most brilliant and powerful concept that man can have—the idea of God (167AB). But professed atheists are less dangerous than certain Stoics whose impiety, though concealed, is fundamentally more scandalous (1075A).

Needless to say, observance (to say nothing of ethics for the moment) requires more than mere formalism. The visitor to the oracle must think holy thoughts as well as pronounce words of good omen (378D). Plutarch is impatient with the parrot guides (395A, 400D) and the ignorant theologians (417F) at Delphi. He recognizes the immorality of assigning to a wicked man who happened to have been initiated a higher position than to such a good man as Epaminondas (21F). The practice of justice comes first; ceremonial obligations come after moral obligations have been discharged. Against superstition Plutarch is more vehement than against atheism (164E, 355D); many escape the quagmire of superstition only to fall over the precipice of atheism (378A). The cult of Attis and Adonis is condemned as being full of barbaric superstition (756C). Sacred writings must be free of superstition and exaggeration (352B, 608B); superstition must be cleansed from men's opinions of the gods like rheum from the eye (1101C). Not religious men, but superstitious ones are frightened by the fantastic geography and denizens of the nether world (167A); these are really only old wives' tales (1105B).

> As for me, if it be lawful to say such a thing, I believe that the impious require neither man nor god to exact punishment of them, but their own lives is a sufficient punishment, all corrupted and confounded as it is by evil (556D).

Nevertheless, the thought of retribution in a future existence is a

deterrent for the wicked (1104B); this is the main point in the Thespesios myth (564-565). It may be added that Plutarch himself often shows a credulity which comes perilously near to superstition, as when he tells how Heracles was entertained by his own sacristan (*Romulus* 5), or how Athena herself prescribed for a workman who was injured working on her Parthenon (*Pericles* 13).

What is the object of this meticulous worship? More than his predecessors Plutarch likes to use *theos* in the singular, but even the plural is nothing more than a common Greek locution. In any case, he asserts the unity of god at many points, definitely at 377F and in memorable words at 393C:

> He exists for no fixed time, but for the everlasting ages which are immovable, timeless and undeviating, in which there is no earlier nor later, no future nor past, no older nor younger; but he, being one, has with only one "Now" completely filled "Forever"; and only when being is after his pattern is it in reality being, not having been or about to be, nor has it had a beginning nor is it destined to come to an end. Under these conditions, therefore, we ought, as we pay him reverence, to greet him and to address him with the words, "Thou art"; or even, I vow, as did some of the men of old, "Thou art One."

Different peoples call him by different names, but he is universal (377F):

> God is not senseless nor inanimate nor subject to human control. . . . Nor do we think of the gods as different gods among different peoples, nor as barbarian gods and Greek gods, nor as southern and northern gods; but just as the sun and the moon and the heavens and the earth and the sea are common to all but are called by different names by different peoples, so for that one rationality which keeps all these things in order and the one Providence which watches over them and the ancillary powers that are set over all, there have arisen among different peoples, in accordance with their customs, different honors and appellations.

It is when we look at god's attributes listed by Plutarch that we realize how far we have come from the older view which, as Mr. Edwyn Bevan has written,[7] credited the Olympians with only two ethical functions, the care of oaths and of suppliants. God is the single king and ruler of all, holding the beginning, middle and end of all (601B). His majesty is associated with goodness, magnanimity, kindliness, and solicitude (167E). Through the eyes of justice god

7. *Later Greek Religion* (London, 1927), p. xi.

watches in every direction the deeds that are done here and yonder, on land and on sea (161F). He knows each man's character and nature, and this knowledge, not vengeance, is the basis for the punishment of the wicked (562D). He may be perceived, not by the sense, but by the spirit (1002C). He requires nothing (*Comp. Aristides and Cato* 4). He is good, and is free from anger, fear, envy, hatred (1102D), in fact, from emotion generally (420E). He is fatherly and just and has created a state wherein gods and men can live in common harmoniously and happily, under the guidance of harmony and justice (1065E). He is consummately good and lacks none of the virtues, least of all those which concern justice and friendliness, for these are the fairest (423D). Heaven is our first and most important friend (140D). God is himself Dike and Themis, the most ancient and most perfect of laws (781B); yet he is honorable and humane, and so to be emulated by princes (781A). The most reverend and the divinest element in divinity is virtue (*Aristides* 6), and it is incredible that heaven demanded or welcomed the human sacrifices of ancient days (417C). Only such barbaric peoples as Jews and Syrians picture god as cruel rather than beneficent (1051E). It would not be remarkable if only isolated passages (and many, many more might be cited) occurred, considering the volume of Plutarch's extant work; the important thing is that practically every page of his work breathes forth the attitude indicated in these passages.

Plutarch's god, like Plato's, is transcendent, but not, as these passages show, to a degree that prevents him from being at the same time a personal and friendly god. In explaining the origin of the universe Plutarch has less need to deviate from Platonic doctrine. The oldest theologians and poets regarded god as the only cause of the world, and the physicists were concerned with material causes alone (436E). Plato combined both principles and assigned to each its proper place; both are necessary, for god cannot make the incorporeal (1014C). But with only god and unqualified matter, how account for evil? Plato introduced the Disordered Soul as the cause of motion in disordered matter, for motion can be caused by soul only; this chaotic and capricious principle god reduced to order and then transformed into a World Soul (1017B). "God changed *akosmia* to *kosmos* by means of *eutaxia* (good order), removing nothing of what existed nor adding to it, but by placing each thing in its appropriate

place he achieved for nature a most comely instead of an amorphous form" (615F; *eutaxia* and *taxis* are used to explain god's part in creation more fully in 927A). The result is *harmonia*. "Reason adjusts the universe and creates concord out of discordant elements; it does not destroy but only cripples the destructive force" (373D). Following Plato, god is called "the unbegotten and eternal father of the cosmos and all creatures" (718F). He *begot* rather than merely made the world, because there is no continuing relationship between a maker and the article made, whereas "the force and principle of the begetter is mingled in the offspring; it contains the nature of the begetter, a portion derived from himself" (1001B). But, as Heraclitus has said, the harmony of the Cosmos is resilient (*palintonos*), like a lyre or a bow (369B, 473F, 1026B).

The World Soul is a self-moving nature, as Plato called it, the fountain and beginning of movement (1031C). Xenocrates had called it a self-moving number (1012D); its being is not number, but it is ordered according to number (1023D). It shares in divine reason, prudence, and harmony, but it possesses also the destructive force, which god has suppressed but cannot destroy (373D). At times the rational part of the World Soul is weary and forgetful of itself; again it is aroused and vigorous and looks to the example of god (1026F).

> As the result of two opposed principles and two antagonistic forces, one of which guides us along a straight course to the right, while the other turns us aside and backward, our life is complex, and so also is the universe. . . . For if it is the law of nature that nothing comes into being without a cause, and if the good cannot provide a cause for evil, then it follows that nature must have in herself the source and origin of evil just as she contains the source and origin of good. The majority of men and the wisest hold these opinions: Some think there are two gods, rivals as it were, the one the artificer of good and the other of evil; others call the better one a god and the other a demon (369D, cf. 1026B).

Such dualism had been taught in various forms by Empedocles, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Zoroaster; but Plutarch's Platonism makes god one, it is matter that partakes of good and evil. The evil tendencies in men are exemplified by the weaknesses of the characters described in the *Lives*.

Then what of the multiplicity of gods in the national religion? Apollo, at least in the Delphian dialogues, is practically identical with Zeus as the supreme god. He possesses the divine attributes,

including unity (384F, 393C, 417F, 715D, 724BC), and is the object of pious devotion. The others are universal ancillary powers (*dynameis hypourgoi*), for whom different honors and appellations have arisen among different peoples (377F). They are benefactors and lovers of mankind (1051E), themselves free of disease (1067C). It is most important not to regard representations or other symbols of the gods, inanimate or (as among the Egyptians) animate, as the gods themselves, for this makes religion ridiculous and brings it into discredit (377D). It is even more important to avoid resolving the divine into physical phenomena, by making Dionysus wine, Hephaestus fire, and the like, by calling the warlike spirit in us Ares, passion Aphrodite, reason Hermes, intelligence Athene, the arts Muses (757B). Ares is *not* our feeling of courage, but the god who orders and directs this feeling. These subordinate powers Plutarch equates with the gods of popular religion. The traditions current about them which are at variance with Plutarch's notion of the divine belong not really to them, but to the class of beings that we must now glance at.

How can the divine manage an imperfect world without marring his own transcendent perfection? And how can imperfect men have dealings with a perfect and transcendent god? An important and characteristic feature in Plutarch's system is a class of intermediaries called daemons, who solve this difficulty: those who first taught their existence and function have resolved more and greater perplexities for mankind than did Plato with his discovery of *hyle* and *physis* (414F; this and the following sections contain an excellent exposition of the subject; the classic instance of a daemon is Diotima's account of Eros, *Symposium* 202E).

> The stories about Typhon, Osiris, and Isis are records of experiences of neither gods nor men but of daemons . . . stronger than men and in their might greatly surpassing our nature, yet not possessing the divine quality unmixed and uncontaminated, but with a share also in the nature of the soul and in the perceptive faculties of the body, and with a susceptibility to pleasure and pain and to whatsoever other experience is incident to these mutations, and is the source of much disquiet in some and of less in others. For in daemons as in men there are divers degrees of virtue and of vice (360E).

The discreditable stories told of the gods, rapine and wandering, concealment and banishments and servitude, happened, in fact, not to gods but to daemons (417E). Asklepios (518D, Numa 4), Pan

(419D), the Sirens (745C), and others are mentioned as examples of well-known daemons. Daemons and not gods have oracles in charge, for gods ought to be free of earthly concerns (418E). They guard the tempered constitution of creation, slackening here and tightening there (436F). They are guardians of men (1124E), of individuals (*Galba* 10.4; *Caesar* 69.2) as well as of peoples (*Fabius* 17; 324B). It is a daemon that sends souls down to earth (330D), and after death a daemon helps the soul reach the lunar regions (594A). Souls are purified for a varying period in interlunar space and then ascend to the moon and become daemons; but they must descend again to care for oracles and participate in the highest mysteries. They punish injustice, are saviors in battle and on the sea; and if they become guilty of anger, injustice, or envy, they are imprisoned in human bodies again (944C). They and the furies, not the Olympians, inflict punishment (458C). Daemons bring pestilences and failure of crops and stir up wars and civil discords until they succeed in obtaining a human soul they desire which is incarnate in a body (417D). His personal daemon appeared dramatically to Brutus at Delphi (*Brutus* 36), and Alexander's murder of Cleitus is partly exculpated as the fault of Cleitus' evil daemon (*Alexander* 50). Daemons' voices go everywhere, but resound only in those who are tranquil and free of perturbation (589D). Docile spirits hear their daemons' voice from infancy (592C); so the Egyptians think little children possess the power of prophecy (356E). The failure of prophetic shrines is due to the defection of their daemons, and when the daemons return the shrines resume their function (418D).[8]

Daemons, then, rank next to Gods, but there is a stage of heroes between them and men, so that the *cursus honorum* is men, heroes, daemons, gods (*Romulus* 28.8). Heroes are, of course, an ordinary phenomenon in Greek religion; an instance in Plutarch is Cleomenes who, after he had been crucified and a serpent had coiled itself about his body, was worshipped as a hero by the Alexandrians (*Cleomenes* 39). The various orders of ministering powers are all guided for the good

8. Many critics have noticed inconsistencies in Plutarch's concept of daemons: they are variously (1) supermundane godlike powers, but subject to feeling and perishable; (2) souls free of bodies; (3) souls separated from bodies or who have received none; (4) hostile genii. There is really no difficulty. Plato had suggested, and the national religion demanded, such intermediaries; Plutarch believed in their existence but admitted several possibilities as to their nature, origin and fate. Attempts to date various treatises by their views on daemons are futile.

of the whole by Providence; god and providence are mentioned together as synonyms, like chance and accident (435E). God regulates the world with harmony; he uses no compulsion but makes Persuasion introduce Necessity (*Phocion* 2). Necessity tempered by persuasion the vulgar call fate; the powers of necessity and mind penetrate everything (1026BC). Fate really is practically equivalent to Providence (573A); we find such expressions as "The decrees of fate and providence" (111E).

Tyche (*Fortuna*) is blind chance. Rome prospered because of Tyche *and* Providence (323F). To avoid the appearance of boasting a man should ascribe some of his success to god and some to Tyche (542E). In many of the *Lives* Tyche follows the hero: Timoleon (21), Pelopidas (13), King Agathocles (*Flaminius* 90), Lucullus (29). But Tyche is not to be trusted (464A); she sometimes grows jealous (*Aemilius* 22, *Sulla* 6). "Among the illustrations which men give of the mutations of Tyche, the expulsion of Dionysius from Syracuse is still to this day the strongest and plainest" (*Dion* 50).

Plutarch's attitude to miracles could be only what it is: he is as critical as he dares to be, but he believes. His views are summarized for us in a long passage in *Coriolanus* 38:

> That statues have appeared to sweat, and shed tears, and exude something like blood is not impossible, since wood and stone often contract a mould . . . and receive tints from the atmosphere; and there is nothing in the way of believing that the deity uses these phenomena sometimes as signs and portents. But that articulate speech should proceed from a lifeless thing is altogether impossible. . . . But where history forces our assent with numerous and credible witnesses, we must conclude that an experience different from that of sensation arises in the imaginative part of the soul and persuades men to think it sensation. . . . However, those who cherish strong feelings of good will and affection for the deity, and are therefore unable to reject or deny anything of this kind, have a strong argument for their faith in the wonderful and transcendent character of the divine power. For the deity has no resemblance whatever to man, neither in nature, activity, skill, nor strength; nor, if he does something we cannot do or contrives something that we cannot contrive, is this contrary to reason.

Of the continuous revelation of the divine through oracles and portents he has no doubt whatever. He is suspicious of the pretensions of certain soothsayers (*Sulla* 7), and very angry with charlatans (407C). The middle ground between gullibility and scepticism is

best (*Camillus* 6); to a modern reader glancing over the numerous prodigies reported as genuine the impression is that Plutarch leans towards gullibility. He confirms the possibility of a miraculously speedy arrival of news of victory on a distant battlefield by referring to an incident of A.D. 91, of which he remarks, "These facts are known to everyone of our time" (*Aemilius Paulus* 25). Of the numerous forms of magic current in his day he is more suspicious. Some he exposes as charlatanry, others as natural phenomena. He offers education as an antidote:

> A woman studying geometry will be ashamed to be a dancer, and she will not swallow any beliefs in magic charms while she is under the charm of Plato's or Xenophon's words. And if anybody professes power to pull the moon down from the sky, she will laugh at the ignorance and stupidity of women who believe these things, inasmuch as she herself is not unschooled in astronomy (145C).

We have spoken of the various levels of superhuman beings and their manifestations, and it remains now to say a word of man. To Plutarch nothing was more interesting than the nature and conduct of man, and one who marks the passages relevant to these subjects will find more than half his book underscored. Of ethics his most systematic treatment is in *De virtute morali,* in which he follows Aristotle. Ethical virtues are to be distinguished from intellectual. Ethical virtue consists not in uprooting the passions but in regulating them by reason; virtue is the mean between the excessive and the deficient; emotion is its matter and reason its form. But the Aristotelian framework does not imply rejection of Platonic ethics; there are numerous ethical ideas derived from Plato. It is worse to injure than to be injured (36B: *Gorgias* 473A). Virtue is likeness to God (550D: *Theaetetus* 176B). We are not to think that good is merely escape from evil (1091B: *Republic* 584 DE). Pure pleasures are those that do not partake of their opposite, pain (1092E: *Philebus* 51-52). Plutarch maintains the freedom of the will, though he offers no arguments in support (*Coriolanus* 32); he attacks the notion that god is responsible for evil and yet punishes it (1050E). We must not forget that the prime purpose of all the *Lives* and most of the *Moralia* is the inculcation of ethical ideas.

De virtute morali 441C ff. also provides the most succinct exposition of Plutarch's opinions on the soul. He discusses the disparate

parts of the soul as divided by Plato and by Aristotle, but himself finds it simpler to think only of two souls, the rational and the irrational. "Our soul has its two sides: on the one side are truthfulness, love for what is honorable, and power to reason, and on the other side irrationality, love of falsehood, and the emotional element" (61D, cf. 566A). Of souls outside the body Plutarch's main thoughts are those of Plato, and like Plato's conveyed in myths. There are three great myths, in *De sera numinis vindicta*, *De genio Socratis*, and *De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet*. They describe the fall of the soul from a more blessed condition to birth upon the earth; the sojourn of the soul after death in a place of reward or punishment; subsequent rebirth in the form of man or animal; and final restoration to its previous state. The principle non-Platonic elements are the connection with demonology, the different treatment of *nous* and *psyche* (*nous* is as much better and more divine than *psyche* as *psyche* than body: 943A), and speculations on the part played by the sun and moon. In these myths, as indeed in Plutarch's concept of daemons, there is much that is vague and even inconsistent; they are, after all, of the nature of poetry, not factual exposition, and are the flowering of faith, not its roots. What emerges as certain is that the soul is immortal and that it is subject to rewards and punishments; transmigration is probable but uncertain. In these fantasies it seems to Plutarch, as it should seem to us, unnecessary to dot the i's and cross the t's if the general character is legible.

Given Plutarch's training and outlook, his views on these and other matters may be easily and accurately surmised and, because his species is fortunately not extinct, would occasion no surprise. But one belief which, to my mind, stands at the very core of Plutarch's faith we might find strange, though it is equally a consequence of his general attitude, and that is his elevation of Hellenism itself into a religion. Much nonsense has been written of the syncretism of Plutarch and of his cosmopolitanism. The plain fact is that his syncretism never involves mingling but the assimilation of an alien god to Greek ideas. All the exotic religions except the Egyptian, for whose antiquity he had a reverent regard and to whose identity with the Greek Herodotus had already pointed, he looked upon as barbarous superstitions. I cite one significant example among many (169C):

Because it was the Sabbath day the Jews sat in their places immovable

while the enemy were planting ladders against the walls of Jerusalem and capturing the defenses, and they did not get up, but remained there, fast bound in the toils of superstition as in one great net.

It is the same with the character of non-Greek peoples (799D):

The Carthaginians are bitter, sullen, subservient to their rulers, harsh to their subjects, most abject when afraid, most savage when enraged, stubborn in adhering to decisions, disagreeable and hard in their attitude towards playfulness and urbanity.

The last named fault is a common failing of those who dwell *in partibus infidelium*. A "good" foreigner is an assimilated one; Isocrates had already taught (*Panegyricus* 50) that the thing which makes a man a Greek is his culture rather than his descent. The conviction emerges that Greek culture has now become a cult. To sit at a symposium and discourse urbanely of subjects in the liberal arts curriculum is to do service to that cult, and so is being a petty magistrate and pretending to be a Greek statesman, or being a priest of an obsolescent shrine.

It is in the service of this cult, I think, that the *Lives* were written. Their purpose is not to introduce Greeks to Romans or Romans to Greeks, but to show Greeks that their own past could boast statesmen and warriors (there was no need to press the point for writers and philosophers) that were easily comparable to those of their Roman masters. If the demonstration seems to us unnecessary, we must remember that Greeks had now been under Roman domination for centuries and might be inclined to accept the contemptuous attitude of the Romans towards themselves. The pride and loyalty which Plutarch inculcates is an aspect not of patriotism but of religion. It is as fantastic to expect Plutarch to question Roman domination as it is to object to his acceptance of slavery. The Romans are the divinely chosen instrument for preserving security and order (602E, 408B); but one need only read such *Lives* as those of Marcus Cato or of Marius to feel Plutarch's contempt for the "barbarism" of individual Romans. In the Greek city state man and citizen were indistinguishable; there were no other loyalties. Now Hellenism is a Church in a larger political structure. One recalls Plutarch's contemporary, Johanan ben Zakkai, who, after the fall of Jerusalem, left government and nationalism to the Romans and took his disciples to Jamnia to make a religion of a civilization.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE PARTICULARITIES OF HISTORY*

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I

In the early years of the present century it was often contended that philosophy must be based on science. But, unfortunately, the term science came to be taken as implying simply the sciences of physical nature. Indeed, the tendency to narrowness has been carried even further, to a main or sometimes sole reliance upon the science of physics. As contrasted with the latter half of the nineteenth century, there has been comparatively little attention to the biological sciences and their significance for philosophy. The fundamental defects of much contemporary philosophy are chiefly due to this limited mode of approach to its problems. But there is another serious weakness in much of the philosophical reflection of our time, shown in the timid reluctance of so many philosophers to admit the metaphysical implications in their positions. The use of such terms as "phenomenology" only serves to reveal attempts to dodge ultimate issues. In consequence, too much contemporary philosophy manifests a radical instability and a lack of what might be called "backbone."

In contrast to this, it must be maintained that philosophy is to be based not merely on science, as so narrowly understood, but upon all realms of human experience and all branches of knowledge. Further, it must be insisted that no philosophy is possible which does not explicitly or implicitly involve the metaphysical as concerned with the nature of ultimates. Those who profess to reject or ignore metaphysics, either present us with a form of agnosticism under the guise of philosophy, or often implicate conflicting metaphysics in their expositions. In nothing is the failure to face metaphysical issues so clear as in much of contemporary writing on sociology, history, and religion. Thus we have sociologists with conceptions of society as dominant in their expositions, and no fundamental understanding of the individual

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person, championing ideas of democracy which involve definite, but unacknowledged concepts of the individual. Some writers on religion endeavor to describe it in terms which implicate a naturalistic metaphysics which they are themselves not aware of, or are too weak openly to admit.

The present paper, concerned with some aspects of history and religion, implies a definite metaphysics which is explicitly acknowledged. For it, each reality is of its own kind: it is itself and not some other thing. The concept "real" is incapable of connotative definition. Nevertheless, it is possible to be aware of similarities as well as differences of "reals." Thus, we may significantly talk of the physical and psychical, or the material and mental, and of relations. Though existence is dualistic in one regard and pluralistic in another, realities are related, even if the relations be solely or in the main external. To defend this metaphysics is not the immediate task. It must suffice simply to state that it recognizes physical existents, minds, and relations, of which we are concerned with our physical world, men, God and their relations.

Christianity is essentially an affair of history, and for an understanding of it a metaphysics of history appears to be involved. It will be readily understood that attention must here be limited to human history—to the neglect of that of infra-human beings. The view of history now presented implies that time is real. It is real in its own kind. That statement is admittedly tautological, and as such indicates that one is concerned with a metaphysical ultimate. Time cannot be described except in terms of itself; and it cannot rightly be explained away by reference to terms other than itself. Human experience is temporal; and human history is human experience. The explanation of history as experience, if it has any, lies in itself, and not in concepts derived from the sciences of physical nature. History as experience is in the lives of persons as particular individuals. This is the first important metaphysical contention. For in the plain ordinary sense of the terms, it is only individual persons that we know of as experiencing. The notions of an "absolute experience" of some forms of Idealism, and of a "social experience" of some types of sociology, are arrived at by fallacies of composition. They are sometimes due also to a failure to recognize that "internal" relations are no less and no more "intelligible" (whatever that may mean!) than "external";

that (using Lotze's terms) "immanent" causality is no less mysterious than "transeunt." [1]

Sociologists, in spite of a not uncommon rejection of the concept of a "group mind," too frequently develop their expositions as though implicitly they accept it. In their failure to recognize the metaphysical status and nature of individual persons as particular realities, both Absolute Idealists and many sociologists give quite inadequate and unsatisfactory accounts of evils in history. The Absolutists must either conceive the Absolute experience as involved in the contradictions between truths and errors, and the oppositions of the moral and immoral, etc., or must maintain that all forms of evil are just "negative moments." Society as "group mind" (whether explicitly admitted or implicitly involved) must also have the conflicts within itself. Such views appear to be simply the futilities of rationalistic speculation. For those not under the spell of this sophistication, experience reveals that, in any senses of the terms real and positive, there are evils just as real and positive as there are goods. Further, they are aware that the conflicts and oppositions of society are those of the particular individuals who compose it.

It is maintained, therefore, that the subjects and agents of human history are particular individuals, even though their experience is often due to their relation to what is beyond themselves, as the physical world, other men, and, if there be such, God. But there is an important question which is too rarely considered today either by philosophers or sociologists, and also altogether too infrequently by theologians. It may be stated in this fashion: Whence come these particular subjects and agents of history? Are they merely products of the past, or are they something new that comes in, carrying on history? That the physical bodies of human individuals are products of the past may be admitted without discussion. The same is not evident of them as minds. Yet it is more as minds that they are concerned in history. Though movements of physical bodies are involved in history, it is only as those movements are significant for the enjoyments and sufferings[2] as experienced by minds. Neither science nor philosophy has been able to show incontrovertibly that as minds human beings are

1. To avoid my being charged with an error, I may point out that Lotze himself accepted "immanent" but rejected "transeunt" causality.

2. "Enjoyment" and "suffering" should not be interpreted here hedonistically.

the products of their parents' minds. It is still far from being established that the individual mind is composite; in fact, the metaphysical problem of unity, of unitariness, of individuality, is raised. Psychical differences between parents and children cannot be simply explained, while many of their similarities may be results of their social interaction with one another. From the standpoint of metaphysics, it is possible to maintain that minds as the particular subjects and agents *come into* the historical sequence. Though it is, of course, no explanation of but only an admission of this, Christianity may talk of them as created by God.

History as the experience of individuals occurs with relation to the physical world. Physical nature is a relatively stable stage upon which are enacted the dramas of history. "Relatively stable" means that the qualities and processes of the physical world do not change chaotically, but are, at least in the main, regular, orderly, uniform, persistent. Yet each and every part of nature, each and every process, however described in conceptual terms, is in itself particular. The particularities of history occur on the stage of nature with its particularities. The failure to recognize the particularity of the actual has all too frequently led to deterministic theories as though covering all aspects of nature. This has been due in large measure to merely rationalistic reflection on concepts without regard to the contingencies of the location of the constituents of nature and of the interactions of processes. So far as stable nature *may* be entirely determined, but inasmuch as it is not without contingencies it is not merely deterministic. Human bodies, as parts of physical nature, are relatively stable, and they are particulars. History involves the particularities both of the stabilities and the contingencies of nature. Without the relative stability of nature, human history as we know it, would not be possible. This is a contention with metaphysical implication.

Human minds, also, are at least relatively stable. It is possible to subsume their qualities and processes under general terms, and to say that these are in the main regular, orderly, uniform, and persistent. Yet human minds are real as particulars: each is itself and not some other thing. But this is not to say that they are isolated. All human minds with which we are concerned are related historically on the same stage of physical nature. We may say that there is a multiplicity of histories: each the experience of each individual. Together they

constitute actual history, as distinct from concepts formed about history. So far as stable in their qualities and processes human minds *may* be determined, but inasmuch as they are not without contingencies, they are not entirely determined. Without both the stabilities and the contingencies of particular human minds, history as we know it would not be possible. That also is a contention with metaphysical implication.

It is just because nature is relatively stable, that is, has stabilities and contingencies, that it provides a suitable stage for human history. It is just because human minds are relatively stable, that is, have stabilities and contingencies, that history occurs. Here also the facts of the similarities and differences of individual persons as the particular subjects and agents of history must be accorded great significance. It is because individual minds are sufficiently alike that co-operation is possible: it is because of their differences that co-operation is mutually profitable. That nature and the similarities and differences of human minds so fit together, making history possible and significant, suggests that the constitution of all of them is not due to mere chance but is in accord with the idea of God as their creator. It is not meant that this is a demonstrative proof of the existence of God, but that the idea of God, otherwise based, may be brought in as the best explanation of the combined facts. Again, this is a contention with metaphysical implication.

The conception of the particularities of history is far wider in its content than its reference to particular persons. Their histories are composed of particular, though not unrelated, experiences. The particularity is evident even in our social groupings: my family, for example, is my family, a specific group. An individual's history is constituted of particular experiences, most of which can be given names, as for example, the enjoyment of an opera. Is history then simply one experience along with or after another? Yes and no. Many experiences, simultaneous and successive are related in more or less systematic unities. Nevertheless, not all are so related. Philosophically it cannot be regarded as significant whether I read my newspaper before, during, or after breakfast. It does not seem possible to say that all the individual's experiences blend into a unity such that they have a significance in their togetherness. Neither is a significant unity found by combining the experiences of all the individuals forming a social group. It is, however, clear that there are continuities and

unities such as those of culture in history. Yet it is an error to consider these as though impersonal developing wholes of significance apart from the particular experiences of individual persons.

Each individual has some recognition of the less and more significant in his experiences. He finds the worth or value, the good or the evil in experience, sometimes being intrinsic, sometimes extrinsic to some related experience, sometimes both extrinsically and intrinsically significant. As an agent the individual may initiate and sustain a continuity of unified experiences. In contrast with the spasmodic and transient nature of so many experiences due to his relation with the physical world and other human beings, he may acknowledge the enduring worth of certain qualities of his own character as a particular person. His history may have a fundamental value in his character as it is for himself. It will have another fundamental value in his regard for these good qualities in others. From one point of view, an essential of Christianity is the continuity of the love of self, and others as ourselves, in history. Compared with this, most other valuable experiences are as "tinkling cymbals."

II

We may turn now to consider Christianity from the standpoint of the previous exposition. In doing so, it is necessary to state that it is primarily Christianity as experienced religion with which we are concerned. Doctrines come into consideration relative to that experience and to the metaphysical ultimates they involve. Already some of these ultimates have been referred to, and here it must suffice to restate them: God, the physical world and individual minds created by God with relative stability and the capacity for contingencies making history possible. The bases given, Christianity is concerned with the purpose or purposes of history. If we use the single term, the purpose according to Christianity might be described as "life abundant for all." But it is better to talk of the purposes which are thus summed up. Intent on some of these, Christians have not infrequently adopted a narrow conception which has been called "other-worldly." But an adequate view both of Christianity and of history requires the widest possible conception of the purposes of history. This may be expressed in a formal way: the purposes of history are the experience of all the values possible through the relationship of nature, self, and other

minds, including God. It may also be described in the words of the New Testament: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are venerable, whatsoever things are righteous, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things."

With his physical body the individual may enjoy economic physical goods, and the Christian view of history may recognize these. With a knowable physical world and other minds, human beings created with the capacity to know, may justifiably include knowledge as a purpose of history. With appreciation for the beautiful, and sometimes with the skill to create it in works of art, human beings acknowledge the aesthetic as within the significance of history. Even the phrase, "the love of God," as used by Christians may be understood to involve recognition of all economic and cultural values as made possible by His creation. Nevertheless, that phrase means something more for religion as a specific form of experience. Though it may have other implications for life (as the one suggested), in itself it is an experience of personal relationship of worth in itself. It is an emotional attitude, of devotion, awe, reverence, worship, and praise. For Christianity this is the supreme purpose of history. The next is "like unto it": the love of minds other than God, including ourselves. But as it is implied that true love for its perfection requires a worthy object, each has the moral task of becoming such. These purposes are not conceived as simply a goal or "end" of history, but as, however imperfectly, constituting part—it should be the chief part—of the experiences which are history.

"Love of God," "Communion with God," as the supreme attainment in religion, and the highest of all values, is what is of greatest importance in Christianity. So, the saying of St. Augustine has been echoed and re-echoed throughout the ages: "Our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee." St. Thomas à Kempis uses almost the same words: "For my heart cannot truly rest nor be entirely contented unless it rest in Thee; and pass above all gifts and creatures." "Love is born of God; and can only rest in God above all created things." Implied in this recognition is acknowledged a fundamental for the understanding both of religion and history: that God is not merely the creator of those bases (to which we have referred) making history possible, but is Himself present in it. Love of God does not arise out

of, nor is it instigated by, the contemplation of "created things," the physical world of nature or human selves. Whatever terms men may have used at their different levels of experience and of language, throughout history God has revealed Himself and at the same time the chief significance of history. God as the Other of religious experience: that is the true meaning and nature of revelation. Ever-living, ever-active creator and sustainer of the relatively stable yet changing stage, He is the predominant author of the dramas (or drama) of history, playing the chief role, even though some of the actors may cause confusion by ignoring Him and deviating from His purposes.

As is evident from its doctrines of atonement and redemption, Christianity is much concerned with the salvation of these sinners. For it recognizes amongst the contingencies of human lives, that, by freedom of choice, individuals may take up attitudes of opposition to the divine purposes of history. But all too frequently in exposition salvation has been discussed in general terms with a sort of fallacy of composition analogous to that in the Absolutists' "absolute experience" and the sociologists' "group mind." What we actually have in history are particularities of salvation. Salvation, as distinct from theological concepts about it, is in the experience of the particular individuals, who are the only subjects or experients of human history. It is experience with two bases, the repentant attitude of the particular individual and the grace of God shown towards and felt by him. Only if this particularity is acknowledged can the fact of salvation in history be properly understood.

It is in the highest degree unfortunate that early Christian doctrinal formulas concerning Jesus and his part in salvation have been preserved by the strength of ecclesiastical organization. Jesus, as individual person, was a particular of history; his life and death were composed of particular experiences. Traditional doctrine has represented his death as a unique particular experience constituting salvation. The vagaries of the attempts to explain this doctrine do not require consideration here. It is, of course, associated with that other traditional doctrine that Jesus was "God-incarnate." That also must be passed over now, as truly of indifference to that with which we are concerned. It is God who saves, and salvation is experience of particular individuals, whatever social relations they may be in. There

is not the slightest evidence that salvation as such depends upon the death of Jesus. Salvation had been experienced by the religious (as expressed, for example, in some of the Hebrew psalms) before Jesus, and by others after him who knew nothing of him. God is merciful: He is no more likely to withhold His grace for salvation from those who call Jesus "incarnate Deity," than from devout Sikhs who do not do so. Jesus, perhaps more than all others in human history, has helped towards salvation in calling men to repent and pointing them to God. He manifested to men the attitude and type of personality of one for whom the love of God is supreme.

In his teaching Jesus expressed, in phraseology from the religion of his forefathers, the main purposes of history: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God"; "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." He recognized that without these the other values, to the attainment and enjoyment of which men give themselves up in history, would not completely satisfy. "What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" It is in view of the second of these purposes that Christians in general have insisted that, though an experience of the individual, salvation is not completely realized by the soul alone with God. Except by a few hermits, Christianity has been understood to involve a continuity of experiences of fellowship, for which the organization of the Christian Church has been a means and an expression. In this the Christian Church may be called, as Jesus also may be, a "mediator" of salvation.

According to the metaphysics here presented, history is the related particular experiences of particular individuals. Death may not be the end of the history of a human being, but itself an experience that is followed by still further experiences. However confused sociologists may be regarding the nature of the individual person, even they cannot blink the fact of the particularity of his birth and death. Apart from noting that Christianity includes the conviction of a continuity of human minds beyond the deaths of physical bodies, we do not propose to consider human immortality. But, in traditional Christianity, this conviction has been associated with belief in the resurrection of Jesus. This is not the place to try to show that the claim once made that this "is the most certain fact in history" is probably the reverse of the truth. What is important is that by their attention to the notion of the resurrection of the "body" of Jesus, and its application as the

basis for belief in a future life, Christians have been too often led to neglect the far greater significance of resurrection as a spiritual fact. Such spiritual resurrection is fundamental for history, for it is the capacity of minds ever and again "to rise on their dead selves to higher things." The fact of spiritual resurrection is that no particular experiences of the past or the present entirely and irrevocably determine the spiritual experiences of the future. With it the future has open possibilities for the main values of history: personal character, the love of the brethren, and the love of God. With it, even other values of culture though lost may be regained, and activity turned also to replacing or reconstructing physical goods. On the one hand, if the stories of the resurrection of Jesus were true, they would not prove human immortality; on the other, spiritual resurrection as involved in history as lived is of the utmost significance.

As distinct from the dogmas with which too often Christian theologians and their opponents identify it. Christianity consists of the particular experiences of particular individuals—human beings and God—in their relations with one another. History is constituted of the related particular experiences of these individuals. The ideal of history, conceived as identical with the ideal of Christianity comprehensively understood, is the experience of the love of God, of others as ourselves, and of all goods economic and cultural which God in the creation of the physical world and of our minds, with their varied capacities, makes possible.

AN ANALYSIS OF PIETY

By Abraham Heschel

From time immemorial, piety has been esteemed as one of the more precious ideals of human character. At all times, and in all places, men have striven to acquire piety, and no effort or sacrifice has seemed too costly to this end. Was this merely an illusion on their part, a flight of the imagination? No! It was a real virtue—something solid, clearly to be seen, and of real power. Thus, as a specific fact of existence met with in life, it is something which indisputably deserves examination. That it is commonly neglected or overlooked by scientific research is due partly to the methodological difficulties involved in an approach to such a subject, but more fundamentally to the fact that it has theological connections which are somewhat repellent to the modern mind. To some, piety suggests escape from normal life, an abandonment of the world, seclusion, a denial of cultural interests, and is associated with an old-fashioned, clerical, unctuous pattern of behavior. To others, the word suggests prudishness, if not hypocrisy and fanaticism, or seems symptomatic of an attitude towards life which is unhealthy and, indeed, absurd. In the interests of mental health and spiritual freedom, they feel that such an attitude to life as that of piety is to be rejected.

Yet the pious man is still with us. He has not vanished from the earth, and, indeed more frequently than is generally realized, situations in normal life are to be encountered which are full of the evidence of pious devotion. The presence of piety amongst us is thus an incontestable fact, so why should prejudice deter us from investigating this phenomenon and, at least, endeavoring to understand it?

To begin with, we may ask—what is piety? Is it some psychical disposition or quality of the spirit? Is it a state of mind? or an attitude? or a praxis? What are its essential features? What is its meaning and value? What is its significance? What are its aspirations? Is it a unique phenomenon, or is it an accidental circumstance concomitant with other events of human life? What is the inner life of a pious man like? What are the underlying concepts, and what are the apprehensions that are realized in acts of piety?

We are not here discussing that implicit faith which is involved in

general systems of faith and worship but is not acquired independently by individuals, nor is it our intention to scrutinize critically any doctrine or creed. Our purpose, rather, is to analyze the pious man, and to examine, not his position with regard to any specific form of institutionalized religion, but his attitudes towards the elemental forces of reality. What does God mean in his life? What is his attitude towards the world, towards life, towards his inner forces as well as towards his possessions?

Piety is not a psychological concept. The word belongs as little to psychological nomenclature as do the logical concepts of true and false, the ethical concepts of right and wrong, or the aesthetic concepts of beautiful and ugly. Piety does not denote a function, but an ideal, of the soul. Like wisdom or truthfulness, it is something attainable, and is subject to the individual character of a man, being colored by his qualities. Thus there is a passionate as well as a sober type of piety, an active as well as a quietistic type, an emotional as well as an intellectual one. Yet, in spite of the fact that it is never independent of the psychical structure of the individual, it is futile to attempt to explain piety by any bent or bias of the mental life. It is far from being the result of any psychical dispositions or organic functions. Certain dispositions may influence or intensify it, but they do not create it.

As an actuality, it belongs to the stream of the psychical life, but its content, its spiritual aspect, is as independent of the psychical chain of causation as the acceptance of the Pythagorean theorem is independent of the individual temper. Ideas are not to be confused with the psychical setting in which they appear. It is fallacious to identify knowledge with the processes of its acquisition or realization. The spiritual content is not identical with the act itself, nor are concepts tantamount to functions of the mind. The spiritual objective content is universal, and should be distinguished from the subjective psychical function. Piety is an objective spiritual entity. There have been times in which piety was as common as knowledge of the multiplication table is today.

Our objective in this paper is an analysis of the consciousness that accompanies the acts of a pious man, and a classification of the concepts latent in his mind. There is hardly need for us to emphasize

the fact that the validity of such an analysis is not impaired by the possibility that the concepts derived from a general inquiry may not be found present in every act or example of piety. The fact that a poet proves to be unacquainted with the rules that govern his art, or does not apply them in every poem, does not mean that there are no rules of poetry.

We are not here concerned primarily with the psychological aspects of the question. These have their own importance, but would require a special investigation. Our purpose is to direct our attention to those essential, constitutive elements that are common to different types of piety, disregarding accidental colorings and the unimportant accompanying circumstances which may differ in different cases. Our task will be to describe piety as it is, without claiming to explain it, or to suggest its derivation from other phenomena. We shall not analyze psychologically the course it runs, or its peculiarities as they appear in the life of an individual. We shall not attempt to trace historically its development through the ages and in the matrix of different civilizations, but shall, rather, try to expound its spiritual content, and set forth its concepts and its manifestations in relation to the main realities of common life.

To label piety as an ability, a potential quality of the soul, would be like defining architecture as a skill. It is impossible to understand facts by mere speculation as to their origins. We should likewise go astray did we label it as a mood, an emotional state, a flutter of romantic feeling. To do this would be like characterizing the light of the moon as melancholy, or judging navigation by its danger to human life. Again, to call it a moral or intellectual virtue would be like trying to nail down the shadow of an escaping horse, and so securing neither horse nor shadow. Piety does not consist in isolated acts, in sporadic, ephemeral experiences, nor is it limited to a single stratum of the soul. Although it manifests itself in particular acts, it is beyond the distinctions between intellect and emotion, will and action. Its source seems to lie deeper than the reach of reason and to range wider than consciousness. While it reveals itself in single attitudes such as devotion, reverence, or the desire to serve, its essential forces lie in a stratum of the soul far deeper than the orbit of any of these. It is something unremitting, persistent, unchanging in the soul, a perpetual inner atti-

tude of the whole man. Like a breeze in the atmosphere, it runs as a drift through all the deeds, utterances and thoughts; it is a tenor of life betraying itself in each trait of character, each mode of action.

Piety points to something beyond itself. As it works in the inner life, it is ever referring us to something that transcends man, something that goes beyond the present instant, something that surmounts what is visible and available. Steadily preventing man from immersing himself in sensation or ambition, it stands staunchly as the champion of something more important than interest and desires, than passion or career. While not denying the beauty and grandeur of the world, the pious man realizes that life takes place under wide horizons, horizons that range beyond the span of an individual life or even the life of a nation, of a generation or even of an era. His sight perceives something indicative of the divine. In the small things he senses the significant, in the common and the simple he senses the ultimate; in the rush of the passing he feels the stillness of the eternal. While piety stands in relation to what man knows and feels about the horizons of life, it exceeds by far the sum total reached by adding up his diverse intellectual and emotional experiences. Its essence, in fact, stands for something more than a theory, a sentiment, or a conviction. To those who adhere to it, piety is compliance with destiny, the only life worth living, the only course of life that does not eventually throw man into bestial chaos.

Piety is thus a mode of living. It is the orientation of human inwardness toward the holy. It is a predominant interest in the ultimate value of all acts and feelings and thoughts. With his heart open to and attracted by some spiritual gravitation, the pious man moves, as it were, toward the center of a universal stillness, and his conscience is so placed as to listen to the voice of God.

Every man's life is dominated by certain interests, and is essentially determined by the aspiration for those things which matter to him to a greater or a lesser degree. The pious man's main interest is concern for the will of God, which thus becomes the driving force controlling the course of his actions and decisions, molding his aspirations and behavior. It is fallacious to see in isolated acts of perception or consideration the decisive elements in human behavior. Actually, it is the direction of mind and heart, the general interest of a person, that leads him to see or discover certain situations and to overlook others.

Interest is a selective apprehension based on prior ideas, preceding insights, recognitions or predilections. The interest of a pious man is determined by his faith, so that piety is faith translated into life, spirit embodied in a personality.

Piety is the direct opposite to selfishness. Living as he does in the vision of the unutterably pure, the pious man turns his back on his own human vanity, and his longing is to surrender the forces of egotism to the might of God. He is aware of both the shabbiness of human life and the meagerness and insufficiency of human service, and so, to protect the inner wholesomeness and purity of devotion from being defiled by interference from the petty self, he strives toward self-exclusion, self-forgetfulness, and an inner anonymity of service. He desires to be unconscious that it is he who is consecrating himself to the service of God. The pious man lays no claim to reward. He hates show, or being conspicuous in any way, and is shy of displaying his qualities even to his own mind. He is engrossed in the beauty of that which he worships, and dedicates himself to ends the greatness of which exceeds his capacity for adoration.

Piety is not a habit, something running along in a familiar groove. It is rather an impulse, a spurt, a stirring of the self. Apart from a certain ardor, zeal, intentness, vigor, or exertion, it becomes a stunted thing. No one who has even been once impelled by its force will ever entirely shake off its pursuing drive. In moments of stress the pious man may stumble, he may blunder or go astray, he may at moments succumb in his weakness to the agreeable instead of holding to the true, follow the ostentatious instead of the simple and hard, but his adherence to the holy will only slacken, it will never break away. Such lapses, indeed, are often followed by a new sweep towards the goal, the lapse providing new momentum.

Although piety implies a certain spiritual profundity, it is not an outgrowth of innate intelligence. Its forces spring from purity of heart rather than from acumen of mind. To be pious does not necessarily mean to be sagacious or judicious. It does, however, as a prevailing trend show features that are peculiar to wisdom, in the ancient sense of that word. Both piety and wisdom involve self-command, self-conquest, self-denial, strength of will, and firmness of purpose. But though these qualities are instrumental in the pursuit of piety, they are not its nature. It is the regard for the transcendant, the devotion

to God, that constitute its essence. To the pious man, as to the wise one, mastery over self is a necessity of life. However, unlike the wise man, the pious man feels that he himself is not the autonomous master, but is rather a mediator who administers his life in the name of God.

Piety and faith are not one and the same thing. They have differences from each other and are not necessarily concurrent. There can be faith without piety, just as there can be piety without faith. Unlike faith, piety not only accepts the mystery but attempts to match it in human endeavor, venturing to lift the human to the level of the spiritual. This should not be called an experience, but the acting upon experience, not a concern about meaning and its exploration, but an attempt to make life balance with an accepted meaning. In other words, it is neither a search nor a quest, neither a discovery of new truth nor a new viewpoint, nor is it some new insight into latent forces or possibilities.

The pious man is alive to what is solemn in the simple, to what is sublime in the sensuous, but he is not aiming to penetrate into the sacred. Rather he is striving to be himself penetrated and actuated by the sacred, eager to yield to its force, to identify himself with every trend in the world which is towards the divine. To piety it is not the outlook that carries weight, but the impression, not the notion but the sentiment, not acquaintance but appreciation, not knowledge but veracity. Piety is not a thinking about coming, but a real approach. It is not identical with the performance of rites and ceremonies, but is rather the care and affection put into their performance, the personal touch therein, the offering of life. Piety is the realization and verification of the transcendent in human life.

Faith is a way of thinking, and thus a matter of the mind; piety is a matter of life. Faith is a sense for the reality of the transcendent; piety is the taking of an adequate attitude toward it. Faith is vision, knowledge, belief; piety is relation, adjustment, an answer to a call, a mode of life. Faith belongs to the objective realm; piety stands entirely within the subjective and originates in human initiative. Piety is usually preceded by faith, and it is then faith's achievement, an effort to put faith's ideas into effect, to follow its suggestions. It desires not merely to learn faith's truth, but to agree with it; not merely to meet God, but to abide by Him, agree with His will, echo His words, and respond to His voice.

It is through piety that there comes the real revelation of the self, the disclosure of what is most delicate in the human soul, the unfolding of the purest elements in the human venture. Essentially it is an attitude toward God and the world, toward men and things, toward life and destiny, and in what follows we shall make an attempt to outline a few examples of this.

The pious man is possessed by his awareness of the presence and nearness of God. Everywhere and at all times he lives as in His sight, whether he remains always heedful of His proximity or not. He feels embraced by God's mercy as by a vast encircling space. Awareness of God is as close to him as the throbbing of his own heart, often deep and calm, but at times overwhelming, intoxicating, setting the soul afire. The momentous reality of God stands there as peace, power, and endless tranquillity, as an inexhaustible source of help, as boundless compassion, as an open gate awaiting prayer. It sometimes happens that the life of a pious man becomes so involved in God that his heart overflows as though it were a cup in the hand of God. This presence of God is not like the proximity of a mountain or the vicinity of an ocean, the view of which one may relinquish by closing the eyes or removing from the place. Rather is this convergence with God unavoidable, inescapable; like air in space it is always being breathed in, even though one is not all the time aware of continuous respiration.

To dwell upon those things that are stepping-stones on the path to the Holy, to be preoccupied with the great and wondrous vision of His presence, does not necessarily mean an avoidance of the common ways of life, or involve losing sight of worldly beauty or profane values. Piety's love of the Creator does not exclude love of the creation, but it does involve a specific approach to all values. Between man and world stands God. He is before all things, and all values are looked at through Him. Mere splendor of appearance does not appeal to the man of piety. He is fond of what is good in the eyes of God, and holds as valuable that which stands in accord with His peace. He is not deceived by the specious nor dissuaded by the unseemly. Shining garments, a smiling countenance, or miracles of art do not enchant him when they cover vice or blasphemy. The most magnificent edifices, most beautiful temples, and monuments of worldly glory are repulsive to him when they are built by the sweat and tears of suffering slaves, or erected through injustice and fraud. Hypocrisy and pretence

of devoutness are more distasteful to him than open iniquity. But in the roughened, dirty hands of devoted parents, or in the maimed bodies and bruised faces of those who have been persecuted but have kept faith with God, he may detect the last great light on earth.

Whatever the pious man does is linked to the Divine; each smallest trifle is tangential to His course. In breathing he uses His force; in thinking he wields His power. He moves always under the unseen canopy of remembrance, and the wonderful weight of the name of God rests steadily on his mind. The word of God is as vital to him as air or food. He is never alone, never companionless, for God is within reach of his heart. Under affliction or some sudden shock he may feel temporarily as though he were on a desolate path, but a slight turn of his eyes is sufficient for him to discover that his grief is outflanked by the compassion of God. The pious man needs no miraculous communication to make him aware of God's presence, nor is a crisis necessary to awaken him to the meaning and appeal of that presence. His awareness may momentarily be overlaid or concealed by some violent shift in consciousness, but it never fades away. It is this awareness of ever living under the watchful eye of God that leads the pious man to see hints of God in the varied things he encounters in his daily walk, so that many a simple event can be accepted by him both for what it is and also as a gentle hint or kindly reminder of things divine. In this mindfulness he eats and drinks, works and plays, talks and thinks, for piety is a life compatible with God's presence.

This compatibility reveals itself in the way in which he regards and evaluates all phenomena. Man is by nature inclined to evaluate things and events according to the purpose they serve. In the economic life a man is estimated according to his efficiency, by his worth in labor and by his social standing. Here every object in the universe is regarded as a commodity or a tool, its value being determined by the amount of work it can perform or the degree of pleasantness it can confer, so that utilization is the measure of all things. But was the universe created merely for the use of man, for the satisfaction of his animal desires? Surely it is obvious how crude and, indeed, thoughtless it is to subject other beings to the service of our interests, seeing that every existence has its own inner value, and to utilize such without regard to their individual essence is to desecrate them and despise their real dignity. The folly of this instrumental approach is manifest in

the vengeance which inevitably follows. In treating everything else as an instrument, man eventually makes himself the instrument of something he does not understand. By enslaving others, he plunges himself into serfdom, serving war-lords or those prejudices which come to be imposed upon him. Often, indeed, he wastes his life in serving passions which others shrewdly excite in him, fondly believing that this is his indulgence of his freedom.

The inner value of any entity—men or women, trees or stars, ideas or things—is, as a matter of fact, not entirely subject to any purposes of ours. They have a value in themselves quite apart from any function which makes them useful to our purposes. This is particularly true of man, for it is his essence, that secret of his being in which both existence and meaning are rooted, that commands our respect, so that even though we knew no way in which he might be useful, or no means of subordinating him to any end or purpose, we should esteem him for that alone.

Further, piety is an attitude toward reality in its entirety. It is alert to the dignity of every human being, and to those bearings upon the spiritual value which even inanimate things inalienably possess. The pious man, being able to sense the relations of things to transcendent values, will be incapable of disparaging any of them by enslaving them to his own service. The secret of every being is in the divine care and concern that are invested in it. In every event there is something sacred at stake, and it is for this reason that the approach of the pious man to reality is in reverence. This explains his solemnity and his conscientiousness in dealing with things both great and small.

Reverence is a specific attitude toward something that is precious and valuable, toward someone who is superior. It is a salute of the soul; an awareness of value without enjoyment of that value, or seeking any personal advantage from it. There is a unique kind of transparence about things and events. The world is seen through, and no veil can conceal God completely. So the pious man is ever alert to see behind the appearance of things a trace of the divine, and thus his attitude towards life is one of expectant reverence.

Because of this attitude of reverence the pious man is at peace with life, in spite of its conflicts. He patiently acquiesces in life's vicissitudes, because he glimpses spiritually their potential meaning. Every experience opens the door into a temple of new light, although the vestibule

may be dark and dismal. The pious man accepts life's ordeals and its meed of anguish, because he recognizes these as belonging to the totality of life. This does not mean complacency or fatalistic resignation. He is not insensitive. On the contrary he is keenly sensitive to pain and suffering, to adversity and evil in his own life and in that of others, but he has the inner strength to rise above grief, and with his understanding of what these sorrows really are, grief seems to him a sort of arrogance. We never know the ultimate meaning of things, and so a sharp distinction between what we deem good or bad in experience is unfair. It is a greater thing to love than to grieve, and, with love's awareness of the far-reachingness of all that affects our lives, the pious man will never overestimate the seeming weight of momentary happenings.

The natural man feels a genuine joy at receiving a gift, in obtaining something he has not earned. The pious man knows that nothing he has has been earned, not even his perceptions, his thoughts and words, or even his life, are his by desert. He knows that he has no claim to anything with which he is endowed. Knowing, therefore, that he merits little, he never arrogates anything to himself. His thankfulness being stronger than his wants and desires, he can live in joy and with a quiet spirit. Being conscious of the evidences of God's blessing in nature and in history, he pays tribute to the values of that blessing in all that he receives. The natural man has two attitudes to life, joy and gloom. The pious man has but one, for to him gloom represents an overbearing and presumptuous depreciation of underlying realities. Gloom implies that man thinks he has a right to a better, more pleasing world. Gloom is a refusal, not an offer, a snub not an appreciation, a retreat instead of a pursuit. Gloom's roots are in pretentiousness, fastidiousness, and a disregard of the good. The gloomy man, living in irritation and a constant quarrel with his destiny, senses hostility everywhere, and seems never to be aware of the illegitimacy of his own complaints. He has a fine sense for the incongruities of life, but stubbornly refuses to recognize the delicate grace of existence.

The pious man does not take life for granted. The weighty business of living does not cloud for him the miracle that we live through God. No routine of social or economic life dulls his mindfulness of this—the ineffably wonderful in nature and history. History to him is a perpetual improvisation by the Creator, which is being continually

and violently interfered with by man, and his heart is fixed on this great Mystery that is being played by God and man. Thus his main asset is not some singular experience, but life itself. Any exceptional experience serves only as a keyhole for the key of his belief. He does not depend on the exceptional, for to him common deeds are adventures in the domain of the spiritual, and all his normal thoughts are, as it were, sensations of the Holy. He feels the hidden warmth of good in all things, and finds hints of God cropping up in almost every ordinary thing on which he gazes. It is for this reason that his words bring hope into a sordid and despairing world.

The scope of that in which the pious man feels himself involved is not a single realm, as, for instance, that of ethical acts, but covers the whole of life. Life to him is a liability, and a liability from which he can never be free. No evasion on his part can escape it, and no sphere of action, no period of life, can be withdrawn from it. So piety cannot consist only in specific acts, such as prayer or ritual observances, but is something bound up with all actions, concomitant with all doings, accompanying and shaping all life's activities. Man's responsibility to God is not an excursion into spirituality, an episode of spiritual rhapsody, but the scaffold on which he stands as daily he goes on building life. His every deed, every incident of mind takes place on this stage, so that unremittingly man is at work either building up or tearing down his life, his home, his hope of God.

Responsibility implies freedom, and man who is in bondage to environment, to social ties, to inner disposition, may yet enjoy freedom before God. Only before God is man truly independent and truly free. But freedom in its turn implies responsibility, and man is responsible for the way in which he utilizes nature. It is amazing how thoughtless modern man is of his responsibility in relation to his world. He finds before him a world crammed to overflowing with wonderful materials and forces, and without hesitation or scruple he grasps at whatever is within his range. Omnivorous in his desire, unrestrained in his efforts, tenacious in his purpose, he is gradually changing the face of the earth, and there seems to be none to deny him or challenge his mastery. Deluded by this easy mastery, we give no thought to the question of what basis there is to our assumed right to possess our universe. Our own wayward desires and impulses, however natural they may be, are no title to ownership. Unmindful of this we take

our title for granted and grasp at everything, never questioning whether this may be robbery. Power-house, factory, and department-store make us familiar with the exploitation of nature for our benefit. And lured by familiarity, the invisible trap for the mind, we easily yield to the illusion that these things are rightfully at our disposal, thinking little of the sun, the rainfall, the water-courses, as sources by no means rightfully ours. It is only when we suddenly come up against things obviously beyond the scope of human domination or jurisdiction, such as mountains or oceans, or uncontrollable events like sudden death, earthquake, or other catastrophes, which clearly indicate that man is neither lord of the universe nor master of his own destiny, that we are somewhat shaken out of our illusions.

In reality man has not unlimited powers over the earth, as he has not over stars or winds. He has not even complete power over himself. In the absolute sense, neither the world nor his own life belong to him. And of the things he does more or less control, he controls not the essence, but only the appearance, as is evident to anyone who has ever looked with unclouded vision in the face even of a flower or a stone. The question then is—who is the lord? Who owns all that exists? The universe is not a waif, nor is life a derelict, abandoned and unclaimed. All things belong to God. So the pious man regards the forces of nature, the thoughts of his own mind, life and destiny, as the property of God. This governs his attitude toward all things. He does not grumble when calamities befall him, or lapse into despair, for he knows that all in life is a concern of the divine because all is in the divine possession.

Thus the pious man realizes, also, that whatever he may have at his disposal has been bestowed upon him as a gift. And there is a difference between a possession and a gift. Possession is loneliness. The very word excludes others from the use of the possessed object without the consent of the possessor, and those who insist on possession, ultimately perish in self-excommunication and loneliness. On the contrary, in receiving a gift the recipient obtains, besides the present, the love of the giver. A gift is thus the vessel that contains the affection, which is destroyed as soon as one begins to look on it as a possession. The pious man avers that he has a perpetual gift from God, for in all that comes to him he feels the love of God. In all the thousand and one

experiences that make up a day, he is conscious of that love intervening in his life.

The ordinary man is inclined to disregard all indications in life of the presence of the divine. In his conceit and vainglory he thinks of himself as the possessor. But this is sacrilege to the pious man, and his method of saving himself from such hallucinations is by asceticism and sacrifice. He rids himself of all sense of being a possessor by giving up for God's sake things that are desired or valued, and depriving himself of those things that are precious to him for the sake of others who need his help. Thus, to sacrifice is not to abandon what has been granted to us, to throw away the gifts of life. It is, on the contrary, giving back to God what we have received from Him by employing it in His service in the cause of good. Such giving is a form of thanksgiving.

Both self-dispossession and offering are essential elements of sacrifice. Mere offering without self-dispossession would be without personal participation and would easily lapse into a superficial ritual act in which the mechanical aspect is more important than the personal. It would result in externalization and perfunctoriness of sacrifice, as has so often happened in religious history. On the other hand, self-dispossession alone tends to make asceticism an end in itself, and when turned into an end in itself it loses its bearing upon God. True asceticism is not merely depriving ourselves, but is giving to God what was precious to us.

Poverty has often been an ideal for pious men, but one may be poor in material goods while yet clinging the more tenaciously to one's ambitions and intellectual goods. Mere poverty in itself is not a good, for the bitterness of poverty often upsets the balance of values in human character, while the delight of the righteous in the gifts of God affords him strength in service and the means to give. Purpose of sacrifice does not lie in pauperization as such, but in the yielding of all aspirations to God, thus creating space for Him in the heart. Moreover it is an *imitatio Dei*, for it is done after the manner of the divine Giver, and reminds man that he is created in the divine image, and is thus related to God.

This, however, presents another problem. How are we to understand this kinship of man with the divine? One indication of man's

affinity with God is his persistent aspiration to go beyond himself. He has an ability to devote himself to a higher aim, the potentiality of a will to serve, to dedicate himself to a task which goes beyond his own interests and his own life, to live for an ideal. This ideal may be the family, a friend, a group, the nation, or it may be art, science, or social service. In many persons this will to serve is kept under, but in the pious man it blooms and flourishes. In many lives these ideals seem blind alleys, but in the pious man they are thoroughfares to God. If these ideals become idols, ends in themselves, they close in the soul, but to the pious man they are openings letting in the light from far places to illumine many a small particular thing. To him ideals are strides on the way, but they are never the destination.

Piety, finally, is allegiance to the will of God. Whether that will is understood or not, it is accepted as good and holy, and is obeyed in faith. Life is a mandate, not the enjoyment of an annuity, a task, not a game, a command, not a favor. So to the pious man, life never appears as a fatal chain of events following necessarily one on another, but comes as a voice with an appeal. It is a flow of opportunity for service, every experience giving the cue to a new duty, so that all that enters life is for him a means of devotion. Piety is, thus, not an excess of enthusiasm, but implies a resolve to follow a definite course of life in pursuit of the will of God. All the pious man's thoughts and plans revolve around this concern, and nothing can distract him or turn him from the way. Whoever sets out on this way soon learns how imperious is the spirit. He senses the compulsion to serve, and though at times he may attempt to escape, the strength of this compulsion will bring him back inevitably to the right way in search of the will of God. Before he acts he will pause to weigh the effects of his act in the scales of God. Before he speaks he will consider whether his words will be well-pleasing to Him. Thus in self-conquest and earnest endeavor, with sacrifice and single-mindedness, through prayer and grace, he proceeds on his way, and to him the way is more important than the goal. It is not his destiny to accomplish but to contribute, and his will to serve shapes his entire conduct. His preoccupation with the will of God is not limited to a section of his activities, but his great desire is to place his whole life at the disposal of God, and in this he finds the real meaning of life. He would feel wretched and lost without the certainty that his life, insignificant though it be, is of some purpose

in the great plan, and life takes on enhanced value when he feels himself engaged in fulfilling purposes which lead him away from himself. In this way he feels that in whatever he does he is ascending step by step a ladder leading to the ultimate. In aiding a creature, he is helping the Creator. In succoring the poor, he is taking care of something that concerns God. In admiring the good, he is revering the Spirit of God. In loving the pure, he is being drawn to Him. In promoting the right, he is directing things towards His will, in which all aims must terminate. Ascending by this ladder, the pious man reaches the state of self-forgetfulness, sacrificing not only his desires but also his will, for he realizes that it is the will of God that matters, and not his own perfection or salvation. Thus the glory of man's devotion to the good becomes a treasure of God on earth.

Yet it is not his desire to serve as a slave. Man's task is to reconcile liberty with service, reason with faith. This is the deepest wisdom man can attain. It is our destiny to serve, to surrender. We have to conquer in order to succumb; we have to acquire in order to give away, we have to triumph in order to be overwhelmed. Man has to understand in order to believe, to know in order to accept. The aspiration is to obtain; the perfection is to dispense. This is the meaning of death: the ultimate self-dedication to the divine. Death so understood will not be distorted by the craving for immortality, for this act of giving away is reciprocity on man's part for God's gift of life. For the pious man it is a privilege to die.

Introduction to the Old Testament. By Robert H. Pfeiffer. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941, pp. xiii + 917. $4.00.

Many old Testament scholars seem to find it difficult to realize how many earnest Biblical students there are who have not the linguistic equipment necessary to read the works of German scholars, nor the training necessary to enable them to get much out of so technical a work as Driver's *Introduction.* Moreover, half a century has passed since the publication of Driver's work, and though there have been excellent handbooks such as those of G. Buchanan Gray and George Foot Moore, and the larger *Introduction* of Oesterley and Robinson, which have incorporated the results of more recent research, these are hardly adequate to meet the needs of the student who has to depend on works in English. In particular, these abovementioned works omit any adequate analysis of the content and religious thought of the sources behind the books of the Old Testament. The particular value of Professor Pfeiffer's book is that it meets this need.

The volume, however, has other values than that of being a good textbook for Biblical students who are dependent on English. Unlike works which content themselves with analyzing the various books into their sources, this book undertakes a detailed examination of the sources themselves. It gives, as others do, synopses of the contents of the Biblical books, but is unique in the way in which it takes up the study of the thought and religious teaching of the sources behind the books. Its method of treating the additions which were made to the sources during the compilation and transmission of the books is also a distinct and remarkable feature of the work.

The author begins by studying the Old Testament as a whole. Starting with its religious interest, he passes to its literary interest, and goes on to its historical and critical interest. This study of the Old Testament as a piece of world literature is followed by two studies dealing respectively with the history of the Canon, and with the text and versions. Then the author takes up the study of the sections of the Old Testament, treating them in the order of the Hebrew Canon, beginning with the Pentateuch and ending with Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemiah. The whole is followed by a selected Bibliography and excellent Indices.

Like every other Old Testament scholar, Dr. Pfeiffer has his own characteristic views. Perhaps the most remarkable is his attribution of sections of material in the Old Testament to authors from the land of Edom. He finds one such Edomitish document used as a source in the Pentateuch, another among the main sources of the Book of Job, and others in Psalms 88 and 89, and in Proverbs 30:1-31:9. In support of his view he points to a series of indications of Edomitish origin, such as: (1) the curious silence in these documents with regard to the tribes in Northern Israel; (2) the marked hostility to the eastern and southern tribes, viz., Reuben, Levi, Simeon and Judah; (3) a wide divergence from the characteristic religious views of Israel; (4) the fact that the geographic background of the documents in question is Edom; (5) the friendliness shown in them towards the Kenites; and (6) the interest in Edomitish affairs (the lists of rulers of Edom, e.g., can best be explained as coming from an Edomitish author). He considers as characteristically Edomitish the view of God found in the Book of Job, where God is pictured as indifferent to the sufferings of man, while still having control over the forces of nature.

The present reviewer, like many others who will read the book, questions the validity of the argument which attributes to a nation an attitude of mind which is probably merely individual, and feels that we have far too little evidence concerning the religious thought, or even the history of Edom, to justify the attribution to authors from that country of writings found in the Old Testament.

Another outstanding feature of Pfeiffer's work is his treatment of law. He analyses the laws of the Pentateuch into six codes: (1) the Code of the Covenant, including the Ritual Code of Exodus 34:10-26; 22:28b-30; 23:12, 15-19; (2) The Twelve Curses of Deuteronomy 27:14-26; (3) The Ten Commandments; (4) the Deuteronomic Code; (5) the Holiness Code; (6) the Priestly Code. Unlike most scholars who hold that the Code of the Covenant comes from the time of the early Kingdom, Pfeiffer argues that in its present form it comes from the time of the completion of the Pentateuch, and was added to it about B.C. 400. Its sources, however, are an early Canaanitish civil and juristic code, an early Canaanite ritual code, and an early Beduin code. He denies that there were any Codes in the J or E sources, and holds that the teaching of the Deuteronomic Code was monolatrous rather than monotheistic.

Other remarkable and noteworthy positions in the volume are: (1) a theory that Deutero-Isaiah was dependent on the Book of Job for its views on God, and is otherwise dependent thereon both in thought and language; (2) its insistence on P's dependence on Deutero-Isaiah for its views both of God and of creation; (3) a denial that there is any material prior to the call of Abraham in the J document; (4) a claim that Saul was a popular king and David unpopular, the contrary view now found in the Book of Samuel being due to manipulations during the transmission of the stories; (5) a theory that Korah, Ethan, and Heman developed from Edomitish clans into temple guilds; (6) a denial that the Book of Ruth is to be regarded as a protest against the reforms of Nehemiah; (7) a claim that the Feast of Purim is dependent on the Book of Esther and not vice versa; (8) a theory that the publication of the Deuteronomic Code was the beginning of the process of Scripture canonization; (9) an emphasis on the part played in canonization by the tradition that divine inspiration had ceased at the time of Ezra-Nehemiah, a tradition which explains why Wisdom, Ben Sira, and the Maccabees were excluded, while Daniel, Esther, and the Maccabean Psalms were included, and how late anonymous prophecies came to be included by being attached to the names of earlier prophets.

The book is equally noteworthy for the position and theories which it rejects or ignores. The fertility-cult school of Old Testament scholars will find their interpretations either rejected or passed over in silence. Similarly, the Supplement-theory which some seek to substitute for the general Documentary theory, finds here little favor. Other famous modern theories rejected or ignored are: (1) that which radically changes the date of Deuteronomy either to the time of the early Kingdom or to late exilic times; (2) that which attempts to divide Ezekiel into sources or to make a pseudograph of it; (3) that which fights for an early dating of the Psalms (Pfeiffer accepts as pre-exilic only Ps. 45 and 27:7-10); (4) that which attempts a liturgical or cultic interpretation of the Psalms, especially of the "I" Psalms; (5) that which defends the historicity of the patriarchal stories and those of Esther and Daniel 1 (here, however, he recognizes two historical features, viz., the recognition that Babylon was the creation of Nebuchadnezzar, and that Belshazzar was the regent of Babylon), or

the Aramaic documents in the Book of Ezra; (6) those which attempt to carry Israel's monotheism back to Moses.

It may be asked whether there is any religious value in an Introduction such as this. While there is no doubt that some of the author's positions are somewhat extreme, he yet maintains that the Old Testament is significant in three ways. Firstly, as the inspired Scripture of church and synagogue it has been through the ages the norm of faith and conduct, the guide for the perplexed, and the source of edification. Secondly, it is the source of such basic doctrines of Judaism and Christianity as that God is the unique and only deity, that God is the creator of the world and man's father in heaven, and that God has revealed Himself to mankind both in men and in history. Thirdly, it is unique as a record of religious progress.

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Rome. By HERMANN VOGELSTEIN. Translated by MOSES HADAS. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1941. xiii + 421 pp. $2.25.

The Jewish Publication Society of America has just added a history of the Jews of Rome to its Jewish Communities Series. Previous volumes in this group include works on Frankfort-on-the-Main, London, Venice, Vienna, Augsburg and Regensburg, and Cologne. Like a number of the above monographs, the present history under review is a condensation of a larger work. Forty-five years ago, Hermann Vogelstein and his friend Paul Rieger issued a two-volume *Geschichte der Juden in Rom* which carried the story down to 1885. The present volume—about one-third the size of the original two—contains additional material and continues the narrative to 1939.

The author has done an excellent job both in reorganizing the material of the older volumes and in incorporating much of the new researches on the subject, this in spite of the fact that he was hampered by the loss of his library in Germany. Following the lines laid down in the older book, considerable space is given to the social, communal, and cultural life of Roman Jewry. The sources that provide an understanding of the economic background have not been neglected, although they have not been exploited as much as might have been expected in view of the available studies and our present-

day interest. In general, the materials are well-chosen, interestingly presented, and handled with that objectivity and cautious reserve that have always characterized the best traditions of sound scholarship.

There are excellent reasons for devoting a volume to the study of the Jews of the Eternal City. Rome is probably the only city in the world that has an unbroken line of Jewish settlement going back for over 2000 years, for, outside of brief interruptions, Jewish communal life there may be documented from B.C. 139 to the present day. The Roman Jews have witnessed the varied fortunes of that great metropolis from the days of the impassioned appeals of the Gracchi down to the last balcony oration of Benito Mussolini. This survival was no mean task!

Beginning with the Christian period when our sources become more plentiful, Vogelstein traces the communal life of Jewry in some detail. He is cautious in his reconstruction of this communal life and in deciding whether the twelve or more congregations were autonomous units or, as is more probable, organized into a central Jewish community. This latter view, to which Vogelstein is inclined, is also shared by Jean Juster in his important work, *Les Juifs dans l'empire romain* (2 vols., Paris, 1914. Cf. 1, pp. 413 ff.) and, apparently, by Frey in his *Corpus Inscriptionum Judaicarum*, p. LXIX. Mommsen, as it is well known, holds that the individual Jewish congregations were merely *collegia*.

Much of our knowledge of Roman Jewry in the early Christian period comes from the Jewish catacombs, on which considerable research has been done in the last generation. Vogelstein has made good use of this material. He is fully aware of the importance of the mural decorations of the Jewish catacombs for the origins of early Christian art, and has not failed to realize the need for a comparative study with the murals of Dura-Europos. Roman Jewry, like many other Diaspora groups (but not all!), did not take the Biblical injunction against figural representations too seriously.

In the chapter on "Personalities and Events" among the Jews in the first century of the common era, he takes up the interesting question of Jewish proselytes and early Christians, and supports the view of Jewish historians, such as Graetz, that Flavius Clemens, the murdered cousin of Domitian, was interested in Judaism rather than

Christianity. The rabbinic evidence—garbled though it may be—seems to be conclusive on this point.

The author next sketches the history of Roman Jewry under the early Christian Roman Empire, the political anarchy of the early Middle Ages, and the consequent rise of the papacy. It is in this study of the history of the Jews both in Rome and in the Papal States, from the earliest days of Christian rule to the present day, that the significance of this work for general history is to be found. The attitude of the various popes toward the Jews, from Gregory I to Pius IX, may well serve, on the whole, as an accurate gauge by which the political policies and the religious convictions of the different Roman papal rulers are to be measured. International papal political policies and the goals of the great reforming movements within the Church all reflect themselves in the attitude of the popes toward the Jews. It is no accident that Clement VII granted an audience (1524) to the Jewish adventurer Reubeni, who advocated an alliance of Jews and Christians against the advancing Turks; or that Giampietro Caraffa (Paul IV), one of the great figures of the Catholic Counter-Reformation, should be the first in modern times to enact draconic laws against Jews (1535), legislation that remained in force, for the most part, down into the second half of the nineteenth century. The disabilities imposed on the Jews were in direct proportion to the orthodoxy and sincerity of the reforming popes!

As the modern period—the age beginning with the French Revolution—dawned for the Jews, the determination of the papacy to resist this new heresy reflects itself in the vigorous repressions of the Jews by such conservatives as Pius VI and Pius IX. Just because the Jews were among the outstanding beneficiaries of the liberal system, the papacy was determined to document its opposition to this new revolution by pushing the Jews back down into the mire of "medieval" legislation. If Mirabeau believed that the relatively mild severity of Frederician legislation in Prussia (1750-1756) could be termed "a law worthy of a cannibal," what must he have thought of the anti-Jewish law issued by Pius VI in 1775, which was one of the severest anti-Jewish decrees in all history?

Yet it would be altogether wrong to assume for a moment that the Church wanted to destroy the Jew, although that would not have

been too difficult. The Church never outlawed the Jews as they did the Albigenses. James Darmesteter was right when he said that the great ambition of the Church was not to burn the Jew but to convert him! Thus suppression was ruled out in favor of repression:

> Forasmuch as it is unreasonable and unseemly that the Jews, whom God has condemned to eternal slavery because of their guilt, should, under the pretense that Christian love cherishes them and endures their living in our midst, show such ingratitude to the Christians as to render them insult for their grace and presume to mastery instead of the subjection which beseems them, etc. (Bull *Cum nimis absurdum*, July 12, 1555).

The Jew was not to be destroyed: this principle had been laid down by Gregory as early as 598. Bull after bull was issued by the medieval popes guaranteeing the Jew the right of protection and survival, and it should be borne in mind that they were never expelled from Rome itself. This attitude of preserving Jewry, yet exerting pressure to expedite its conversion, finds its clear expression in a number of popes, and particularly in Benedict XIV (1740-1758). It was this man who issued a series of regulations governing the baptism of Jews, and who even accepted as valid the private baptism of a Jewish child carried out by a Christian nurse! Yet it is this same Benedict XIV who graciously received Jacob Selek, an envoy who came to protest against ritual murder accusations in Poland, and who encouraged one of his cardinals, Lorenzo Ganganelli, to issue his famous memorial repudiating the ritual murder accusation (1758).

The story of the Jews in Rome abounds in curious and fascinating facts: the "Hell and Paradise" of Immanuel of Rome in imitation of the *Divine Comedy;* the Jews of this city making a pilgrimage on the Sabbath to the Church of San Pietro in Vincoli to stand in admiration before Michelangelo's statue of Moses; the life and career of Anaclete II, that pope of remote Jewish origin, of whom the kindly Bernard of Clairvaux wrote: "To the shame of Christ a man of Jewish origin was come to occupy the chair of St. Peter." (Is it possible that "racial" considerations played a part in the medieval antipathy to the Jew?)

Vogelstein covers the modern period briefly; it *is* brief, chronologically speaking. The Jews of Rome were not emancipated until 1870. That is the very year in which the author of this book was born. When Rieger, his collaborator, finished the second volume of the

original German edition in the early '90's, the flame of freedom and liberalism filled the souls of these brilliant young men, still in their early twenties. Listen to them:

> The spell of the spiritual ghetto is broken for all eternity. Out of the ruins of that horrible monument (the Roman ghetto), out of the confusion of the human mind, there has emerged victorious the spirit of humanity and freedom. Now for the first time Rome . . . is the home of *everyone* (vol. II, p. 410).

Brave words of a brave young generation. Forty-five years later (1940), with Italian Jewry crushed under the burdens of anti-Semitic fascist legislation of the Nazi type, Herman Vogelstein concludes his short chapter on the "Two Generations of Freedom" with the sad words: "And all this fair promise was choked in the bud by a policy of hatred which recalls the most evil periods of papal rule" (p. 378).

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Essays on Maimonides. An Octocentennial Volume. Edited by SALO WITTMAYER BARON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. 316 pp. $3.75.

This volume contains addresses as well as essays. The addresses were delivered by Nicholas Murray Butler, Richard McKeon, Richard Gottheil, and Salo W. Baron, at the celebration of the eight-hundredth anniversary of Maimonides, held under the auspices of Columbia University, and by Etienne Gilson, the French medievalist, delivered in Paris. The essays deal with different aspects of Maimonides' work and make up the main part of the volume.

Jewish historians of the past devoted their attention mainly to the outstanding individuals and their literary activities, disregarding the life of the group and its social conditions. Salo W. Baron has contributed considerably to the widening of the horizon of Jewish historiography by his understanding of the social aspects of Jewish life and literature. His essay in this volume deals with the social and economic views of Maimonides as reflected in his works, a subject which has so far been neglected. Although Maimonides does not recognize economics as an independent science, he had, as a codifier, to treat these

problems, since they constitute part of the legal material in the Bible and Talmud which he undertook to systematize. Three books of his great code are devoted to matters predominantly economic.

The authority of the ancient sources of Jewish law was unbroken in the Middle Ages. The underlying purpose of this law, in its economic aspects, was the preservation of a proper balance between the interests of society and the rights of the individual. It combined "millennial continuity in fundamentals with great elasticity in details even at the expense of logical consistency." In their "staunch adherence to its traditional, but pliable law, permeating its self-governing communal organism," the Jews succeeded "in salvaging a considerable measure of autonomous control over its historical destiny." However, the Jewish community under Islam exercised no control whatsoever over the structure of its economic life. Hence there was a gap between economic theory and practice.

The realities of life, the dependence on the fiscal interests of the governments in the revenue-producing activities of the population, frequently conflicted with the concepts of the ancient legislation as it has been preserved in the traditions of the Jews. The jurists were forced to adjust some of their principles to the changing economic trends. Enjoying a large measure of judicial self-government, the Jews in the Middle Ages had to regulate many phases of their industrial and commercial life by a process of continuous legal adaptation. "The economic doctrines incorporated by Maimonides in his juristic as well as philosophic works may serve both as a truly representative summary of the general rabbinic attitude toward economic life and as a reflection of the numerous adjustments made by the vast and prosperous Jewish community under medieval Islam."

With rare erudition, together with a command over modern analytical method and a sharp insight into manifold aspects, Baron pictures the guiding principles of social relationships, the problem of economic interest and religious duty, the different types of ownership, their limitations and validity, social justice, prices, money, banking, slavery, and free labor. The discussion is comprehensive and illuminating.

In his essay, "The Literary Character of the *Guide for the Perplexed*," Leo Strauss develops the theory that "the *Guide* is not a philosophic book," that "no philosophic topic of any kind is, as such, the subject matter of the *Guide*," nor can it be called a "theological

work" or a "book of religion." It is "a book devoted to the explanation of the secret teachings of the Bible." But since there is a legal prohibition against explaining these secrets, Maimonides as an observant Jew could not have written such a book. Strauss, therefore, assumes that the *Guide* is "not a book at all," but "merely a substitute for conversations or speeches." It cannot be read in the way we may read books. It is "devoted to the explanation of an esoteric doctrine. But this explanation is itself of an esoteric character. The *Guide* is, then, devoted to the esoteric explanation of an esoteric doctrine. Consequently it is a book with seven seals." There is a necessity to unseal it. "For both the history of Judaism and the history of medieval philosophy remain deplorably incomplete, as long as the secret teaching of Maimonides has not been brought to light."

The reviewer regrets to state that he cannot regard the evidence which the author cites for his theory as correct. To mention one of many examples, the author says:

> It is noteworthy that Maimonides himself in the *Guide* never calls it a book, but consistently refers to it as a *maqala* (*ma'amar*). *Maqala* (just as *ma'amar*) has several meanings. . . . It may also mean—and this is its original connotation—a speech. Maimonides, by refraining from calling the *Guide* a book and by calling it a *maqala*, hints at the essentially oral character of its teaching.

The second premise in this syllogism is untenable. *Ma'amar* is one of the most popular names for a systematic treatise in medieval Jewish literature, and there is nothing unusual in the use of *Ma'amar* for the *Guide*. Benjacob, in his Bibliography, lists 157 books entitled *Ma'amar*. Moreover, Maimonides himself calls his other treatises, like those on Resurrection (Maqala fi Teḥiyyat ha-Metim), on Asthma (Maqala fi 'r-Rabw), on Logic (Maqala fi-ṣina'at al-Manṭiq) and others, Maqala.

R. Gottheil presents a "Responsum of Maimonides" on a legal question. The assumption that Maimonides studied medicine with Averroes (p. 9) is without any foundation.

Max Meyerhof offers a concise survey of the "Medical Work of Maimonides." After characterizing the ten medical treatises of Maimonides, he expresses the view that although several of them gained an excellent reputation in the medieval world, and the name of Rabbi Moyses became as famous in medicine as in theology and

philosophy, "Maimonides, as a medical writer, was less original and less a pioneer than in his theological and philosophical writings."

Joshua Finkel writes a comparative study on Maimonides' *Treatise on Resurrection,* of which he gave us a fine edition several years ago. After summarizing the main contents of this treatise and their relation to the views of some other Jewish scholars, Finkel discusses three parallels to Maimonides' doctrine as found in the writings of the Brethren of Purity, Avicenna, and Averroes. Finkel's remarks on the ambiguities in that treatise, as well as on the "enforced circumspection" of Maimonides, are lucid and interesting, although it seems to the reviewer that he overemphasizes somewhat Maimonides' consideration for his Arabic opponents.

The obvious significance of this symposium is the laudable effort to approach the work of Maimonides from new angles, throwing light on facets which have been hitherto dark. The reader will certainly benefit by many ideas, observations, and results to be found in this very interesting volume.

ABRAHAM HESCHEL

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The Jew Faces a New World. By ROBERT GORDIS. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1941, xii + 333 pp. $2.75.

The Jews are numerically few and materially weak, but they continue to be the subject of newspaper headlines, magazine articles, and even of substantial volumes. Most of the descriptions of them are one-sided, superficial or vague, and not infrequently all three. Dr. Gordis' book is a welcome exception. It is comprehensive. It is penetrating. It is plain and straight-forward. Not that it pretends to be the last word—the author himself declares that "the views expressed in this book are put forward, not as final answers to the pressing problems considered, but as a basis for further thought and discussion."

Clearly evident is the careful research and scientific accuracy to be expected of one who occupies the Chair of Biblical Exegesis at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. But the technical accoutrements of scholarship do not obtrude. The style is simple and direct. The reader is carried along by the interest of the subject matter and the earnestness with which it is treated. Robustness and vigor characterize the writing throughout. There is honest expression of opinion, no matter where the chips may fall.

Dr. Gordis has illumined contemporary Jewish problems in much the same way as was done for periods preceding the present by Rabbi Milton Steinberg, in *The Making of the Modern Jew*. Any inclination the general reader may have to secure further information about some of these problems is encouraged by the "Notes on Bibliography" appended at the end of the book. These are brief and practical. They are a descriptive list of easily available sources and include suggestions for additional reading. When the contemplated syllabus is published with further aids for using the volume as a basis for study and discussion, it should be widely utilized in adult education programs.

The eighteen essays contained in this volume are grouped in three sections. The first analyzes the internal and external situation of the Jewish people today, with special emphasis upon the dangers to Jewish survival. The second discusses various philosophies and programs for Jewish living. The third deals with the influence of Judaism and religion generally upon the current economic, social, and spiritual situation.

The general procedure in each essay is to begin with analysis and to conclude with proposed solutions. While a constructive spirit predominates, criticism of the existing order is virile and forthright. This is the case in treating with subjects as diverse as organized religion, the Good-Will movement, the competitive economic system, communism, and war.

Balance and proportion are preserved even in controversial areas. Dogmatism and the grinding of axes are avoided. To be sure, the author has certain points to which he returns again and again with emphasis and enthusiasm. The urgent necessity of a program and point-of-view for American Jews is summarized as follows:

> What is needed above all is a well-integrated philosophy of Jewish life that will grapple realistically with the problems of today, without losing the sense of an eternal destiny. The required outlook will reckon honestly with the spiritual problems of Judaism and the practical problems of the Jew within the framework of modern life. Such a philosophy is now in process of emerging on American soil.

Conservative Judaism, and especially its "reconstructionist" left wing, are hailed as the best hope for the future:

> Judaism as the evolving religious civilization of the Jewish people—therein lies the distinctive attitude of Conservative Judaism that makes it not alone the most rapidly growing movement in the present, but the most vital and

promising tendency for the future, if it adheres to its program with intelligence and zeal.

The correction of economic ills is a special obligation devolving upon Jews, not only for its own sake, but also for the elimination of anti-Semitism. This is clearly stated in these words:

> Since the economic factor is most pronounced in contemporary antisemitism, it follows that concrete and effective steps must be taken to advance social and economic progress. Aside from the inherent justice of a better social order, the preservation and welfare of the Jewish group can only be secure when the worst inequalities of the present system are overcome and at least the basic necessities are made available to all members of society. While unemployment and economic insecurity prevail, there can be no peace or confidence for any American, least of all for the Jew, who is the first victim of mass discontent, whether legitimate or created by demogogic rabble-rousers. . . . It is obvious that the Jewish destiny is bound up with democracy—not with its externalities but with its vital content—as an order which strives to bring to all men the opportunities of happiness and self-fulfilment. Both because of the teachings of Jewish tradition and the logic of Jewish destiny, the Jew must do his share to advance the causes of social justice, economic freedom and international peace.

The Good-Will movement is commended in general, but the criticism is made "that in its anxiety to command universal support, it has not shown sufficient vigor in speaking out against the nefarious forces that threaten to undermine the American tradition of equality and fair play." Anti-Semitism must be met by the use of various means summarized as follows:

> The advancement of social and economic progress, the dissemination of the truth regarding Jews and Judaism, the furthering of community movements in which all groups can participate and the utilization of legal means against the embattled forces of prejudice, these constitute the most effective means of fighting antisemitism. But their efficacy depends upon utilizing not one or two, but all these means in unison, in a broad unified attack on the menace.

Dr. Gordis then confesses that even with the employment of all of these methods, anti-Semitism will only be reduced, not eliminated. The morale of Jews must be strengthened the better to endure the prejudice and discrimination which will remain. This can be achieved

> through a growing understanding and love of the Jewish heritage. . . . Moreover, without meaningful Jewish values in their lives, all Jews are

in imminent danger of identifying Jewish life with "anti-antisemitism" and Jewish activity with an unending process of fund-raising. That would be a tragedy not only for Judaism, but for the Jew, whose heart would be filled with bitterness and suspicion. On the other hand, in striving to build Jewish loyalty and self-respect, American Jewry is taking the most constructive step toward protecting the psychic health of four and a half million men, women and children. Efforts in this direction still fall woefully short of the necessary maximum in extent and in resourcefulness.

The author's appraisal of the economic and political scene indicates close contact with all the relevant events and philosophies of the day. It appears that there *are* busy ministers and scholars who can keep up with the latest developments in the social life of their time. Dr. Gordis believes that religion must have both general and specific proposals for the improvement of our social order.

> The world-wide depression, the frantic imperialist search for markets, and the horrors of modern warfare are rooted in economic dislocations. . . . This being the malady, [Karl] Marx suggested the remedy: the collective ownership of the means of production, to be operated not for the profit of the few, but for the welfare of all. Both within religion and without, men are divided on the feasibility of Marx's program. It has never yet been genuinely practiced by an entire people, and Soviet Russia is no exception. Yet it seems clear that the goal of a cooperative society agrees with the aspirations of religion. Increasing numbers of religious leaders feel that the socialization of economic resources is the practical technique for realizing social justice. If the cardinal doctrine of religion is the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man, it follows that all human beings have an equal right to share in the blessings of God's world.

In these war times especially, Dr. Gordis has done a real service in pointing out the need for preserving freedom of conscience. He states that

> The long record of man's struggle for the right to think for himself, to express sharp criticism of authority, begins with the Prophets of Israel, as does the battle for social reconstruction and economic equality. Without this deeply ingrained Jewish ideal of the right to difference of opinion, the entire development of traditional Judaism is inconceivable, for the Talmud is the world's greatest monument to controversy.

In adverse criticism of the book it should be stated that there are occasional lapses in felicity of phrasing and a few instances of exaggeration. Examples of the latter are to be found on pages 149 and 250. In the first case, the author makes the elimination of Semitic blood the

chief domestic occupation of Hitler's Reich. In the second, anti-Catholic propaganda is said to be carried on always with the highest motives.

Isidor B. Hoffman

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Man of God. By David E. Adams. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941. 210 pp. $2.00.

Now, if ever, the figure and teaching of Jesus need to be understood. But this understanding is an increasingly difficult task, for exegesis and interpretation must be guided by Synoptic Gospel criticism, and criticism grows more and more complex. To attempt a summary of criticism, exegesis, and interpretation in a volume of two hundred pages requires courage.

Professor Adams' teaching experience, both in the classroom and the pulpit have enabled him to seize upon points of salient interest to those who would like to understand the Gospels, but who need to be inducted into their study. He finds the chief obstacle in their way to be "the failure to distinguish clearly between the traditional forms of thought and expression utilized by the New Testament writers in their portrayal of the religious experience of their day and the nature of that experience in terms of modern modes of expression." This is the obstacle which he wishes to clear away. He is evaluating the Gospel record and seeking to state the significance of Jesus today.

The guiding thread in making one's way through the tangled mass of material is the Old Testament concept, "Man of God," which the author believes to have been clearly defined in the popular mind in the first century A.D. and to which the figure of Jesus was made to conform in the records. The stories attached to the ancient men of God had molded this tradition: Abraham, Moses, Samuel, Elijah and Elisha—wonder-workers, to be distinguished from prophets. Jesus' "biographers attempted to place him in the tradition, not so much of Amos and II Isaiah, where it is quite clear that he would himself have preferred to be placed, but in the tradition of the earlier wonder-workers." This is the first of "three main types of Old Testament thinking which seem to converge upon and influence, not to say dominate, the interpretation of Jesus in the New Testament." The second is the group of ideas related to the Messiah, the Suffering Servant, and

the Kingdom to come; and the last is "the idea of sacrificial atonement developed with the growth of Hebrew moral and ceremonial law."

As one reads through *Man of God,* one is first of all struck by the debt which Gospel criticism owes to David Friedrich Strauss, who first made clear the great influence of the Old Testament upon the Gospel records. One is also reminded of Lord Raglan's fascinating study of *The Hero,* in which identical features are found to exist in many mythical heroes, so that one may delineate the concept, "hero." In passing, however, it should be said that whereas Raglan does not include any element in the stylized portrait of the hero which is not found in a number of instances, Adams builds into the concept, "Man of God," features which occur only once in the tradition. The Man of God ascends to heaven because of Elijah's ascent, and feeds the multitude on the basis of Elisha's feeding. And although it may be clear to us now that "wonder-worker" better describes Moses, Samuel, Elijah, and Elisha than "prophet," it is equally clear that these men were included in the category of prophet in the Bible. Was the concept, "Man of God," so distinct? Moreover, not only Old Testament thought, but Hellenistic tradition as well, has put its stamp upon the the Gospel concept of Jesus. He is the Son of God by divine procreation; He is Savior, and Lord.

The book follows Mark's Gospel, at suitable places adding comments upon the material in the other Gospels. The conclusion is that Jesus' "mission was that of a teacher, to make clear to people the insight about God and the Kingdom that had come to him in the long silent hours of manual labor, and in the evening under the Galilean stars." One may read more or less of eschatology into this teaching, as one chooses, although the book lays little stress upon it. To many, including the reviewer, this is an acceptable conclusion. However, there is a stronger basis for it than appears in the book. There is the concept of the wise man or the teacher, frequently found in the Old Testament and in Document Q. "The queen of the south came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and behold, a greater than Solomon is here."

This method of dealing with the Gospel material in the order in which it occurs has a great advantage over the topical method in that it makes clear the setting and sequence of each pericope. It would be still clearer to go through each Gospel separately; but that was im-

possible within the limit of words which Professor Adams evidently set for himself. Nor was it possible to explain with any fulness some statements which would raise serious questions if the reader encountered them here for the first time, such as the denial that either Jesus considered himself the Messiah, or that his disciples so considered him. There is some risk of confusion for the ordinary reader who tries to digest the quick summaries. The author had no intention of giving an exhaustive treatment of any part of the Gospels; however, he opens up a path for an inquiring reader to follow, with the Gospels open beside him, and throws light on many an obscurity.

There are matters of criticism which are open to doubt, such as the suggestion of the influence of Paul's "high Christology" upon Luke. And there are matters of exegesis: speaking of non-resistance of evil in the Sermon on the Mount, the author asks,

> For whom were these injunctions intended, and under what historical circumstances? To ask the question is to answer it. Jesus was speaking to a subject people about the conduct distinctly related to their immediate survival. He did not have to name names for his auditors to get the point that submission to the current military regulations was necessary to their continued survival. There is of course the interpretation that Jesus is here legislating for the anticipated apocalyptic Kingdom. Even if Jesus thought in apocalyptic terms, which is open to argument, this assumption is unnecessary, when the content of his teaching at this point fits the contemporary situation so aptly.

As we look back upon their history, it is plain that non-submission brought about the non-survival of Israel as a nation. Jesus may have warned them of a house left desolate; but he probably believed in the ultimate destiny of Israel as securely as he believed in the Kingdom. And again, "The immediate problem was to help people who had suffered much, and for whom the future held little hope, to find some measure of happiness in a world where they must apparently expect to live out their lives under hard and discouraging conditions." Was Jesus then a utilitarian moralist? Was a measure of happiness his ambition for his hearers?

To the question as to where, for his disciples, the power of Jesus' personality lay, the answer is: first, in his sense of nearness to God; second, in his remarkable personal power; third, in "the feeling of the permanence of Jesus. For his death did not terminate the experience of God into which he had led his followers, nor diminish their consciousness of new personal power. . . . Furthermore, out of these three

developed a fourth element in the disciples' experience of Jesus—the experience of salvation."

Let us end with a delightfully homely and striking passage:

> Jesus was a Jew and it is not to be supposed that he conceived God in the morally weak and easygoing terms of the American dad who condones the sins of his children because he doesn't know what to do about them, because he doesn't want to be bothered, and because he's committing most of them himself, and his children know it. There are moral requirements inherent in the very background of Jesus' life and thought which cannot be left out of account in the effort to understand the full significance of his teachings about the character of God.

The volume contains both a general index and an index of scripture references.

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The Nature of the Early Church. By E. F. SCOTT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941. vii + 245 pp. $2.00.

This book raises a problem that ranks high on the agenda of current historical and theological discussion: what is the essential nature of the Christian Church? Three assumptions underlie Professor Scott's approach: (1) the church is a unique creation; (2) its uniqueness can be explained only in terms of its message; (3) this message can best be understood in its New Testament formulation. "The church was most fully itself at the very outset."

The initial pattern, always normative for Christians, may be summed up in the phrase "an impossible possibility." That paradox originated with Jesus, whose message, accurately preserved in the Gospels, centered in the proclamation of an apocalyptic kingdom. Jesus taught uncompromising loyalty to the demands of this kingdom, knowing that they were foolish and impractical during this present age. "The religion of Jesus has never been put into action because it cannot be" (p. 21). Jesus and his disciples realized that they must conform to a continuing existence in this world, all the while they awaited the kingdom and sought to live as if it had already come.

The primitive Church, with the disciples as a nucleus, remained loyal to this ideal. The death of Jesus "made no break with their previous life." Even the resurrection made little difference. Emerging from the "exalted mood" of the disciples, it served to lift them, for the

time being, out of the present world into direct contact with the higher world. They felt themselves reborn as citizens of heaven, entering into the larger invisible life of Christ and participating in his spirit. As a communal incarnation of Christ, the Church is an "outpost of heaven" and must remain separate from the existing order. Yet it must acclimatize itself within the world, fashioning its fellowship as an earthly society. This dilemma has faced Christians from that day to this. The main object of Paul's letters (as well as of this book) is to advise Christians on meeting the tensions issuing from this dilemma.

Having thus defined the Church as a unique fellowship of those who live in two worlds at once, the author illustrates the paradox by referring to developments in worship, organization, theology, and ethics. In worship, the kingdom hope kindled "that first, fine, careless rapture"; when the hope faded, spontaneous ecstasy succumbed to formal routine. Yet, because the hope can never disappear, Christian worship remains potentially ecstatic and even volcanic. Likewise, as long as hope for the new age was white-hot, organization seemed superfluous. Ecclesiasticism arose from the failure of Jesus' dream, and from the consequent need for fitting the Church into the frame of the present world. Even the development of theology came as a concession to deluded hopes. Jesus was not interested in theology, for the chief occasion of theology was the need of adapting the message of the kingdom to this age. Theology represents "a weakening of the genuine religious apprehension" and a "confession of defeat," although, by this concession, the Church "made sure its victory." The same paradox explains as inevitable the shift from Jesus' unrealizable ethic to the practical everyday morality of the later Church. The Church began and remains a unique fellowship that is rooted in two worlds at the same time.

Although this dichotomy is clearly present in the early Church, one wonders if early Christians themselves would have found here the definitive norm. Professor Scott is primarily concerned with the relation of Church to society; they were primarily concerned with the relation of men to God. To Professor Scott, the basic problem is continuing conflict and accommodation between the Church and the world; to them, it is the need for escaping the bonds of sin and death. The former can find the essence of Christianity in the Sermon on the Mount; the latter could only find it in the Cross upon a Hill. We may stress the impossibility of the Sermon; they stressed the miracu-

lous possibilities open to them through the death and resurrection. They found in those unique events that God had opened unexpected avenues of forgiveness, that he had already, in fact, conquered Satan, Sin, and Death, and that his love in Christ had already blotted out the tragic futility of human striving. It is true that the Cross is an unforgettable symbol of the conflict between the two ages, but it is also true that the resurrection brought power to resolve that conflict. Paul, for example, had been tormented by the impossible possibility of the kingdom before his conversion rather than after it. Pharisaism had multiplied frustrations in seeking the divine righteousness; the Church was born out of the unique experience of the grace of God in Christ, which placed that ideal within the reach of redeemed sinners. Justification by faith, which Professor Scott dismisses as a doctrine that anyone of moderate intelligence can understand, was for early Christians a *sine qua non* of the Christian community. Christianity presupposed the impossibility of achieving the kingdom; it rose out of a new covenant which God had instituted, a divine revelation and salvation which brought ultimate answers to a human situation that otherwise was intolerable.

If this experience of God's love in Christ be made the touchstone of developing theology and institution, a different picture results. Theology appears not as a concession to deluded hopes, a secondary accretion to justify prior faith. Rather, it is implicit in the initial events, made necessary by the attempt to describe and interpret them. The rise of an institution need not be attributed to the discarding of apocalyptic; rather, it is due to the operation of spiritual gifts which those events had released as signs of the kingdom. Peter, James, and Paul did not become ecclesiastics because of waning hopes, but because the revelation of God's activity in Christ constrained them. The first disciples would agree with Dr. Scott in maintaining that the Church, in its essential nature, can neither develop nor deteriorate. But they would attribute this finality, not to the continuing dilemma of living in two worlds, but to the adequacy of the events through which God had disclosed his saving power to this elect community. In the one case, the Church is primarily a social entity, defined by its opposition and accommodation to this world; in the other, it is primarily a sphere of divine activity, defined as God's chosen instrument of salvation.

PAUL S. MINEAR

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Early Churches in Palestine. By J. W. Crowfoot. (The Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1937), London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. xiv + 166 pp., xxx plates. $3.25.

In a series of lectures delivered in 1937 under the auspices of the Schweich program of the British Academy, Mr. Crowfoot has presented a concise survey of our current knowledge of the early ecclesiastical architecture of the Holy Land. As collected in this small book, the lectures give a clear picture of the Palestinian churches from the Constantinian period to the Islamic conquest early in the seventh century. The first lecture deals with the beginnings of Early Christian architecture in Palestine before and at the time of Constantine: the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the first Church of the Nativity, the Eleona church, and the building at Mamre. The second lecture deals with the setting, parts, and plans of churches from the late fourth through the early seventh century, basilicas with and without transept, cruciform and centralized churches. This is followed by a third chapter which deals with the building materials and the decoration, including marble incrustation, glass mosaics, stone mosaic and marble pavements, capitals, door lintels and chancel screens. Short bibliographical notes refer to the single monuments. A brief excellent "retrospect" concludes the book.

Mr. Crowfoot calls his book, perhaps too modestly, a "progress report." Indeed, it seems to this reviewer to have all the merits of an excellent report on what we actually know; the book attempts to give nothing but a series of facts, sober, concise, and minute. Mr. Crowfoot concentrates entirely on the few remnants of churches that are still preserved, and on the important excavations which were undertaken during the last ten years, such as Gerasa, excavated by Mr. Crowfoot himself, Bethlehem, Tabgha, Mount Garizim, Bosra, Khirbat Mukhayyat, etc. The reluctance to draw general conclusions is extremely impressive, although it cannot be denied that this reticence at the same time somewhat limits the outlook. Just because one realizes on every single page that Mr. Crowfoot knows his material probably better than any one else in the field, the reader would sometimes like to hear more about the development of architecture in Palestine, and about the interrelations with the architecture of the other Mediterranean provinces.

The reviewer who is forced to sum up the results of Mr. Crowfoot's book, realizes how far-reaching they really are. To begin with Constantinian architecture, among the four Constantinian churches in Palestine remnants of which are preserved, the two most important seem to represent a type which is different from anything we would have expected only a decade ago: the nave with its aisles is followed not by an apse or a transept, but by a central structure. Such was definitely the type of the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, as proved through Mr. Harvey's excavations. Mr. Crowfoot suggests very convincingly a similar reconstruction for the martyrion at the Holy Sepulchre: the ἡμισφαίριον with its twelve columns would have been, rather than an apse, a circular structure at the end of the basilical nave; it would have skirted the eastern end of the courtyard of which the western end was occupied by the tomb of Christ. The rotunda of the Anastasis over the tomb, which, recently, has been attributed to Constantine's son, is now given back to the Emperor himself. These plans of basilicas that are terminated by central structures are unexpected and interesting, and so is the author's hypothesis that reproductions of them are given in buildings represented at either side of the late fourth century mosaic at S. Pudenziana in Rome. This, then, would seem to be the dominating Constantinian church type in Palestine, a type quite different from that normally accepted for the Early Christian basilica. Indeed, Mr. Crowfoot would seem to be right in doubting the Constantinian date of the remnants as well as the basilical plan of the church at Mamre, and, while he seems to feel convinced of Vincent's reconstruction of the Eleona, this reviewer wonders whether in this church also there was not a central structure above the cave at the far end of the nave; no slightest trace has been found, either of the apse with its inner semicircle and its exterior polygon, nor of the flanking pastophories as reconstructed by Vincent. At any rate, the combination of a nave with a central structure in the two outstanding Constantinian edifices opens up a number of far reaching questions. Evidently the nave was intended as a congregational hall, while the central structure was a memorial building rising above the venerated spot. At Bethlehem this was the grotto of the Nativity; could it at Jerusalem have been the spot where the crosses were found? Obviously it would be hard if not, indeed, impossible to find within such an arrangement an appropriate place for an altar, a dif-

ficulty which is much stressed by Mr. Crowfoot. Yet need there have been a permanent altar in these Constantinian edifices? As late as the end of the fourth century, Etheria describes the rites at the Holy Sepulchre so as to suggest that mass was usually read in the rotunda behind the basilica, and only exceptionally in the church. Another question is whether the combination of a congregational hall with a memorial structure has any parallels elsewhere in the Early Christian world; this reviewer feels that the problem might be raised with regard to the transepts of the Roman fourth century basilicas.

The mention of these Roman churches brings to mind some other surprising results of Mr. Crowfoot's investigation: first, the buildings were much more quickly erected than one usually assumes; from two to ten years was apparently the normal time required for the construction. Second, the Palestine structures are amazingly small if compared with the edifices erected contemporaneously in Rome and in Constantinople. The total *length* of the Church of the Nativity, only 150 Roman feet, remains considerably less even than the *width* of Old St. Peter's: the basilica of the Holy Sepulchre was even smaller, not to speak of that of the Eleona. Mr. Crowfoot states that the smallness of these edifices allows for revealing conclusions as to the size of the congregations in Palestine. After all, this is only natural since both Jerusalem and Bethlehem were small country towns. Yet it is most gratifying to see it proved clearly that, in spite of their being imperial foundations, the Constantinian churches in the Holy Land were anything but the equals of the imperial basilicas in the capitals of the Empire.

A great number of the post-Constantinian churches discussed are known through the author's previous publication on Gerasa; added to these are the basilicas at Tabgha, the Justinian church at Bethlehem, and the centralized churches on Mount Garizim and at Beisan. In describing them, Mr. Crowfoot closely follows the analysis previously given by A. M. Schneider, H. Vincent, and G. M. FitzGerald respectively. Only brief remarks refer to the important churches at Ras Siagha, and to the small churches near Mount Nebo which were published by Bagatti, and to those in the Negeb which were uncovered but not published by the Colt expedition; other churches in South Judea which were published by Mader have been only mentioned. Mr. Crowfoot departs from the earlier reports on only a few occasions: he tactfully shifts Vincent-Abel's date of Emmaus from

the third to the fifth century; he suggests that even Schneider's new date for the church at Tabgha (about 400 instead of 360) should be moved further into the fifth century; indeed the plan fits much better into the second half of the fifth century or even into the sixth century, and so do the beautiful mosaics (I cannot see that they should remind anyone of China!). The plan of the church with its cross transept (it is in no way related to the Roman transepts) is, indeed, quite different from the normal basilical type in Transjordania and Palestine with a plain apse flanked by lateral rooms. The cross transept points to Egypt, to the coast of Asia Minor, or to the Balkan countries, rather than to the Syrian neighbor region to which the normal type of the Palestinian and Transjordanian basilicas seems to be related. The changes in the layout of the chancel parts of these normal basilicas are linked to the liturgical development; on the other hand, Mr. Crowfoot would evidently prefer to see no liturgical need at the root of the arrangement of pastophories on either side of the apse. The cruciform churches at Gerasa and Gaza are well known; no reason is given why the cruciform memorial at the Well of Jacob should not be dated fourth century—in spite of the close resemblance of its simple plan to the church at Kaoussié-Antioch which is dated 379. On the other hand, I wonder whether the central church at Beisan, with its atrium with side chambers, is not dependent on the plan of the church of the Ascension as shown in Arculph's sketch.

Of the greatest importance is, finally, the discussion of the sculptural and the mosaic decoration; the re-dating of the capitals at Bethlehem from the time of Constantine into that of Justinian will make it necessary to revise the previous concept of the development of capitals in the Near East. Of even greater importance is the discussion of the wall decoration and the mosaic pavements: the description as given by Mr. Crowfoot helps the reader to visualize the Palestinian churches as they actually were, the fourth century Church of the Nativity, for instance, with its lower sections covered with a veneer of marble slabs and the upper parts with figurative mosaics, with its carpet-like pavements in which geometric patterns, trellis work, and figure medallions were intermingled. The aspect of most other churches seems to have been similarly splendid, and one is induced to wonder with Mr. Crowfoot whether the Syrian churches, contrary to De Vogüe's opinion, did not look alike.

I hope I have made it clear how valuable Mr. Crowfoot's report

is. If I should venture any criticism I would concentrate on two points: first, I should say that Mr. Crowfoot's extraordinary and justified caution against generalizations should be extended also to those time-honored generalizations whose generalizing character is no longer evident: simply to derive the single elements of the Christian churches, pastophories, exterior apses, etc., from classical prototypes, basilicas or temples, is perhaps an undue simplification of a far more complicated process in which classical and Christian Antiquity have developed parallel types. (Incidentally the exterior apse does, of course, occur in secular basilicas; to mention one well known example, the basilica of Constantine in Rome even had two exterior apses erected in two consecutive campagnes.) Secondly, the justified abhorrence of theories might be supplemented by a comparable mistrust of reconstructions. For instance, the details of Vincent's reconstruction of the Church of the Nativity are really quite doubtful; it does not even conform to the structure shown on the mosaic at S. Pudenziana which, according to Mr. Crowfoot, is a representation of the church.

That the scales on some plans are missing is a minor but regrettable mistake.

Richard Krautheimer

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Meister Eckhart, A Modern Translation, By Raymond Bernard Blackney. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941. xxviii + 333 pp. $2.00.

Meister Johann Eckhart, the medieval Dominican, is a shadowy figure because there are few authenticated facts about him. Yet, in spite of this dearth of biographical material, his reputation seems secure, for he seems to have been the fountainhead of a great river of faith—the Rhineland Friends of God.

Here is a new translation of his basic works, including about half of the works ascribed to Eckhart: *Meister Eckhart's Talks of Instruction, The Book of Divine Comfort, the Aristocrat, About Disinterest*, twenty-eight sermons, fragments from the sermons, *Legends*, and the *Defense*. The last named is the only certain piece from Eckhart's pen. In this book these tracts have been re-translated into adequate, if at times colorless, language, thus forming the core of the known works of the great medieval Dominican.

Eckhart's was a transcendent although greatly misunderstood

genius. From him have come two streams of thought: the first is the deeply religious and philosophical mystics of the church whose specialty has been contemplation—men like Suso, Tauler, and Angelus Silesius, whose writings have been the certain source of a vibrant spirituality; the second is the evil activism of Alfred Rosenberg, who in his vicious book, *Der Mythus des 20 Jahr-hunderts,* claims the medieval Dominican as the exclusive property of the racial mystics of modern Germany. And then it must also be remembered that Eckhart was condemned by a Bull of Pope John XXII. Because of such a diversity of judgment and influence it is necessary that Eckhart's writings again be published.

In these tracts Eckhart's *Innerlichkeit* is apparent. His questionable scholastic subtleties are buried beneath an avalanche of devotion, beneath a great mountain of Christian faith. The Eckhart that here emerges is a Christian of firm conviction and sanity, a believer who understood the nature of sin, the tragedy of man's existential situation, the difficulty of Christian obligation, and the serenity of faith. Read, for example, *The Book of Divine Comfort,* a work supposed to have been written for the consolation of the Queen of Hungary. Eckhart begins his comfort with thirty propositions the learning of which will greatly aid in the comforting of the soul. Without escaping into Stoicism, Eckhart presents a series of principles which will aid in the comfort of the distressed. The goal of such comfort is not the Stoic identification of the distressed soul with the universal reason, but the identification of the soul with the sufferings of Christ. Here is the medieval counterpart of Zinzendorf's blood and wound theology, the mystical participation in his sufferings and also his glorification:

> I say that, since God is with us when we suffer, he suffers with us. . . . God, suffering with men, suffers incomparably more in his own way than men suffer for him.

Again:

> Since God goes through my pain before I do, then I suffer for him, then my agony, however great and manifold it may be, is a comfort and a joy and very easy.

The goal of Eckhart's mysticism is what the translator calls "disinterestedness," from the German *Abgescheidenheit.* This is a quality which Eckhart considered to be far greater than love, because love

compels man to suffer for God's sake while disinterest makes him sensitive only to God. Disinterest is the *summum bonum* of Christian living, for to be full of things is to be empty of God, while to be empty of things is to be full of God.

Passages in Eckhart's writings cry out for quotation. He was more than an abstract philosopher who talked of the *Abgrund;* he was also a medieval pietist, seeking to create in his readers' hearts a spirit of deep devotion. His was no social gospel; his was a personal gospel of regeneration and re-birth:

> People ought not to consider so much what they are to do as what they *are;* let them but *be* good and their ways and deeds will shine brightly. If you are just, your actions will be just too. Do not think that saintliness comes from occupation; it depends rather on what one is. The kind of work we do does not make us holy but we may make it holy. However sacred a calling may be, as it is a calling, it has no power to sanctify; but rather as we *are* and have the divine being within, we bless each task we do, be it eating, or sleeping, or watching, or any other. Whatever they do who have not much of God's nature, they work in vain.
>
> Thus take care that your emphasis is laid on being good and not on the number or kind of things to be done. Emphasize rather the fundamentals on which your work depends.

Unfortunately the translator of these tracts of Eckhart seems to have worked independently of the Eckhart Commission, a group of European scholars who have been seeking to establish the text of Eckhart's work. Their meetings have resulted in the seriatim publication of the Meister's Latin works by Felix Meiner in Leipzig, 1934 and 1935. Another limitation of this translation is the arrangement of the sermons. The translator defends his arrangement by saying that the "twenty-eight sermons are arranged to illustrate the movement of Eckhart's inner career." But such was not Eckhart's intention. He obviously based his sermons on the pericopes, not upon a reconstructed empirical view of his mysticism.

Yet these limitations do not detract from the quality of the translation nor from the spirituality of Eckhart's work. Here is a book well designed to deepen religious life, a good handbook of devotion. It is an excellent book for those whose task is to comfort souls in a weary world.

John Joseph Stoudt

Allentown, Pennsylvania

Niels Hemmingsens teologiska åskådning. By KJELL BARNEKOW. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1940, xvi + 311 pp. Kr. 7:50.

Few realize what a center of theological inquiry Lund University is. Right now long-range investigations are under way that may have profound effects on theological thought. Sweden seems definitely destined to come increasingly into considerable Christian leadership. The most important fact in the long run, moreover, may be not the work of such scholars as Aulén, Bring, Nygren, and Odeberg (Uppsala), but the fact that these men are gathering around them a large number of young, creative thinkers who have the thorough training and technique of Swedish scholarship. Since the dominant Swedish theological method, furthermore, affirms that theological content must be found in history, an increasing number of important motif studies are being produced.

One of these, Dr. Barnekow's presentation of Hemmingsen's systematic theology, is both thorough and lucid. Of Hemmingsen's approximately one hundred published pieces over a period of sixty years (1555-1615), Barnekow rightly uses chiefly the two basic works: *Enchiridion Theologicum* (1557) and *Syntagma Institutionum Christianarum* (1574). In view of the depth, power, and clarity of his system and his contemporary influence, not only in Scandinavia and Germany but also in England, Holland, and Switzerland, Hemmingsen is altogether too little known. This is especially true since Hemmingsen represents a vital combination, even if not an adequate synthesis, of Thomist philosophy, Erasmian humanism, Calvinist interpretation, and Lutheran theology, the last particularly, however, in what to much neo-Lutheranism is the distinctly diluted form of Melanchthon's *Loci Communes.*

Even though Hemmingsen considered Melanchthon his greatest teacher, he himself was, as we have indicated, far from being an orthodox Lutheran theologian. He departed much further that is, from Luther than did his teacher. His main interest, for instance, is not justification but new birth. His vital concern is with the Christian life, the fulfilling of the law. As a matter of fact, in a thoroughly un-Lutheran fashion he treats the Gospel before the law. Christ *helps* man to fulfil the purpose for his creation. The *analogia fidei* of Hemmingsen's entire theological system is the restoration in man of the image of God, and the greatest attention is paid to man's transition from a state of sin to a state of grace.

In a short review only brief mention can be made of important discussions in Dr. Barnekow's presentation. Hemmingsen, who was philosopher before theologian, has a real appreciation of Thomism's *analogia entis* and explains the relation of God and His creation in its terms. It is interesting to find in a Lutheran theologian a real understanding and acceptance of the Aristotelian relation between matter and form. As a matter of fact, though Dr. Barnekow's treatment of this subject is most careful, it seems to the reviewer that Hemmingsen's whole conception of God's *schaffende Liebe* is far nearer St. Thomas' than Luther's conception. The love of God *as the sharing of His goodness by the sharing of His being* is for Hemmingsen central in God's relation to man. God's love (as considerably with Plato and Thomas) is treated as the expansive power of His goodness. (With Luther, of course, the treatment is almost entirely *in loco iustificationis*.) Thus there is ontological continuity between God and man, and man consequently has natural light to discover God as his highest good *via* general analogy.

The interested reader will find Hemmingsen's treatment of nature and grace especially important. God's dual presence in man, by nature and by grace, the basic problem within Roman Catholic, and especially within Thomistic thought, this Danish Lutheran theologian discusses with force and clarity. And, in terms of this problem, he ponders such doctrines as Creation, Providence, Will, Intellect, etc. To the reviewer, Hemmingsen's theory of προάιρεσις, and the specific relation of our love for God as *actus elicitus* and *actus imperatus* seemed especially significant. Too little is generally done with the question as to how general commitment actually eventuates in specific, concrete action for God.

Hemmingsen's discussion of the work of Christ reveals that he is fundamentally a philosopher and a psychologist, for the next chapter, on conversion, seems, at least to the reviewer, much more suggestive. *Metanoia* is a *proairesis* of will, on the one hand an act among free acts, and on the other, a *mutatio* of ontological significance. *Contritio* is the negative side of *fides* and presupposes it. *Contritio* and *fides* are basically the positive and negative sides of the same thing—the working of the Gospel of Christ. Since natural reason can know the law but not the Gospel, all that the law can achieve in man is *metameleia,* regret over past action (used much like *attritio,* but with

less emphasis on fear of consequences), but never *metanoia*, which is a real shift in the will to the divine Object. The law, therefore, cannot produce penitence, but only the Gospel. (Hemmingsen identifies *metanoia* and *poenitentia*.)

There is naturally no room here for extensive discussion, but the reviewer ought to indicate to those working on the problem that Hemmingsen's discussion of the relation of *metameleia* and *metanoia* is especially suggestive. The thoughtful reader can reconstruct much from the hint that there can be *metameleia* without *metanoia*, but never vice versa. In later writings Hemmingsen uses *metameleia* most surprisingly as synonymous with *contritio*, but is then careful to distinguish between *contritio* as the recognition of just punishment of sin and as the offer to God of a truly penitent heart (both senses, of course, going beyond much of the connotation of *attritio*).

Omitting mention of much suggestive material, the reviewer must point out Dr. Barnekow's especially forceful discussion of the doctrine of predestination. Hemmingsen polemizes vigorously and skilfully against Calvin's doctrine. His discussion of man's free will as conditioned but not determined by God, of the three functions of Providence, of the definite and indefinite foreknowledge of God, of the clear relation between *causa prima* and *causae secundae* and freedom, of theodicy, and of the Church and the means of grace, etc., can only be enumerated. Actually Hemmingsen was best known for his sacramental theory, which was almost purely Calvinist. The bread and the wine are symbols that convey Christ's body and blood, not locally, but to the spirit of whoever participates in faith. There is no immediate connection between the symbol and the reality, but the symbol is a normal means of making the reality available through a secret and incomprehensible act of the Holy Spirit.

Hemmingsen was a profoundly constructive theologian who was great enough to accept the true in every system he knew. Thus he considered the Reformation, to which he was passionately devoted, no more than the necessary consequence of humanism. Again, he was a realist, while his teacher, Melanchthon, was a nominalist. Though a real Protestant, he kept the best in scholasticism and humanism. With all his stress on grace, he held that it fulfilled rather than destroyed nature. In spite of his rejection of the idea of *meritum de congruo*, and in general of the whole idea that the keeping of the

law is a means of salvation, he retained, irenically and constructively, Aquinas' *analogia entis* as the basic relation between God and the world. In spite of his stress on grace, he stressed the *liberum arbitrium* as a necessary instrument of salvation.

One wonders why a constructive thinker like this is largely forgotten, while so often passionate, one-sided theologians survive. Is it the fault of the host of smaller thinkers who need one-sided presentations to see the truth which is there upheld, or does this fact imply something as to the nature of truth? The reviewer hopes, in any case, that when Dr. Barnekow, in the last paragraph of the book, calls Hemmingsen a rationalistic moralist, that term is not meant to be a basically Lutheran reproach against a really great thinker.

Nels F. S. Ferré

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Christian Truth in History. By Hugh Miller. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941. xvii + 236 pp. $2.50.

The argument of this book may be summed up in a single sentence: it is an empirical fact that Christ redeemed a world. In order to prove this point the author must establish two theses: first, religious truth is subject to empirical verification beyond the subjective test of individual experience, that is to say, there must be objective social-historical verification of religious truth; and, second, the verification of religious truth in Western civilization has been progressively accomplished in historical Christianity from the dawn of the Christian era to the present day. To these arguments Professor Miller brings a welcome stress upon the study of social evolution as opposed to theoretical science and metaphysics, and a refreshing attempt to solve, in terms of the Christian experience, the problems of a world which has recovered the functional significance, if not the limitations, of political faith.

Professor Miller considers that truth is the adequacy of expression and communication of experience, where adequacy is measured by the ability of the expression to guide one to confirmatory experiences. Religious truth in these terms is variable and subject to an evolution. The history of Western religion offers a progressive sequence of confirmatory experiences. All knowledge supposing an evolution of truth postulates the actuality of an articulate realm pro-

gressively to be described and appreciated. The postulate of religious knowledge in the West, as Professor Miller understands it, is that there is a supersocial, that is to say spiritual, environment affecting human scientific and social activity. The empirical verification of religious truth must then take the form of the study of cultural evolution in so far as the latter can be explained only upon the basis of man's response to his spiritual environment.

The second phase of Professor Miller's argument is directed toward showing that cultural evolution is explicable only upon such a religious basis as that offered by Christianity. The hypothesis upon which he operates is that Christianity has always been man's conscious response to his environment in terms of new forms of social relationship which transcend and yet govern the social actualities. He finds that Christianity has shown itself to be a vision of nature and humanity in progressive creation, an insight into the fact of organic emergence. The general reformation of modern scientific and social activity is considered as primarily due to men's love of that Christ who revealed the divine particularities and potentialities in nature and man and inspired society to become "a community of divine beings, children of God." Humanism has lacked such an interpretative vision. Further, the sciences have failed to account for historical emergence because, having defined contextual environment in exclusively physical terms, they have severally failed to understand the historical relation between it and organic life. Christianity, in terms of the incarnation, discovered and has explored the consequences of the dynamic continuity between ultimate environment and the organism.

Professor Miller's stress upon the ultimate dichotomy between the Judaean-Christian dynamism and Greek rationalism is relevant to the problem of the empirical verification of religious truth, for he considers that only the former bridges such impassable distinctions as those between time and eternity, the natural and the supernatural, the finite and the infinite. But it is questionable whether he can assume such a uniformity of religious experience and its relation to scientific and social activity as is necessary for his argument. Religious response in the West is a tree with many branches; it is difficult to point out the trunk of this tree, and more difficult still to prove that such a trunk has not been balanced by a number of culturally

grafted limbs. The historical sequence of religious experiences in the West has been conditioned by—and has at times attempted to reject—other syntheses than that between Judaean-Christian dynamism and Greek science. Further, while one may appreciate the endeavor to find empirical verification of religious truth in cultural history, one wonders why Professor Miller makes no mention of modern attempts at non-metaphysical verification of objective religious truth based upon individual experience; if the validity of this method is denied, then empirical verification in the case of religious truth is not what that term means in connection with scientific truth. With regard to the second phase of his argument, one can only say that anything akin to proof would require a more exhaustive description and documentation than Professor Miller has offered. In particular, one might take issue with the patriotic but otherwise questionable assertion that the American Revolution was the successful means to a progressive Christianization of life. Further, his frequent implications that empirical method and biological science are results of the larger history of the Christian vision are not persuasive. Finally, despite Professor Miller's apparent attempt to restrict the term progress to the idea of mutation, there is more than a suspicion of Herbert Spencer's "beneficent necessity" in his use of the term.

While the reader may disagree with many particulars of this work and, further, may deny that Professor Miller has offered empirical verification of Christian truth in history, one can, within limits, agree to the fundamental assertion—that "Christianity has been a dynamo of social evolution and political progress."

FREDERICK DEW. BOLMAN, JR.

Columbia University

Christian Doctrine. By JOHN S. WHALE. New York: The Macmillan Company. 197 pp. $2.00.

This book represents the slightly edited and expanded lectures given by President Whale in the Michaelmas Term of 1940, in the University of Cambridge. Delivered at the request of the Board of the Faculty of Theology, they were intended for students of all Faculties, and in these first few weeks of the war, over six hundred men and women came to these lectures, and stayed throughout the whole

course. Such a fact is sufficient tribute to the style and substance of Dr. Whale's exposition. Few preachers and probably fewer scholars, and he is both, can equal his gift for vivid presentation and yet exact expression of religious problems, as anyone who has listened, for example, to his broadcast addresses on Sin and the Problem of Evil on the B.B.C. a few years ago—can testify.

The present book discusses the main tenets of Christian Faith and Doctrine. Belief in God, the doctrine of Creation, Man and his Sin, the doctrine of the Fall, Life in the Spirit, and the Doctrine of the Church; these and other aspects of theology he sets before the reader. On the whole, his method is to indicate the problem as it presents itself to the thought and conscience of mankind, and then briefly but not superficially, to sketch the main efforts at explanations and the difficulties thereof, in the history of Christian thought. And then, finally drawing his critical arguments together, he presents the classic Christian interpretation, which is the New Testament interpretation. Technically speaking, the book should be classed with Christian apologetic, but it is not apologetic in tone or treatment. The existential problem is the ground of his concern, and the Christian interpretation of the human situation is expounded, neither apologetically nor dogmatically, in the popular understanding of those words, but as the only interpretation ultimately relevant or adequate to the dilemmas of the human situation.

Thus, in the final chapter, "Death and the Age to Come," characteristically Dr. Whale starts from the fact of human death, "The literature of the race is one long testimony to the mystery and pathos of man's mortality," and then proceeds to analyze what is involved in this universal fact, "that there is an irresolvable, inexplicable contradiction or tension in every human death. Man is not only conscious of the fact of death; . . . He thinks he was not made to die." To explain this contradiction, the Christian doctrine takes it up into its interpretation, and "is always affirming one great truth, through all its varied imagery that the only true evaluation of this world is one which recognises the impermanence of this world." For "death is the one inescapable fact which compels men to choose between faith and despair. . . . There is no middle course, . . . and Christian eschatology is the outcome of faith."

From the point of view of theological position, Dr. Whale represents orthodoxy—not orthodoxy of any fancy, party, or reactionary brand, but in the sense of taking the main stream of classic Christian expression seriously, and upon its New Testament basis. Thus, in his discussion of theories of Atonement, he appeals to the formulations of Trinitarianism in order to illuminate the claim of faith that it is "the Holy God, . . . who as the second 'hypostasis' or 'person' of the Trinity . . . goes deliberately and freely to his death." This insistence by Dr. Whale that Trinitarian theology must be taken seriously is, of course, in line with his rather general but not extreme Augustinianism. It is interesting to note the similar emphasis made by Professor Cochrane of Toronto, who has pointed out how integral is the trinitarianism of Augustine to his socio-political theory (*Christianity and Classical Culture*, Oxford, 1940). But the technical language of theology is not the last word, "the true meaning of the Christian doctrine of Atonement is that Christ died for our sins 'according to the Scriptures,' not according to later forensic or philosophical ideas which use the language of Scripture only to misuse it."

In the same fashion, dealing with the doctrine of the Incarnation, he shows "by confessing One Person in Two Natures, the official Christology of Christendom raises many unsolved problems; . . . but it has one great and abiding merit: it leaves the paradox of Christ's Person as such, and in so doing it safeguards the truth as it is in Jesus, given to us for ever in the pages of the New Testament and in the ongoing life of the Church."

The compass of the book, under two hundred pages, is remarkable. To deal with all the main aspects of Christian thought and interpretations as they are related to man's nature and need, as well as to the New Testament basis, is more than an ordinary achievement. Chosen by The Religious Book Club, the book certainly should be read and digested by ministers, theological students, and all those interested in the Christian interpretation of life. While for those academic specialists already familiar with the material, there is the stimulus of a fresh treatment, the lesson of vivid statement and address, and the moral of concise coherence.

Ursula M. Niebuhr

Columbia University

Regeneration. By DENIS SAURAT. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1941. 64 pp. $1.00.

Denis Saurat is Professor of French Language and Literature at the University of London. His previous books have been written in the field of literary criticism, but in the present volume he has undertaken a field of inquiry and analysis as broad as Plato's *Republic.* And in a frontispiece to the volume, he has earned the following tribute from General de Gaulle: "You are an analyst. But you are also a synthesist, and no one can read your work without finding in it a thousand grains of thought to make him think for himself. . . . The world was made out of ideas. We shall remake it from the same material."

That is the assignment which Professor Saurat sets himself: to remake the world. His ideas are presented in the aphoristic style of Nietzsche; that is why the content of his book is out of all proportion to its actual length. The essay is divided into five parts: "Foundation"; "The Crisis of our Civilization"; "Immediate Remedies"; "Spiritual Reconstruction"; and "Conclusion."

In the first part, Professor Saurat indicates his anthropological basis for the new society. Any society which will endure must be founded upon the pattern of the inner life and structure of its members. When we understand what man is, then we shall be able to construct that form of society in which man can live in the optimum, not necessarily in the maximum, of pleasure and freedom. And so, analysing the interior life of man, the author finds that it consists in two major divisions: the head and the masses. Within the head, again, there is a subdivision into the "chief" and the "talents." The masses comprise all that immense portion of the soul in which are mixed memories, feelings, impulses.

> The true liberty of man is his inner liberty when these different sections of himself work harmoniously. . . . In order to be free a man or nation must first establish liberty in themselves. This liberty which is the harmony between the head and the masses . . . . Then the soul is polarized and its energies flow in the direction of God (pp. 8-9).

The establishment of this harmony is the problem which no present political organization has solved. Professor Saurat sees in Russia the dominance of the head to such an extent that the rights of the

masses are denied; in Germany, the complete triumph of the masses through the emergence of their dictatorship; in the democracies of Britain and America, the failure of either principle to reconcile itself with the other; and in all, the subordination or neglect of the religious sphere which is "the essence of all life and of all sane organization . . . since life is only the manifestation in the world of the power and the will of God" (p. 20).

The crisis of our civilization lies in this disappearance of the religious idea, "the cessation of belief in the fundamental values on which that civilization has been based" (p. 22). That the idea has disappeared is clear from the world's attitude toward the sexual problem, its social and economic problems, and the realm of international morality. No longer is love regarded as a part of the whole creative process, its rightful function. In place of considering marriage as designed for the production of children to the glory of God, the modern view holds its primary purpose to be the comfort or happiness of the two individuals concerned. In the social and economic sphere the religious principle of "love toward one's brother for the love of God," has been supplanted by the principle of enlightened selfishness, "love thy brother for thine own sake." The idea of a morality obtaining in the transactions of nations has simply vanished in the gross tide of nationalisms which are sweeping over the world.

To overcome the self-destructive tendencies within society, society needs a person who will exercise the functions of the chief. His particular care will be the material organization of his society, which, in the immediate future, means the curbing of egoisms and the material satisfaction of the masses. How or where the nations of the world are to find their chiefs, and the problem of discovering their successors, these matters admit of no easy solution.

For its lasting peace the world must look to a spiritual reconstruction, "regeneration," a new birth. The state must recognize that its only sound basis is spiritual, its only true orientation is toward God. The fiction of the separation of state and church must be abandoned, and each state must choose for itself the religion which it will espouse. Inevitably that religion must be the one with which its own history has been associated. But the utmost of tolerance must prevail toward the other religions which exist within its borders. The exclusion of religious teaching from the public centers of education must also

cease; and the state itself must offer instruction in the broad principles of religion, leaving to ecclesiastical organizations the specific indoctrination of the tenets to which they cling. And with this reconstruction of the educational system must come a revision of the program of general education, so that during the first years will be presented a sort of minimum standard, allowing for the encouragement of special skills and talents in the later years. The abuses in the present state of marital, and other social and economic affairs, will be corrected through legislation. And in the new world, even the arts will be subject to some control from the chief.

These are the arguments of Professor Saurat's book. Few will be able to contradict his indictment of modern society. Many will take exception to his idea of the chief as being too suggestive of the dictatorship which the democracies have always feared. Granted that it is a narrow channel which passes between the Scylla of the dictators and the Charybdis of a confused and chaotic democracy, Professor Saurat sees salvation only along this route. His greatest contribution is to have called the attention of his readers to the all important role which religion must play in the lives of both societies and individuals.

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BOOK NOTES

Arabica and Islamica. By U. Wayriffe. London: Luzac and Co., 1940. xii + 416 pp. 15*s*.

This is a revised edition of a book first issued in 1936, and it is not a little remarkable that such a work, consisting for the most part of translations of Arabic texts chosen from various branches of Arabic literature, should call for a new issue so soon. The great value of the book is that it provides, in spite of its limitations, a very useful assemblage of material from which the layman, whose normal acquaintance with Arabic literature seems to be confined to the *Arabian Nights* (which the Arabs themselves hardly consider literature at all), may get a taste of some other samples of what that really interesting literature has to offer. Here are translations from Tradition—both as to the life of Muhammad and as to social legislation—from the historians, from the historical romances, and from the poets both early and late, which will give the non-Arabist a very fair idea of the nature of these areas of Arabic letters.

The new edition embodies numerous corrections and emendations, and the addition of many pages of Notes, Observations, Addenda, Errata, etc., including a sixteen page pamphlet entitled "Prospectus and Notes to Revised Edition," which is pasted in between the Table of Contents and Chapter I. The author apparently takes criticism very hard, and in these Notes etc. is at great pains to deal severely with the critics of the first edition, though one may feel grave doubts as to whether any of them will be greatly moved thereby.

A. J.

Towards Understanding Islam. By Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi. Lahore: Tarjuman-ul-Quran, 1940. 183 pp. Re. 1-8-0.

This little volume seems to be worthy of some praise as an apologetic introduction, as "an attempt at a clear and concise interpretation of Islam," by an orthodox Moslem who believes that Mohammed is "the world-Prophet for the whole of mankind" (p. 76), and that "the social system and the Law of Islam is universally applicable" (p. 182). The work was written in Urdu for the sake of an appeal to Moslems and others of India, and has been put into English for still wider uses. It is in itself of interest to all who watch for signs of life in contemporary Islam, and who may wonder at the fitness of Islam in this new and changing time. The *sayyid* gets at the substance of Islam and presents it clearly in seven chapters which deal with the nature of the faith, its God, its prophet, its observances and its operation as Law.

He asserts that the whole universe follows the religion of *Islam* and that all men are born *Muslims*, that the disbelief of many men comes of ignorance, ingratitude—or rebellion. True knowledge, he claims, leads men

to the true Way. "Islam is the natural religion of man, not associated with any people or country" (i.e., exclusively, he means). "Islam makes no distinction in descent, language, country, home, colour, etc." (p. 183). In spite of the author's puristic disposition (and he objects to "ignorant sufis" as well as to non-Moslems who lack knowledge) he shows unconsciously something of theosophical (Hindu?) influence when asserting that not only are all men Muslims, but the sun, the moon, the stars, air, water, trees, stones, animals, and all are "Muslims" (p. 3). The little book is after all some indication that even orthodoxy, if it be apologetic (and not entirely dogmatic), must submit to one or another kind of compromise.

JOHN CLARK ARCHER

I Have Considered the Days. By CYRUS ADLER. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1941. xiv + 447 pp. $2.50.

When Dr. Adler passed away, in 1940, having lived more than the span allotted in the Bible, he left behind a memorial in the hearts of his fellow-men of all religions. As an educator, as a humanitarian, as an administrator, as a scholar, his life was rich in accomplishment, and other lives were enriched by contact with his.

His autobiographical memoirs, dictated as relaxation during the last years of his life, and made available with a brief introduction by A. S. W. Rosenbach, tell with engaging simplicity and directness of his many activities. Adler, born in the South during the Civil War, became one of the earliest of American Assyriologists; one of the first members of the faculty of Johns Hopkins University; agent with portfolio, but without salary, for the Columbian Exposition; Librarian of the Smithsonian Institute; associate with Samuel P. Langley in early experimentation with heavier-than-air flying machines. This is romance; this is the American dream. Yet this is but the beginning of the story of Cyrus Adler.

The conclusion, and the true meaning of the story is to be found writ large in the story of Jewish life in America and in the world during the twentieth century. For, after 1908, when Adler left the Smithsonian, bearing the title of Honorary Associate in Historic Archeology, to become the president of the newly established Dropsie College, his whole life centered about the advancement of the Jewish people. The duties undertaken by this man must be read in detail to be appreciated; no summary can contain them. His communal service was exceeded in magnitude by that of no other leader of his generation.

If this book may be said to fail to do that which it did not set out to do, it may be said that it fails to reveal the mind of Adler as it does the heart. Though much of his later bibliography was publicist in character, his earlier work shows a penetration and keenness which leads one to feel that had he felt able to devote his life to scholarship, the results would have justified the course. Only at the very end of *I Have Considered the*

Days is there a brief statement of a philosophy reminiscent of that of William James, who seemed to Adler "something like my conception of the rabbinic Jewish tradition," a comparison which would have delighted its subject. Even here, however, Adler's is a philosophy of action, "To keep so busy doing that I have no time to be a philosopher."

Adler had a basic faith in humanity, though he declared, at one point, that his greatest disappointment had been the people living in the world; his greatest hope was that there would come an era in which "the world will fall under the sway of the Good, the True and the Beautiful." His wit and his genius for friendship, both of which this book declares, were the leavening influence in a life dedicated to people who did not always live up to his dreams of them.

He marked with concern the growing development of intolerance in this country, and did his utmost through precept and example, alone and with others, to lead in the return to tolerant Americanism. Like many another leader of Conservative Jewry, he saw in the democracy of America the establishment in the modern world of the prophetic and pharisaic vision of justice.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

Heresy and Inquisition in Narbonne. By RICHARD WILDER EMERY. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. 184 pp. $2.50.

The thirteenth century saw the amazing growth of heresy in southern France stamped out by the crusade of Simon de Montfort, and the subsequent inquisition encouraged by the king of France and largely directed by Dominicans. Béziers and Carcassonne suffered terribly, but nearby Narbonne escaped. Inasmuch as even a casual examination of the situation would tend to show that Narbonne resembled its neighbors in social structure, the problem set up by Professor Evans for Dr. Emery was an interesting puzzle, the solution of which would aid materially in understanding the inquisition in southern France. As in most medieval problems, much depended upon the amount and the validity of the sources available for study. Could the sources answer the question of why Narbonne underwent so little inquisitorial activity in the thirteenth century?

Dr. Emery examined the sources at first hand and gives a description of them in an introduction, primarily from the archival standpoint. In the course of his study (pp. 106, 135, etc.) he discusses their validity for phases of his problem; possibly it would have been better for the discussion to have been included in a longer introduction. More important, however, is the fact that Dr. Emery scrutinized his documents with care and understanding, realizing that documents yield more information if considered in the light of contemporary sources. For instance, he explains how an earlier writer probably misunderstood the list of names of the *Amistance* by comparing that writer's description with another list of names of the time (p. 89), thereby throwing new light upon this municipal conspiracy. Again

(pp. 96-97), he shows that the opinions of three scholars were based upon an omission in a printed text as compared to the manuscript. Such care in checking previous work is less frequent than it should be. These instances and others exhibit a mastery of detail which inspires confidence that his methods of historical criticism provide a sound basis for his interpretations.

In a series of chapters, Dr. Emery gives a chronological survey of the history of Narbonne from social, religious, and political angles. Narbonne was a curious stage; half a "city" holding of the archbishop of Narbonne, half a "bourg" holding of the viscount. Within the walls, the townsmen strove to create a democratic government. Outside of the walls, the power of the king of France approached from the north, and the authority of the pope from the south. Worldly prelates, land-hungry religious houses, inquisitorial enthusiasts, crafty viscounts, powerful burgesses, multitudes of humble artizans, and even a host of crusaders sweep across the scene. The author has a complicated tale to tell which he has done soberly and clearly.

His solution of the problem forms the last chapter and derives easily from the sequence of earlier chapters. Narbonne probably had as much heresy as its neighbors in the thirteenth century. However, the archbishops did not surrender the inquisition to other inquisitors, and the viscount averted intervention and almost certain confiscation of his fief by accepting the crusade of 1212, while he pleased his own people by taking his crusading obligations lightly. Both archbishop and viscount found it expedient to notice only the more notorious cases of heresy. Thus the severe inquisition fostered by king and mendicant which injured Béziers and Carcassonne was postponed until Narbonne came under royal influence in the fourteenth century.

Religion as portrayed in this work is not very edifying. The generosity of the townsmen to the religious houses appears here and there. The appeals of the mendicants and of the Spiritual Franciscans to certain groups are mentioned. However, the sources deal primarily with the almost interminable disputes of the clergy, never a pretty picture. Out of the evidence perhaps a chapter on the toleration of the Narbonnese might have been written—the toleration of people who gave to the religious and protected the heretics, and of the leading citizens who, while not heretics themselves, tolerated these persons.

Altogether this is a very satisfactory book. It should be read by those who are interested in the medieval inquisition and can be read with profit by a much wider range of people. Its shortcomings are few and seem the result of inexperience. The strong points (including many very readable paragraphs) lead us to hope that the author will continue to study and write upon medieval society and its religion.

JOSIAH C. RUSSELL.

The King James Version of the English Bible. By DAVID DAICHES. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941. vii + 228. pp. $2.50.

While scholars are carrying on the great tradition of Bible translation, bringing to bear the ampler resources of knowledge now available, it is of timely interest to have a book which precisely describes the circumstances, labors, and sacrifices leading up to the most famous English Version. The scholars who are making translations into the language of our day are doing no other than did Jerome and Wyclif. Erasmus and Tyndale desired in their time that "the husbandman while ploughing, the weaver at his loom" should be able to understand for themselves the contents of the Bible.

Nevertheless, the King James Version is so distinguished for the dignity and the charm of its diction that a familiarity with it is indispensable. As the author of the book here reviewed points out, the translators "always insisted that their version should be pleasant to read, familiar yet impressive, simple yet dignified, and it is this combination of qualities . . . that makes the style of the Authorized Version what it is (p. 168).

In the account of this Version, Dr. Daiches gives the results of extended study and rich scholarship. Attention should be called to the scope of his discussion, and to his critical notes on one of the Old Testament books.

> My task has been, first, to write the history of English Bible translation from 1523 to 1611 as accurately and succinctly as was possible, and, second, while confining my textual investigations to the rendering of the Book of Isaiah, to throw some light on the sources, equipment and methods of the translators. I have throughout been more concerned with the Old Testament than with the New, discussing problems connected with the translation of the latter in considerably less detail (Prefatory note, p. v).

Dr. Daiches' book is packed with information, supported by documentary evidence. The textual notes on Isaiah will be of most interest to specialists, but the author has excellent ability for clear exposition which the general reader will find illuminating and easy to follow.

A subject which has a present relevance is the connection shown between the translation of the Bible and humanism. In distinction from the humanistic movement in Italy,

> it was in Northern Europe that the Renaissance became implicated in the Reformation, and the "New Learning" became an instrument in the hands of the reformers. . . . And this was because the northern scholars were at the same time more disinterested as scholars and more alive to the practical issues of their day. Their scholarship was not the handmaid of a neopaganism, and in this sense it was disinterested; nor was it isolated from contemporary life to dwell in a world of make-believe, as the work of the Italian humanists inclined to be (p. 76).

This difference is plainly illustrated in the writings of Erasmus.

> In the observations on the necessity for Bible translation scattered throughout his works we have the first clear indication that in this one respect humanism had led to the same point of view as the heretical movements which had sought the foundations of Christianity exclusively in the text of the Bible (p. 77).

Tracing further this unity of purpose, it is stated, "This combination of the humanist and the democratic (Wyclifite) traditions persisted in English Bible translation until it had produced the Authorized Version" (p. 140).

When religion and humanism are often superficially set over against each other, to resume and to continue this vital historic relationship would undoubtedly yield equally productive results.

R. C. K.

Ignatius His Conclave Or His Inthronisation in a Late Election in Hell. By JOHN DONNE. (Publication No. 53 of the Facsimile Text Society.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. xxiv + viii + 149 pp. $1.60.

All students of Renaissance literature and thought must welcome the reproduction of this rare first edition of Donne's *Ignatius*. In spite of its popularity in its own century, it was for some time available to most modern students only through the extracts given by Evelyn Simpson in her *Study of the Prose Works of Donne;* the only modern edition available has been that given by John Hayward in the Nonesuch Press edition of *Complete Poetry and Selected Prose of Donne* (Bloomsbury, 1929). Hayward's edition, however, did not include the important marginal notes and references which are essential for a complete understanding of the text.

Professor Charles Coffin, in his excellent introduction to the present edition, discusses both the complex bibliographical problems and the evidence for the date of composition. He also points out the reasons for the popularity and importance of this work, which reflects, on the one hand, the religious-political controversies of the early seventeenth century in both France and England, and, on the other, the "new philosophy," which to Donne, as to many others, called "all in doubt."

There is probably no work of the period which catches more accurately the conflicting strains of thought which puzzled and bewildered many a thinker of the seventeenth century. Before the bar of Hell are summoned, one by one, the great "heretics" of the day, heretics in philosophy, in science, in politics, in religion. Through the defenses of Paracelsus, Machiavelli, Copernicus, and Loyola we may determine the extent to which the early seventeenth century considered each one a heretic—and, still more subtly, the extent to which Donne himself affirms or denies the charges brought by his generation.

Even apart from its ideas and its reflections of contemporary opinion, Donne's work would continue to have an independent existence for its great literary value. The most brilliant of all his prose writings, it has all the freshness of his earlier poetic period, together with the audacity of youth; it is pregnant with both wit and wisdom. It shows the dramatic qualities which Donne shared with so many of the great Elizabethans, for the "heretics" cease to be mere names, and take on unforgettable personal-

ity as they plead their case before the Judge of Hell. In this, one of the great "dialogues of the dead" of all time, Donne more than holds his own with Fontenelle, and need not bow before even his great predecessor, Lucian.

MARJORIE NICOLSON

Olaus Svebilius intill ärkebiskopstiden: En biografisk studie. By FOLKE PETERSSON. Lund: Hakan Ohlssons Boktryckeri, 1940. xxiii + 377 pp.

The above volume is a doctoral dissertation written under the guidance of Professor Hilding Pleijel at the University of Lund. It is very readable, well written, and indicates an exhaustive study of a great deal of source material. The reviewer read it with interest. The volume contains much which would not greatly interest the average church historians. Religious conditions in Sweden during the latter part of the seventeenth century were not very different from those existing in other Protestant countries. The Reformation by no means wiped out much of the superstition so characteristic of the Middle Ages.

Dr. Petersson has succeeded in portraying Svebilius as a sympathetic, learned, though proud person. The material found by Dr. Petersson was so abundant that the author was compelled to end his study with the year 1681. The volume, therefore, does not deal with Svebilius as archbishop.

Svebilius was a product of his age. After having received his master's degree at the University of Upsala, he traveled abroad and studied at the universities of Strasbourg and Paris. Then he served as principal in a secondary school, and was later ordained, and entered upon a brilliant career in the Church. Of particular interest to American historians, and therefore especially mentioned, should be that part of the book which deals with Svebilius as Pastor Primarius of Stockholm and Bishop of Linköping.

Svebilius was deeply impressed by social rank and position, and this undoubtedly influenced him in the administration of church discipline. The master's thesis which he had written earlier indicated a spark of religious toleration on the part of Svebilius, but while pastor in Stockholm he had seemingly become influenced by a change in sentiment which may be called almost universal. He had become less tolerant, and if he did not succeed in prosecuting the dissenters who violated the Conventicle Act, it was no fault of his, but rather due to the unwillingness of the government to cooperate for international reasons. The spirit of religious tolerance which was, in part, influenced by the Thirty Years War lost its strength, and before the century had passed witch hunting was resumed on a larger scale. An epidemic of witch hunting began in Sweden, and Svebilius, without hesitancy, urged the extreme penalty of death for three women accused of witchcraft in Stockholm.

The study is not as critical as it might have been, and Dr. Petersson could have been more severe in condemning Svebilius' intolerance and his social prejudices so characteristic of the Swedish clergy. The author might

also have profited by making a more earnest effort at a comparative study, comparing the conditions in Sweden and Svebilius with other countries and other religious leaders, for undoubtedly Svebilius does represent his age and his counterpart undoubtedly can be found elsewhere.

O. Fritiof Ander

The Eighteenth Century Background. By Basil Willey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. viii + 302 pp. $3.25.

The aim of this book is expressed by the author as an attempt "to illustrate the importance, in that century, of the idea of 'Nature' in religion, ethics, philosophy and politics, and in particular to indicate some stages in that divinization of 'Nature' that culminates in Wordsworth." Nor is this aim merely arbitrary, or by the way, for the author informs us that in "Nature" we have the key-word to the eighteenth century, just as in "Truth" we have the key-word to the seventeenth century. Since the investigation of the latter concept had been made by the author in his previous book, *The Seventeenth Century Background*, we are asked to regard *The Eighteenth Century Background* as the continuation of the story—namely the background of the centuries—as it gives rise to key-concepts.

But in the actual development and presentation of his material, the author fails to live up to his ambitious aim. Nowhere does he seek the defense of this thesis that the essential meaning of the eighteenth century is to be grasped in the key word "Nature"—and on the other hand, with the exception of Chapter I, "The Turn of the Century," and Chapter IX, "Holbach's Systeme de la Nature," the book is entirely confined to England. Furthermore, the illustration of the "Idea of 'Nature' in religion, ethics, philosophy and politics" is actually carried out in the fields of exclusive literary selection to the neglect of non-literary or institutional materials. I mention this, not by way of criticism, but only to confine the reader's attention to the actual contents of the book and their treatment.

Reworded, the intent of the author seems to be twofold: firstly, the interpretation and expression of the concept "Nature," as reflected in some of the outstanding literary works in England of the eighteenth century, and secondly, the history of the materials that culminated in the maturer view of Wordsworth, who saw in the visible universe the clearest evidence of God.

Viewed in this light, *The Eighteenth Century Background* is a thoroughly readable and highly informative treatment of the very many ways in which "Nature" has been regarded by the prominent thinkers of the century. Considerable attention is given to the traditionally prominent, such as Shaftesbury, Butler, Mandeville, Hume, Hartley, Holbach, Priestley, Godwin and Wordsworth. Among the lesser figures discussed are Thomas Burnet, John Ray, William Derham, and Soame Jeyns.

Although, according to the author, "the whole book is addressed, partly

to the general reader who takes an unprofessional interest in the history of ideas, and partly to the literary student who may care to seek for explanations or analogies outside the sphere of 'pure' literature," *The Eighteenth Century Background* cannot fail to interest the student of philosophy, who will find here that the articulation of his concepts in non-philosophical media greatly enhances the value and vitality of his subject-matter—and will convince him, if he is not already convinced, that there can be no separateness of human interests, especially when the expression is significant in its aim, and consciously critical of what it has to offer.

WILLIAM J. NORTON, JR.

Hegel's Hellenic Ideal. By J. GLENN GRAY. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. 197 pp. $2.00.

This illuminating monograph offers a broad survey of Hegel's philosophy viewed within the perspective of Hegel's interpretation of Greek culture. That Hegel's early studies centered around the problem of the relation between the spirit of Greek religion and that of Christianity, and that this early interest exercized an enduring influence upon his subsequent thought, has been increasingly recognized since the publication of his *Jugendschriften* a generation ago. This monograph of Dr. Gray's admirably succeeds in showing the way in which Hegel's imagination was, in his early period, captured by the living folk-religion of the Greeks. There was, in this religion, no haunting sense of estrangement from either nature or the Gods, no dissonance of inner and outer. Here was the embodiment of freedom without subjectivity or caprice. It is the thesis of Dr. Gray that this essential and dominant humanism colored Hegel's whole philosophy and left its stamp upon all the major problems with which he subsequently dealt.

In his more mature thinking, however, Hegel saw both in Christianity and in modern culture something of positive significance to which the Hellenic ideal did not do adequate justice. Individualism and subjective freedom came to acquire a new meaning and importance. The central problem both of modern life itself and of Hegel's philosophy was thus generated. "Only by combining," writes the author, "the new truth brought by Christianity with the older humanism revealed in Greek culture could a better synthesis be revealed."

In his final chapter, "Minerva's Owl," the author has given an account of the two dominant concepts of Hegel's metaphysics, the twin ideas of dialectic and of *nous* or reason, in the light of Hegel's interpretation of Greek philosophy, itself viewed as the conceptual expression of the entire Hellenic ethos and culture. The author has succeeded admirably in laying bare, in non-technical fashion, the nerve of Hegel's theoretical philosophy, and in setting forth the bonds which link it with an understanding and appreciation of the Hellenic ideal. This monograph may be heartily com-

mended to anyone who wishes to gain a synoptic view of the living issues to which Hegel devoted himself, and which are also the basic issues forced upon our attention by the sweep of events within our modern culture.

GEORGE P. ADAMS

The French Laic Laws (1879–1889). By EVELYN M. ACOMB. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. 282 pp. $3.50.

French anticlericalism, as it has existed for the last 150 years, is a phenomenon which most Americans find it hard to understand. Religious conflicts have played a relatively small part in the political history of this country, whereas, in France under the Third Republic, the religious question was until recent years the dividing line between the parties of the left and the right.

From the fall of MacMahon's Government in 1879 to the final disestablishment in 1905, the radical elements, both in the French Chamber and in the country, waged incessant war on the Church. One phase of this struggle—and perhaps in the long run the most important one—was the effort of the radicals to obtain complete control of public education. They ended by triumphing, and the so-called Laic Laws were the instrument of their victory.

That much has been written on the subject of these laws can be judged by the copious bibliography which is appended to the latest work in the field, a book entitled *The French Laic Laws 1879–1889*, by Miss Evelyn M. Acomb. This study, although it was presented as a dissertation, is much more than the usual doctoral thesis; it is a scholarly but also a vital and interesting discussion of these Laws and of the political situation which created them. For the first time the subject is presented in its entirety with perfect impartiality. Miss Acomb's point of view, she tells us, is that of "a Protestant who believes that the civil and religious liberty of those of every faith should be preserved." Her objectivity, which is unquestionable, makes both her treatment of events and her conclusions doubly valuable.

What stands out from these pages is the fanaticism of many of the neo-Jacobins, men like Henri Brisson, Paul Bert and even Jules Ferry. In that generation antagonism towards the Church and all its doctrines was a living passion, and to make France, willy-nilly, a nation of free-thinkers, was for these men an object in itself.

The Laic Laws were the means whereby the Radicals, laying hold on public education, gradually weaned the new generation not only from the Church, but from religion itself. That these laws were in many respects illiberal, and even unjust, is a conclusion which the open-minded reader, whether Catholic or not, cannot escape after reading this careful work. The Jacobin tendency has always been to impose "liberty" on the nation

by force, and the Laic Laws, while they were promoted in the name of freedom, were in themselves a manifestation of intolerance.

It has long been said by Catholics and Conservatives in France that the Radical and Radical Socialist parties, which dominated the Third Republic for so many years, found the religious issue convenient, and used the attack on the Church as camouflage which enabled them to avoid more ticklish matters, such as social and economic legislation. There is a good deal in Miss Acomb's book to support this thesis—notably certain quotations from party leaders, and particularly from Gambetta. Yet it was in a later generation that this cynical use of the religious question was most evident.

The result of the Laic Laws was, in the long run, to dechristianize large portions of the French population. In the years before the war, an extraordinary number of teachers in the primary schools were avowed communists, belonging actively to the party. The loss of the religious tradition was undoubtedly weakening to the nation.

For all who are sincerely anxious to understand France, Miss Acomb's book is of first-rate importance. Much of it will be sad reading for liberals and Catholics, but it undoubtedly does shed light, indirectly at least, on the social policy of the Pétain Government, which is trying to undo a portion—the least creditable one—of the work of the Third Republic. We may disagree both with the aims and the methods of Vichy, but this story of past struggles makes its attitude in internal affairs at least more comprehensible.

CHARLOTTE T. MURET

Methodism and the Frontier: Indiana Proving Ground. By ELIZABETH K. NOTTINGHAM. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. vii + 231 pp. $2.50.

The distinctive features of the Christian Church of the late first century were very different from those of the fourth century. Equally striking were the changes wrought in Methodism in America during its first one hundred years on this continent. Miss Nottingham traces those changes, using the first half of the nineteenth century as to time, and Indiana as location. The form of treatment is much like a story; yet one receives the impression that here is an accurate historical account. But she does not stop with narrative; the rewarding element is that which relates how important changes came in the mind of Methodists and in their church, through living under the conditions of that pioneer period. All our denominations will be better understood and more greatly appreciated when their history has been written as this one is. Upon such a basis the Churches may work out a genuine Christian unity, and thereby be able to aid in creating a sense of world brotherhood as a foundation for international peace and good will. Those goals, of course, are far ahead, but such an account of how we came to be what we are will help to guide us into what we want to become.

ROBERT W. GOODLOE

The Search for God. By MARCHETTE CHUTE. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1941. 320 pp. $2.75.

Throughout this book the author shows a firm belief in intellectual inquiry and also a discriminating insight into spiritual values. As is indicated by the divisions of the book (p. 11), there is not only maintained "The Right to Search," but also "The Object of Search" is kept steadily in the foreground, with a tracing of "The Search" which successfully leads to "The Finding." Exception may be taken to a statement in the foreword that the theologian is "handicapped by the fact that he must read his Scriptures by the light of a pre-conceived theory," so that he is compelled to resort to forcible interpretation. There are certainly some theologians who are as sincerely committed to the right and the necessity of unbiased search as the author claims and commends. Nor is it true that the scholar "is handicapped by the fact that he must read the Bible by no light at all." Much of the light by which the author makes her interpretation is gained from careful and critical scholarship, as is evident on many pages.

While this book is somewhat marred by too sweeping, even dogmatic, statements, it is nevertheless a worthy and helpful contribution to an understanding of the Bible, contents of which supply the main subjects discussed.

It is not the purpose of this review to consider in detail the author's interpretation of biblical books or passages. In some instances one may question whether the results of biblical scholarship have been accurately used. To compare with this book, *The Literature of the Old Testament*, by Julius A. Bewer, and the corresponding book on the New Testament, by Ernest F. Scott, would enable the reader to make clarifying corrections. But Miss Chute has written with fine candor and appealing spiritual discernment, which give her book a distinct and welcome place.

R. C. K.

That They May Have Life: The Story of the American University of Beirut, 1866-1941. By STEPHEN B. L. PENROSE, JR. New York: Trustees of the American University of Beirut, 1941. xv + 347 pp. $3.75.

Among the many Christian colleges founded overseas by American missions, the University of Beirut deserves the high recognition that a wide constituency gives it. For few of these colleges is a comprehensive historical record available. In this volume, however, is to be found a detailed history of the origin, growth, problems, and administrative solutions of a college beginning under the old Ottoman Empire and continuing amid an explosive mixture of varied religions and races.

The book's main appeal obviously will be to those immediately interested in this University. But throughout this record the general reader cannot fail to catch a picture of an assuredly living and powerfully influential Christian institution, producing leaders in a dozen different walks of life for the whole Near East. The student of international affairs will be

interested in the diplomacy with which successive University leaders made adjustments with governments not always friendly; and religious educators will be interested in the principles, clearly formulated in the face of opposition and consistently followed, by which a Christian witness has been given through the years to a student constituency made up of Moslem, Maronite, Nestorian, Jacobite, Copt, Chaldaean, Gregorian, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Roman Catholic.

"Beirut" has come to stand for a broad liberal approach to those of other faiths. Hers has not been the negative aim of tearing students from their accustomed affiliations and ceremonies, but rather the positive aim of developing the spiritual nature of her students without a proselytizing spirit or emphasis on names and forms. The record shows that back of this center of life and service were many devoted lives, outstanding among them three great college presidents, Daniel Bliss (1866-1902), Howard Bliss (1902-1920), and Bayard Dodge (1922-).

DANIEL J. FLEMING

This Is the Victory. By LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941. 276 pp. $2.00.

This book was written in the midst of the *blitz* on London and it shows it on every page. Leslie Weatherhead is one of the most distinguished preachers in the English-speaking world today. This volume comes from a mind thoroughly trained in scholarly pursuits and from a heart sympathetic to the ethical issues of the day. There is not a note of bitterness or of revenge in the two hundred and seventy-six pages, but there are many notes of compassion, of insight and of faith. This book could not have been written before the war and perhaps could not have been written by any minister in time of peace. It has a certain unevenness, the unevenness of hard-pressed life, as it is, without artificial polishing. One can see the author in his study amid raids, amid calls for help. There is no attempt to dramatize himself, but to present the most dramatic fact in the world—the saving power of God in a day of ultimate testing. *This Is the Victory* is an honest effort of an honest man to set down his own faith and to present the Christian faith on its deepest levels, a faith which will some day bring victory to mankind.

Weatherhead has escaped the temptations of the busy minister to rush into the opportunities of action and thus to avoid the difficulties of thought. He sees, as readily as does Reinhold Niebuhr, where the personal and collective sins of our generation have led. He has no faith in progress as such, and no belief in the ability of man to lift himself by his own boot straps. He has immense faith in the value of life, in the reality of God, in His assistance to men who believe that this help should be accepted and God's will obeyed, rather than merely asking God's blessing on man-made plans.

This Is the Victory is the result of hard preaching in hard times by a hard-pressed minister in war-torn London. It is a powerful document of faith, torn almost out of the living flesh of a man who is doing a job under the most trying conditions.

GEORGE STEWART

The Christian Interpretation of Sex. By OTTO A. PIPER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941. 234 pp. $2.00.

This is an important book on a vital subject, by one of the greatest of contemporary theologians. Its author, exiled from Germany because of his forthright opposition to Nazi tyranny, now teaches at Princeton Theological Seminary. He brings to the theme a viewpoint which combines biblical theology with much psychological insight.

Dr. Piper's thesis is that the truth about sex cannot be arrived at by treating the sexual relation as a matter of physiology, psychology, sociology, education, or even of ethics. The problem is primarily a religious problem, and only as the relations of men and women are seen in the light of a divine purpose and God's redemptive love do the virtues of sex life, or sin and its forgiveness, take on meaning. Such a philosophy of sex must, according to the author, be based exclusively on the Bible and must regard the Bible as an organic unity setting forth a revelation which affords an ultimate standard of judgment. He indicates the sequence, both of his own thought and of the book's arrangement, when he says, "We shall first of all describe the Biblical understanding of sex, then we shall show what rules of conduct follow thereon, and finally we shall deal with the actual difficulties of sex life, and how on the basis of faith they may be overcome."

With both the initial premise that sex must be viewed religiously and with the greater part of the author's conclusions I agree. Much of the current misuse of sex (with rapid sentimentality or a hard-boiled lack of sentiment in attempts to correct these abuses) could be avoided, if the sex life were viewed with religious reverence and concern for the will of God. Awareness of our sin before God and of His forgiving love ought to make every Christian home a center of reconciliation and mutual forgiveness.

However, the assumption that there is a single definitive view of sex in the Bible, and that this is the one source of a Christian interpretation of sex, must be radically challenged. It leads the author to draw heavily from the first three chapters of Genesis and the words of Paul. The result is a divinely established hierarchy in the relations of husband and wife. Though no claim is made that marriage is absolutely essential to a full human life, so little attention is given to women who are not wives that one is left wondering about the place of Mary and Martha in the scheme of things! A more inclusive citation from the acts and words of Jesus might have caused less attention to be given to differentiations of function in the sexes and more to the equality of all persons before God.

I doubt whether the book can rightly be called *the* Christian interpretation of sex. Nevertheless, it is *a* Christian interpretation, and a valuable corrective to much that is sub-Christian.

GEORGIA HARKNESS

Anthropology and the Future of Missions. By JOHN M. GRAHAM and RALPH PIDDINGTON. Aberdeen: The University Press, 1940. 27 pp. 1*s*.

This brief pamphlet announces the establishment of a Bureau of Missions and Colonial Planning at Aberdeen, under the direction of Sir John Orr, Professor Lancelot Hogben, and the authors, Professor John M. Graham and Dr. Ralph Piddington. The Bureau will welcome communications addressed to one of the authors at the Anthropological Museum, Marischal College, Aberdeen, Scotland.

Judging from the preliminary statement of aims contained in this pamphlet, the enterprise represents an advanced point of liberal British thought on the complex problems of missions and colonial policies just on the eve of the war. The authors believe in the great usefulness of Christian missions, if missionaries and scientists can work along broad lines of co-operation conducive to native welfare. Neither the missionary's reliance on preaching, example, and "spiritual first-aid," nor the anthropologist's interest in preserving native institutions, are adequate means of achieving large-scale improvement. Instead of attempting to infuse a Christian way of life into unfavorable situations, the real task is to create from native and European elements institutions conducive to a "supra-racial humanism shared as an ideal by both Christianity and science." The authors are quite aware of the difficulties arising from economic imperialism and its conflicts. They have illustrated their points by well-chosen material from African experience.

H. L. F.

Temples and Towers. By GEORGE VAUGHAN. Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1941. Pp. 626. $2.50.

Being troubled by the "spiritual outlook" in the world today, and puzzled as to whether one should be optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects, a University of Arkansas law professor decided to conduct a unique experiment in this age of popular polls and to get answers by a widespread survey of the field. This volume is the result. Now the canvassing involved—covering, as it did, outstanding figures in religion, education, literature, art, etc.—undoubtedly was costly in time and effort, if nothing more to Dr. Vaughan, and it should have yielded a fruit justifying his trouble. It did not; it was not worth the trouble.

For "spiritual" is itself a troublesome word, and what is meant by "spiritual awakening" does not simplify matters. But there the troublesome words stand, unclarified, in his initial inquiry, and the globe-encircling poll has done nothing to clarify them. If a revival of spirituality means for

you a revitalizing of religious tradition, and a return to it, you will find varied and respectable company here. If it means, on the contrary, a complete break with that tradition, you will find in this volume company equally as varied and respectable. It is all very confusing, and gives no light to a benighted world.

One need not, therefore, completely endorse *The New Yorker's* editorial response to the inquiry in order to appreciate it:

> Sometimes we think the moral renascence is just around the corner; at other times we are sure morality will be as dead as duck by Christmas; and both these prospects seem to us equally dismal. This is our general and *total* reaction to the spiritual outlook, and we can see that it won't amount to much to a worried man in Arkansas. We're sorry that the matter ever came up.

JEROME NATHANSON

The Old Catholic Church. By VICTOR JAMES HORTON. Woodstock, New York: Saint Dunstan's Church, 1941. 36 pp. $1.00.

A brief history of the Old Catholic Church, tracing its origins back to the earliest protests in the Church against the constantly increasing claims to authority by the Roman see, down to the declaration of the doctrine of papal infallibility at the Vatican Council of 1870, which resulted in the separation of the Old Catholic group from the parent Church.

The Return to Religion. By HENRY C. LINK. (New Edition). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941. 181 pp. $1.00.

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